Policy Recommendations for Economically and Socially Valuable Asteroid Mineral Resource Exploitation Activities by Hennig, Anthony
Rochester Institute of Technology
RIT Scholar Works
Theses Thesis/Dissertation Collections
5-2016
Policy Recommendations for Economically and
Socially Valuable Asteroid Mineral Resource
Exploitation Activities
Anthony Hennig
aih2400@rit.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Thesis/Dissertation Collections at RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hennig, Anthony, "Policy Recommendations for Economically and Socially Valuable Asteroid Mineral Resource Exploitation
Activities" (2016). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
 Policy Recommendations for Economically and Socially Valuable 
Asteroid Mineral Resource Exploitation Activities 
 
By Anthony Hennig 
Masters of Science 
Science, Technology and Public Policy  
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Graduation Requirements for the  
 
College of Liberal Arts/Public Policy Program at 
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Rochester, New York 
 
May 2016 
 
 
Submitted by: 
 
Anthony Hennig 
Department of Public Policy    Signature   Date 
Department of Mechanical Engineering 
 
 
Accepted by: 
 
Dr. Eric Hittinger/Assistant Professor 
Department of Public Policy    Signature   Date 
 
 
Dr. Thomas Cornell/Professor 
Department of Science, Technology, and Society Signature   Date  
 
 
Dr. Kean Wu/Assistant Professor 
Department of Accounting    Signature   Date  
 
  
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 2 of 178 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................................ 7 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 8 
2 Space Resource Exploitation Basics and Risks ................................................................................................ 12 
2.1 The Changing Status Quo of Space Mineral Resources ....................................................................... 12 
2.1.1 Growing Body of Knowledge on Asteroid Composition and Location ............................... 13 
2.1.2 Mineral Resource Scarcity and Demand is Increasing Economic Pressure...................... 17 
2.1.3 Decreasing Technology Costs for Spaceflight ............................................................................... 23 
2.1.4 The Potential for a Space Resource Industry ................................................................................ 25 
2.2 Policies in Place for Space utilization ......................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.1 The Outer Space Treaty .......................................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.2 National Space Policy of the United States ..................................................................................... 35 
2.2.3 The SPACE Act 39 
2.3 The Exposed Policy Gaps................................................................................................................................. 42 
2.3.1 Technology Development ..................................................................................................................... 45 
2.3.2 Surveying Duties 46 
2.3.3 Ownership 47 
2.3.4 Infrastructure Development ................................................................................................................ 48 
3 Methodology of This Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 49 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 3 of 178 
 
3.1 Historical Analogs .............................................................................................................................................. 49 
3.2 Mineral Mining .................................................................................................................................................... 51 
3.2.1 Spanish Silver Exploitation ................................................................................................................... 51 
3.2.2 American Gold Rush 55 
3.2.3 Australian Gold Rush ............................................................................................................................... 59 
3.2.4 Modern Mining 61 
3.2.5 The Use of Antarctica .............................................................................................................................. 64 
3.2.6 Deep Sea Bed Exploitation .................................................................................................................... 68 
3.2.7 Diamond Mining 73 
3.3 Fructus Stocks...................................................................................................................................................... 76 
3.3.1 French and British Renewable Resource Exploitation ............................................................. 77 
3.3.2 Fishing and Exclusive Economic Zones ........................................................................................... 79 
3.4 Digital and Telecommunications Resources ........................................................................................... 83 
3.4.1 Radio Spectrum 84 
3.4.2 Geostationary Orbit Allocation ........................................................................................................... 86 
3.4.3 Internet Allocation 87 
4 Policy Issue: Technology Development Policy................................................................................................. 91 
4.1 Technology Development Types .................................................................................................................. 91 
4.1.1 Basic Research Needs ............................................................................................................................. 92 
4.1.2 Applied Research Needs ........................................................................................................................ 93 
4.2 Dimensions of Research Agents ................................................................................................................... 94 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 4 of 178 
 
4.2.1 Public Research Policy Support .......................................................................................................... 94 
4.2.2 Private Research Programs .................................................................................................................. 96 
4.3 Policy Mechanisms ............................................................................................................................................ 97 
4.4 Hybrid Research Policy for Space Mineral Resource Activities ...................................................... 99 
4.4.1 Public Procurement Might Be Forbidden .................................................................................... 100 
4.4.2 Public Prizes and Contests to Develop Shared Technology Interests .............................. 101 
4.4.3 Intellectual Property (IP) as a Resource ...................................................................................... 104 
4.4.4 Tax Subsidies and Incentives are Not Appropriate Now ...................................................... 105 
4.5 Conclusions and Future Evolutionary Pathways ............................................................................... 106 
5 Policy Issue: Surveying ........................................................................................................................................... 107 
5.1 Surveying as Part of the Claim Process, and Changes From Tradition ..................................... 108 
5.2 Identifying Asteroids for the Public Good ............................................................................................. 114 
5.3 Characterizing Asteroids for Private Benefit ....................................................................................... 116 
5.4 Conclusions and Future Evolutionary Pathways ............................................................................... 119 
6 Policy Issue: Ownership ......................................................................................................................................... 121 
6.1 The Failures of the Common Heritage of Mankind ........................................................................... 122 
6.2 Res Communis Policies Are Also Insufficient ...................................................................................... 128 
6.3 Total Ownership Policies Propose a Frightening Future ................................................................ 132 
6.4 Coordinating Asteroid Use Through Licenses ..................................................................................... 134 
6.4.1 History of Success 135 
6.4.2 Preventing Exclusivity ......................................................................................................................... 139 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 5 of 178 
 
6.4.3 Protection from Interference ............................................................................................................ 141 
6.5 Conclusions and Future Evolutionary Pathways ............................................................................... 143 
7 Policy Issue: Infrastructure Development ...................................................................................................... 149 
7.1 The Purpose of Space Mining Infrastructure ....................................................................................... 149 
7.2 Calls for Government Transportation Infrastructure are Unsubstantiated............................ 153 
7.3 Market Creation and Subsidies Pose Dangerous OST Risks .......................................................... 155 
7.4 Conclusions and Future Evolutionary Pathways ............................................................................... 157 
8 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................................................. 158 
9 Works Cited ................................................................................................................................................................. 161 
 
  
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 6 of 178 
 
 ABSTRACT 
Asteroids are quickly moving from a speculative resource to potentially economically 
valuable deposits of a variety of mineral resources. There is a potential for a large scale disruptive 
innovation within the fundamental resource base, and at the same time policy does little to ensure 
that asteroid resource exploitation is socially and economically valuable. Existing international 
policies were put into place to prevent militarization of space and related basic risks, and the first 
national policies focusing on basic ownership rights are only now being put into place. 
  We identify five major technology, policy, and social issues that must be addressed: 
surveying duties, technology development, mining and ownership right, and profitability or market 
demand. We use analysis of existing proposals and relevant historical cases from other resource 
rushes to evaluate regulatory concepts and determine who (international, national, or private 
agents) should exercise these policies. The goal is to use history and anticipatory governance to 
ensure the social and economic value of space resource extraction activities. 
 Developing technologies to support the exploitation of space mineral resources would be 
best supported through intellectual property right support as well as public/private contests in 
light of the overlap of interests between public and private space systems developers. Surveying 
programs should share location data as a public service, but be allowed to maintain the 
characterization data as intellectual property to help substantiate a licensed claim or to be bought 
and sold. Ownership policies should mimic the actual licensing mechanisms seen with orbital 
allocation to mineral resources, and a claim system should encourage further risk mitigation, 
exploitation, and surveying done by private agents to strengthen and sustain a claim. Finally, 
infrastructure development for market creation and transportation of mineral resources from 
space to surface is fundamentally an applied research issue, and should be handled by private 
agents because the public and private benefits of these projects has yet to be determined.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The field of space policy is a relatively new field, and in November 2015, it fundamentally 
changed with the passing of the SPACE Act. The SPACE (Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship) Act was the first major space policy passed that allowed 
United States of America citizens as private asteroid miners to actually possess and own space 
resources, a sudden reversal from the previous fifty years of  the Common Heritage of Mankind 
precedent. The current state of knowledge, technology development, and economic pressures 
indicate that space mineral resource mining might be a possibility in the near future, and 
consequently, policy needs to be written such that the future development of this industry 
maximizes its social and economic benefit.  
The policies on mining and resource exploitation have been developed over thousands of 
years, with many of the policies being traced back to early Roman laws. However, space policy is 
only fifty years old, and there has been very little policy written on the explicit ownership of space 
resources, and very few parallels that could be drawn until now. To support the development of 
space mineral mining programs, there are a few fundamental policy questions that should be asked 
and answered to ensure the economically and socially valuable development of this brand new 
industry and the industrial and technological developments associated with it: 
 What are policies that could be implemented to allow and support the exploration and 
potential development of these new industries if they do prove to have some value? 
 What elements of proposed policies or those in place could be used to support future goals? 
 What can be learned from previous resource management policies that could support future 
asteroid resource exploitation? 
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There are interested politicians, a populace interested in space, and several agenda makers and 
policy proposals that are filling the policy gap; now is the time to develop new policies. There are no 
entrenched interests yet and few incumbent powers save for national governments who have had a 
fifty year history of public basic research programs, but not much applied work on asteroid mining 
and international treaties that limit their participation in space mineral resource programs. Policy 
written now, before serious investments are made in the engineering and technology, will have a 
substantial effect of the future development of the systems and business plans. 
In light of a lack of direct space policy heritage, parallels can be made throughout history to 
better understand the development of this field and how policy might play a role. For any major 
economic mining activity or resource exploitation policy and strategy, policies have been put into 
place to help support the surveying of the resources, the technology development to exploit those 
resources, the infrastructure to further develop and decrease the costs, and most importantly the 
ownership policies to ensure that miners can spend money on investing into the land and 
recovering those resources. Because space mineral resource mining is on the technological horizon 
and there is a great deal of industrial, economic, public, and political interest, policy written now 
can address these needs. By looking at the utilization of minerals in case studies such as gold rushes 
or deep seabed minerals, biologically reproducing or fructus stocks, and telecommunications 
resources including geostationary orbit or radio spectrum allocation, analogies can be drawn about 
the development of these resources that ensures equitable use, an impetus to exploit, and 
appropriate policies to reduce the risk of development.  
 From reviewing this history, four major policy recommendations can be made to support 
the development of an economically and socially valuable space mineral mining policy regime and 
the reasoning behind these will be expanded in the following chapters.  
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 Technology policy should be written to support the use-specific research relevant for 
taking the basic research already done by national space programs and focusing it on 
resource exploitation business plans (rather than the applied research necessary for 
space mineral resource mining), and focus on prizes and contests and intellectual 
property protections to reflect the current state of technology 
 Surveying should be mandatory, with the option of the identification of asteroids being 
a shared responsibility between public sky-watch and private mining agents. These 
private agents can participate in publically subsidized sky watch programs, while 
private agents can keep the intellectual property of characterization for themselves 
 Ownership policy should reflect a traditional heritage of licensing structures here on 
Earth and even in space to some extent with geostationary orbit allocation, rather than 
the res communis (first actor appropriation) or complete ownership policies promoted 
by asteroid miners and the SPACE Act as licensing prevents exclusivity while still 
maintaining basic protections. Additionally, the Common Heritage of Mankind principle 
previously used has failed when economic and social pressures have been applied in 
Antarctica and the Deep Seabed, and it could be expected the same will happen now that 
similar pressures are being applied to space. 
 Infrastructure development for transportation and market creation is more of an 
applied research need, and consequently in light of the unknown public and private 
benefits of this field, should be put off into the future until these benefits are identified. 
The subsidies and tax incentives recommended by many space mining advocates are 
more appropriate for later technology development stages and more developed 
industries. 
The analysis is structured starting with the background in chapter two, which reviews the 
changing status quo that has created this field with advances in the changing resource knowledge, 
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decreasing technology stocks, and a steady increase of the knowledge of mineral wealth of these 
bodies. Over time, the policies in place have allowed space mineral resource mining to come into 
being but in the process has left substantial policy gaps that have yet to be addressed in a few major 
fields. 
 Chapter three reviews relevant historical analogs, focusing primarily on resource rush 
scenarios, a parallel that is often drawn to asteroid mineral resource mining right now, and 
identifies salient characteristics, context, and history throughout that example. Each example is 
drawn to provide some evidence on the potential implications of various policy regimes and 
provided to give some context when the historical analog is used again in the following chapters.  
 Chapters four, five, six, and seven analyze four major issues found through the policy gaps 
as well as policy proposals, technology development, surveying responsibilities, ownership policies, 
and infrastructure development policy. Each one of them uses a base of historical examples to 
analyze previous policies driving resource rushes and compare them as well as identify the context 
that made that policy succeed or fail in its intent. Historical outcomes, their context, and their initial 
intent are compared to determine the best potential policy mechanisms based on criteria for that 
specific issue developed from academia and relevant historical criteria. 
 Chapter eight is an overview of the previous findings and the presentation of the policy as a 
single regime. Ultimately, this analysis only provides a recommendation for future pathways based 
on previous historical examples, but the general regime described could be sufficient to develop the 
field more in the near future and provide base protections for a variety of issues.  
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2 SPACE RESOURCE EXPLOITATION BASICS AND RISKS 
The space mineral resource mining industry is beginning to form after a decade of work by a 
few private mining firms developing the first technologies, performing the initial assays, and even 
helping make the basic policies necessary for a successful mining architecture.1 The asteroid 
miner’s appearance was not accidental; it was the product of increasing scarcity of mineral 
resource deposits on Earth with associated price volatility, and an increasing knowledge of the 
resource deposits within asteroids identified by sky watch programs. At the same time, the costs to 
operate in space have been steadily decreasing, as a byproduct of basic research programs and 
relaxed policy gaps on the private use of space resources. These policies have also allowed private 
space mineral resource mining programs to come into being, but in the process leave several policy 
gaps open in the regimes of responsible technology development, surveying for the public and 
private good of potential ore bodies, ownership of privately gathered space mineral resources, and 
the responsibility for transportation and market infrastructure. Policies have been proposed and 
some issues have been addressed, but there are many disagreements. Some have made it into law, 
such as the SPACE Act which conferred an ownership right of space minerals to United States of 
America citizens, but there are still more policy issues to address. 
2.1 THE CHANGING STATUS QUO OF SPACE MINERAL RESOURCES 
Today, the mines of Earth operate on economic resource deposits, where a profit will be 
gained from the exploitation of a chosen resource deposit.2 These profitable mining locations are 
defined by:3 
                                                             
1 Architecture being defined as the system of components, vehicles, processes, and business applications to 
complete a given task (Werz, Everett, & Puschell, 2011) 
2 (Martin L. , 2004) 
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1. Technology capability 
2. Future demand of resource 
3. Current price of resource 
4. Cost for the exploitation of the resource 
5. Availability of substitute and recycled materials 
Space mineral mining programs are benefiting from several factors changing the economic, 
business, and technological landscape.4 The availability of these space-based resources are 
becoming more well-known through a variety of sky watch programs that have identified that 
asteroids contain Platinum Group Metals (PGM’s) and Rare-Earth Metals (REM’s) in often higher 
abundance than the economic resource deposits on Earth. Exacerbating this economic resource 
base shift to asteroid mining is a reducing number of usable resource deposits on Earth which is 
also increasing the economic and environmental costs of mining traditional resource deposits.5 In 
contrast to increasing terrestrial prices, reducing technology costs for spaceflight coupled with the 
growing prices and growing demand is making space mineral exploitation more and more realistic 
and profitable. Ultimately, all of these factors are creating an environment conducive to further 
development of a space mineral resource mining program. 
2.1.1 Growing Body of Knowledge on Asteroid Composition and Location 
Four and a half billion years ago, when our solar system was beginning to form, everything 
that would eventually become the planets, asteroids, and sun started out as a homogeneous nebula 
of simple molecules, gas, and dust.6 As the constituent components collapsed into an accretion disk 
through gravity and the conservation of the original nebula’s angular momentum, the individual 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 27-29 
4 (Soucek & Brunner, Outer Space in Society, Politics, and Law, 2011) p14-15 
5 (Glaister & Mudd, 2010) 
6 (Montmerle, Augerau, Chaussidon, Gounelle, Marty, & Morbidelli, 2006) p 66-69 
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particles were attracted to each other and eventually grew into planetismials.7 Several of these 
planetismials continued to grow through accretion, eventually getting to a critical mass that 
maintained molten cores which started tectonic movement of the minerals and molecules that 
made up the planet.8 Differentiation began to occur, with heavier minerals and elements settling 
near the core, and lighter elements resting on top of this molten surface, forming the crust.9 Many of 
these protoplanets would be destroyed through impacts, creating more asteroids of varying 
composition, but four of them would become the terrestrial planets of the inner solar system 
(disregarding 1 Ceres, a dwarf planet just outside of Mars with a diameter of nearly 1,000 
kilometers).10 These terrestrial planets are similar in geological composition.11 They have light, 
non-metallic crusts of silicon, carbon, and gases, and heavy and dense cores of platinum group 
metals (PGM’s), rare-earth metals (REM’s), radioactive minerals, nickel, and iron.12 Some 
planetismials never grew large enough to collide and reform, establishing the population of 
asteroids seen, observed, studied, and target for exploitation today.13 
In the early 1980’s, there were only a few hundred discovered asteroids and little data on 
their composition.14 Thanks to two decades of sky-watch programs to identify potential NEA 
threats, much has been learned about asteroid location, composition, geology, and potential value. 
HR4489, as part of the 103rd United States of America Congress in 1994, was the first major policy 
among industrialized nations that created a public service, Spaceguard, to identify 90% of all Near 
Earth Asteroid (NEA) impactor threats, within a decade’s time.15 In 1998 these policies were 
                                                             
7 (Meyer, Hillenbrand, Backman, & Beckwith, 2006) p 118 
8 (Rubie, Nimmo, & Melosh, 2007) p 54-60 
9 (Park, Hu, Gao, Campbell, & Gong, 2012) p 63-64  
10 (Reimold, Koeberf, Gibson, & Dressler, 2004) 
11 (Pop, Appropriation in outer space: the relationship between land ownership and soverignty on the 
celestial bodies, 2000) 
12 (Blair & Gertsch, Asteroid Mining Methods, 2010) 
13 (NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center, 2016) 
14 (PAN STARRS Science Consortium) 
15 (Martin P. , NASA's Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards, 2014) p 2 
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enhanced with more funding to find more asteroids as public interest in the field grew and it was 
soon discovered that there were no estimates for the upper limit of the number of asteroids.16 
These sky-watch programs have continued to develop detector technology in terms of imaging 
sensors, spectrometers which generate information about composition from light, and automation 
to search parts of the sky without direct human control.17 For the public scientific benefit, 
spectroscopy data collected provided insight into the differentiated and non-differentiated 
composition of asteroids to aid planetary geology and geochemistry.18 Over the past two decades of 
detector and automation improvement, the detection rate is still increasing, and the number of 
economically valuable NEA asteroids continues to grow, surpassing 16,000 out of the total 
discovered population of 750,000 asteroids in our solar system (Figure 1).19 From this surveying 
data, publically released under Articles X and XI of the Outer Space Treaty,20 it was found that 
asteroids only experienced light differentiation into various types, and some had higher valuable 
mineral concentrations than economic mines on Earth.21  
 
                                                             
16 (Evans, Shell, & Stokes, 2003)p 199-202 
17 (NASA Near Earth Object Program, 2013) 
18 (Safi, 2014) 
19 (Bidstrup, Michelsen, Anersen, & Haack, 2004) 
20 (United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2016) 
21 (Gupta & Dasgupta, 2009) p 2-5 
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Figure 1: NEO Program Discovery Rates22  
M-type asteroids (metallic) are often the target of space mineral resource miners and 
exploiters, as they have some of the most valuable mineral compositions.23 These asteroids 
comprise approximately 5% of the asteroid population and often contain 80% or more of nickel-
iron mixture,24 where the remainder is comprised of REMs like gallium (11 to 55 ppm), germanium 
(25-190 ppm), and iridium (0.3 to 2ppm).25 Platinum concentration might be upwards of 50 ppm in 
M-type asteroids (at least 10% of the M-type composition), in comparison to densities of 20 to 30 
ppm found in the economic mines for platinum on Earth.26 These valuable metallic elements could 
be used for in space manufacture and assembly or even for their high mineral value here on Earth.27 
The other major types of asteroids, C-type (carbonaceous) 28 and S-type (stony),29  which 
constitutes 80% and 10% of the number of asteroids respectively, have large amounts of water 
                                                             
22 (JPL Near Earth Object Program, 2016) 
23 (Lewis, Mining the Sky, 1997) P172-174 
24 (Gerlach, 2005) 
25 (Lewis, Asteroid Mining 101, 2014) p 180 
26 (Yarnoz, Sanchez, & McInnes, 2013) 
27 (Farrell, 2013) 
28 (Lewis, Asteroid Mining 101, 2014) p 140-142 
29 (Mazanek, Merrill, Brophy, & Mueller, 2014) 
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locked within the carbon-based compounds and hydrolyzed stony minerals in their surfaces as 
identified by the few sample return missions done to these asteroids.30 They tend to have high 
mineral and volatile compositions, but low metallic composition from 1% to 20% by weight.31 They 
might not be very profitable now, but are thought to be necessary for further infrastructure 
development and the potential settlement of space.32 The volatile and organic compounds could be 
used for plastics or manufacturing needs and the stony minerals could be used for fabrication 
(along with the metals found in M-types) or for the water locked up in their minerals.33 Water by 
itself could be used for a variety of purposes, from fuel cells to generate electricity, to propulsion by 
recombining the hydrogen and oxygen.34 Even without sophisticated chemical reactions, pure 
water could be used as a propellant for thermal or steam rocketry, or to support crewed 
exploration as drinking water, atmosphere, or radiation protection. 35 
2.1.2 Mineral Resource Scarcity and Demand is Increasing Economic Pressure 
The differentiation process of the large terrestrial planets fundamentally altered the 
structure of the planet, taking the original homogeneous mass and spreading the mineral resources 
throughout the crust and core, making the crust lighter, and the core heavier.36 The crust is 
primarily composed of lighter elements and gases, with iron and nickel forming the primary 
components of the Earth’s core along with PGM’s, REM’s and radioactive minerals.37  In order to 
economically mine PGM’s and REM’s on Earth, there are very few sites where these materials exist 
in high enough densities on the crust to make mining profitable, such as in the Sudbury Basin in 
                                                             
30 (NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center, 2016) 
31 (Crawford, Gump, Lewicki, & Seager, 2013) 
32 (Sonter M. , 2006) 
33 (Lewis, Asteroid Mining 101, 2014) p 165 
34 (Werz, Everett, & Puschell, 2011) 
35 (Adams, 2012) 
36 (Blair & Gertsch, Asteroid Mining Methods, 2010) 
37 (Campbell, Handley, Wise, & King, 2009) 
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Canada (PGM and REM),38 Gobi Desert in China (PGM and REM),39 and highest in the Merensky Reef 
and Bushveld Mining Complex (20-30 ppm PGM concentration) in South Africa.40 When looking at 
terrestrial PGM and REM resource stocks, there is a technology capability to mine these resources, a 
future demand for the resource, and a capability to use recycled materials to some extent, 41 but all 
of them have upper limits to their efficacy and capacity.42  
PGM’s are very difficult to mine, requiring high temperatures and toxic reagents like 
mercury to remove them from ore.43 Because of this, PGM mining costs are very high, typically 
above $20,000 to $30,000 USD/kilogram, which is only exacerbated with how few sites are actually 
economically exploitable.44 Other factors, such as environmental regulations, labor shortages, and 
national conflicts continue to increase these prices and increase their volatility.45 Prices have 
ranged from $15,000 USD per kilogram in the early 2000’s to over $70,000 per kilogram in 2008 
(Figure 2).46This has made these mineral deposits highly conditional in nature, with mines turning 
on and off as the costs to exploit that alternate between making a profit or not based on demand 
and the stockpiled supply.47 The low prices since 2010 can be mostly attributed to large stockpiling 
of PGM’s from the last major resource boom in 2008.48 
                                                             
38 (Reimold, Koeberf, Gibson, & Dressler, 2004) 
39 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
40 (Johnson Matthey Precious Metals Management) 
41 (Msimang & Makhuvela, 2014) 
42 (Campbell, Handley, Wise, & King, 2009) 
43 (Gertsch & Gertsch, 2005) 
44 (Martin L. , 2004) 
45 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
46 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
47 (Walker, Breaking the Rare-Earth Monopoly, 2010) p 47-49 
48 (Massari & Ruberti, 2013) 
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Figure 2: Global Platinum Prices49 
With REM and radioactive mineral resources, there are growing environmental costs 
associated with the economic mining of these resources.50 Originally, REM were refined from 
economic concentrates in the sands of South Africa, but due to the exhaustion of these resources, 
production shifted heavily to ore deposits in North America and China in the 1950’s.51 In these ore 
deposits, rare-earth metals are collocated with radioactive and heavy metal resources, which have 
severe environmental and health consequences when exploited, which increases costs and has 
caused some nations to reduce mining capacity.52 Early compositional data via spectrometry 
indicates that REM’s are found in similar or higher densities than Earth’s economic sites and would 
have negligible impact on the space environment if they were refined in situ.53 
The same is also true with PGM metal mining. Throughout the early 21st Century, South 
Africa was the key producer of PGM’s in the world, at nearly 80% of world production. Mining 
                                                             
49 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
50 (Campbell, Handley, Wise, & King, 2009) 
51 (Walker, Breaking the Rare-Earth Monopoly, 2010) p 47-49 
52 (Walker, Breaking the Rare-Earth Monopoly, 2010) p 46 
53 (Lewis, Asteroid Mining 101, 2014) 
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platinum is very difficult, as concentration within rock is usually only at a few grams per metric ton 
mining (with PGM mining now operating at 99.99% waste due to its low concentration),54 and to 
mine these resources, a great deal of energy is used to mine and refine(Table 1), some water is 
used, and in the process, and large amounts of CO2 are produced55 (a 21 mpg or 8.92 kilometer per 
liter car driving 1,000 miles/1609 kilometers a month will generate approximately 6 metric tons of 
CO2 a year).56  Combined with this is that many mining agencies in the western world also have to 
dedicate a great deal of time and energy in ensuring that the mining of mineral resources is 
environmentally safe, with those inspections and controls being put in place increasing the cost 
even more, sometimes upwards of 10-20% as part of contingency costs, but can increase 
substantially in reaction to cleanups for acid leeching.57 Mining in space removes the energy 
production issues by working with material in dust form rather than ore form and removes the 
potential for contamination in the sterile space environment.58 
 Mining  Milling Energy Energy Water Water CO2 
Emissions 
 MJ/t 
rock 
MJ/t 
ore 
GJ/kg 
PGM 
MJ/t 
Ore 
m3/kg 
PGM 
m3/t 
ore 
t CO2/kg 
PGM 
Minimum 21 130 28.5 107 192 0.509 2.3 
Average 365 204 141 519 511 2 33 
Maximum 1268 487 241 1755 1612 12.6 78.3 
Standard 
Deviation 
361 110 59 389 399 3 18 
Number 
of 
Surveyed 
Sites 
8 8 13 13 13 13 10 
 
 Table 1: Energy Requirements of Platinum Mining59 
                                                             
54 (Glaister & Mudd, 2010)p 448 
55 (Chen, Lundqvist, & Platell, 2005) 
56 (Glaister & Mudd, 2010) p 444 
57 (Rudenno, 2012) p 26-27 
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59 (Glaister & Mudd, 2010)p 448 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 21 of 178 
 
For PGM, REM, and many other valuable mineral resource stocks, there is also a growing 
potential for exhaustion of these resources.60  In some cases, expecting extreme resource growth at 
10% per year, a variety of PGM and REM resources could be completely economically depleted by 
2175.61 Recycling of PGM’s is getting better, as evidenced by the recycling of 155 tons of a globally 
used 200 tons in 2014, but these processes is unable to keep up with growing demand (Table 2).62 
 Platinum Production 
(kilograms) 
Palladium Production 
(kilograms) 
PGM 
Reserves 
 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 Current 
United 
States 
3,720 3,660 3,700 12,600 12,400 12,500 900,000 
Canada 7,000 8,500 9,000 16,500 20,000 24,000 310,000 
Russia 25,500 23,000 230,000 80,000 83,000 80,000 1,100,000 
South 
Africa 
131,000 94,000 125,000 75,000 58,400 73,000 6,3000,000 
Zimbabwe 12,400 12,500 12,500 96,000 10,100 1,000 63 
Other 
Countries 
3,870 4,800 4,800 8,900 9,000 8,000 800,000 
Total 183,000 147,000 178,000 20,3000 193,000 208,000 800,000 
Table 2: Platinum Production, Supply 2013-201564 
A 10 meter asteroid, smaller than any other visited already, could contain 625 metric tons 
of nickel iron and 50 kilograms of platinum.65 21 Letutia, an M-type visited by Rosetta on the way to 
a comet, has a mass of 1.7x1015 metric tons, with a high density indicating 40% or more of metal. If 
one were to assume that this asteroid had a nickel-iron weight density of 40%, 21 Letutia would 
contain more than 420,000 times the world use of nickel-iron steel in 2013.66 16 Psyche, which is 
over ten times the mass of 21 Letutia, is thought to be the failed core of another protoplanet and 
comprised of nearly pure nickel-iron.67 Using stochastic methods, it is currently assumed that there 
                                                             
60 (Cohen, 2007) 
61 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 28 
62 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
63 Included in Other Countries 
64 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
65 (Endsor, 2014) 
66 (World Steel Association, 2014) 
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are at least ten (with three or more being discovered every year) potential ore bodies greater than 
one kilometer in diameter that would require less energy to reach than the moon with at least $1 
billion USD in PGM’s alone (disregarding the other metals, water, and volatiles).68  
Besides the highly valuable metal supplies, water, one of the most common resources 
available, could potentially be valuable in space if delivered from a space-based source to the 
people who need it. Normally, to operate the International Space Station and keep its crew of six 
alive, 300 kilograms of water are sent every few months to the orbiting outpost for food and drink 
and other architecture needs.69 Every kilogram costs $10,000 to get into space, based on mass and 
energy costs alone.70 This comes out to $3 million USD in water alone, nearly $30 million every year 
(ten flights per year) which is just used for drinking. Water could be used for more things, such as 
radiation shielding, operating fuel cells to generate electricity (as seen on the Space Shuttle, Apollo 
and Gemini flights),71  or even as propulsion as the use of space increases.72 Volatiles or carbon-rich 
compounds could also be extracted from C-type asteroids, and used in plastics, medicine, fertilizer, 
and more for early space settlers.73 By procuring resources in space rather than bringing them up 
from the surface, there could be a potential cost savings and public good enabling greater future use 
of space.   
Ultimately, the resources found in asteroids are highly desirable on Earth, might be more 
economical to mine in space, and are found in greater concentrations in asteroids than in the crust 
of Earth. This potential has gotten many excited about the potential colonization and exploitation of 
resources, and addresses many of the necessary economical resource deposit characteristics. If the 
                                                             
68 (Elvis, 2014) 
69 (National Space Society) 
70 (Werz, Everett, & Puschell, 2011) 
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material is there, and there is a demand for it, technologies and techniques to mine them are the 
last major requirement that must be met. 
2.1.3 Decreasing Technology Costs for Spaceflight 
The past century of spaceflight has helped lay a foundation that made asteroid mining 
possible today. The early basic research done by national space agencies, as well as the 
rudimentary infrastructure construction (ranging from launch pads to tracking and data relays), 
have made space more open to numerous private agents who didn’t have to take on the risks of 
figuring out how to work in space at the very beginning.74 Over fifty years, private agents have 
helped reduce cost, increased performance, added new opportunities for access and use, and 
allowed space systems to be made inexpensively, including systems for space mineral resource 
mining.75  
Early aerospace system development was driven by nations, mostly between the United 
States of America and now defunct Soviet Union locked in a Cold War, aiming to gain a technological 
advantage in warfare by dominating the high ground of space.76 In the process, they developed the 
first rockets, satellites, crewed capsules, and robotic systems, while building launch pads and 
ground stations to run the missions.77 Some initial scientific programs and missions experimented 
at the basic research level on the potential uses of space for industry, military, defense, and 
science.78  
The basic research done by nations out of scientific curiosity and national interest for 
defense allowed private industry to recognize the potential value for operating in space for 
research, defense, telecommunications, and remote sensing. The applied research and private 
                                                             
74 (Angelo, 2007) p 19-20 
75 (Werz, Everett, & Puschell, 2011) p 308 
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interest provided enough economic and technological pressure to lower costs, open the field up to 
more competitors and better process improvement, further reducing costs, and increasing 
participation. Policies such as the Outer Space Treaty79 heavily limited national operations in space 
and it has terms approved by nearly all nations (Figure 3), such as prohibiting military operations 
in space,80 but the private industry grew as quickly as they could while still being supported by 
national space programs looking to invest and growing national economic strength.81 These 
national space policies would continue to promote an environment of technology development that 
would continue to support the development of novel private industries that use space as a resource 
today (the most recent US Space Policy being published in 2010).82  
This basic research has not solely focused on the development of basic rocketry and 
infrastructure, but also has helped the development of In Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) systems. 
The development of these systems is intended to provide mass savings for exploration based 
flights, where fuel, life support, and other resources could be refined or produced from materials 
found in space.83 Through the 1990’s, ISRU has been developed for crewed Mars exploration to 
reduce the total amount of mass needed to launch from Earth.84 This research is done through 
procurement services and even public competitions to extract water and oxygen from lunar 
regolith. For asteroid miners, these same systems could be used as the basis for further research 
into developing refinery and mining systems to extract PGM’s, REM’s, and water.  
As a product of all of this basic research, there has been a direct reduction in costs for 
launch services and for space systems, which is driving further privatization of who is accessing and 
                                                             
79 (United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2016) 
80 Article I of the Outer Space Treaty “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not 
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
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81 (Hogan, 2007) p 65 
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using space.85 Most visible is the growth of launch service providers and new rocketry companies 
such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and OrbitalATK now competing against the incumbent United Launch 
Alliance in the United States of America, providing cheaper launches.86 Services for 
telecommunications have also steadily been growing, such as the satellite phone network, Iridium, 
which uses a constellation of over 80 satellites, DirecTV which streams television from 
geostationary orbit, or providing internet broadband with a constellation of 900 satellites in Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO).87  
The costs for spaceflight are decreasing and the number of suppliers and operators of 
spaceflight hardware is increasing.88 The basic research for ISRU has already been done, and the 
applied developments of the past century potentially can make the application and implementation 
of a space mineral exploitation regime even more possible at a lower cost89 (the full flight and 
operation of an asteroid redirect mission to be undertaken by NASA to bring back 70 metric tons of 
mass is estimated at $2 billion USD).90 Ultimately, the exploitation of space mineral resources and 
asteroid resources is on the technological horizon, requiring a few more developments in the 
business aspect to be achieved. 
2.1.4 The Potential for a Space Resource Industry 
In light of the growing body of knowledge, the increasing value of mineral resources, and 
the reduction of cost for spaceflight implementation, space mineral resource exploitation plans 
were experimented with throughout the 1990’s as an academic exercise, demonstrating that it 
might be very profitable.91 The first major contribution to the literature on asteroid mineral 
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resource exploitation appeared in 1997, with the publication of Mining the Sky by Dr. John Lewis.92 
Earlier than most, Lewis saw that there was an opportunity to reduce mineral scarcity, promote 
space flight, and bring new opportunities for technology development through the use of space-
derived mineral resources. 
 Others added to Lewis’ original analysis, one of the most notable being Mark Sonter, who 
now works with Lewis at Deep Space Industries, designing business plans and advocating for policy 
such as the SPACE Act.93 His analysis, from an economic standpoint, set the precedent seen today in 
evaluating that asteroid resource mining is highly profitable. This early work in 2000 determined 
that an M-type asteroid (roughly 10% of the NEA population) could yield $500,000 in nickel-iron, 
PGM, and REM based on prices at the time (less than $30,000/kilogram of platinum seen today).94 If 
launch costs decreased (one of the largest drivers he recognized) to approximately $10,000 
USD/kilogram, the exploitation of space mineral resources could be profitable.95 Through the work 
of basic technology development done by national space programs, this has been achieved, with 
launch prices potentially going as low as $2,200/kilogram.96 Ultimately, Mark Sonter also laid out a 
set of salient characteristics necessary for an environment to support space mineral resource 
mining, based on a variety of historical examples and academic research on the topic:97 
I. There needs to be a market for the products 
II. There needs to be adequate spectral data indicating presence of the desired materials 
III. The location of the ore bodies and their orbits need to be well known 
IV. There needs to be feasible engineering systems behind a mining architecture  
V. There needs to be feasible mineral return architectures 
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VI. With the architectures, they need to generate a profit from the mineral resources 
returned 
To achieve Characteristic I and Characteristic VI, M-type asteroids might be very 
economically advantageous due to their high metal, PGM, and REM composition. Platinum is one of 
the most expensive elements on Earth,98 currently evaluated at $30,000 USD per kilogram (the 
highest value being nearly $70,000 USD per kilogram in 2008), much more than at the time of 
Sonter’s original analysis.99  
In 2008, there was a massive boom in the PGM commodity markets which triggered the 
founding of two asteroid mining companies, Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources 
Incorporated.100 These two companies believed that the PGM demand could be met with space-
derived mineral resources, not realizing that the conditional deposits on Earth increasing their 
production in response would quickly lower the price again and that the severity was not as 
extreme as thought. The massive price drop in the following years for PGM’s did weaken some 
business prospects, even though Planetary Resources was able to successfully collect over $40 
million USD in venture capital over those first few years from a crowdsourced funds and investors 
such as James Cameron and Sergei Brin of Google.101 
The PGM price instability in 2008-2010 demonstrated that PGM focused mining programs 
were not going to be very successful. Early after Sonter, Shane Ross, another early economic 
analyst, had been arguing that the focus should be on water.  Where platinum proved to be unstable 
in its prices,102 Thomas Coffee argued to focus on water and volatile resources to decrease the cost 
                                                             
98 (Crawford, Gump, Lewicki, & Seager, 2013) 
99 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
100 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
101 (Octa Finance, 2015)  
102 (Ross, 2001)p 14-18 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 28 of 178 
 
of in-space operations,103 and in 2014, Lewis reevaluated the possibility of PGM’s paving the way 
for space mineral resource activities and argued for a focus more on rare-Earth metals, water, and 
other resource developments that would enable more infrastructure growth in orbit and 
consequently more demand in orbit and on the surface.104 Despite the economic problems they 
faced with unstable PGM prices, these companies managed to adapt and have continued to develop 
their space resource exploitation plans.  
Ultimately, with regards to Sonter’s original analysis of the six salient characteristics of a 
successful asteroid mining community, many of them have been met over the past two decades of 
space mineral resource exploitation business development. Characteristic III, location of economic 
resources, has been underway through a variety of sky-watch programs identifying NEA’s that 
could be economical to mine and Characteristic II, the basic characterization has partially been 
done. Characteristic I, a known market for the products, and Characteristic VI, the potential for 
profit generation, are possible through the demand for a variety of minerals in space and on Earth, 
and there are decreasing costs to potentially mine these ore bodies.  These two companies, Deep 
Space Industries and Planetary Resources, who function more like a Silicon Valley startup than a 
traditional mining company, both generally agree on the space mission architecture to do this; 
surveying by telescope, deploying a refinery, deploying a tug to gather the material, and return it to 
some depot and then returning that tug back to the refinery to continue to mine and exploit.105 
Deep Space Industries is primarily focused on a societal constructivism approach, arguing and 
supporting policy developments before they start their mining process.106 They have been heavily 
involved with the proposal of the ASTEROIDS Act (American Space Technology for Exploring 
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Resource Opportunities in Deep Space)107 in 2014 and the passing of the SPACE Act in fall 2015 that 
provided US citizens with an ownership right for space-derived mineral resources.108 The other, 
Planetary Resources, has already started flying craft, arguing that the policy will come later.109 They 
launched a testbed prospector telescope probe in the summer of 2015, and are planning to launch 
more every summer until they deploy a full orbital telescope system to track, identify, and analyze 
asteroids to further guide exploitation.110  
2.2 POLICIES IN PLACE FOR SPACE UTILIZATION 
Space mineral resource companies have developed, thanks to previous policies steadily 
changing the nature of the utilization of space. Original national policies favored technology 
development for military and scientific purposes, but the military aspects were quickly limited by 
the international community. In November 2015, the first official space policy supporting space 
mineral resource engineering came out, fundamentally changing the way that these private miners 
interact with the national and international community.  This policy development has only been in 
place for fifty years, but its impact on the highly risky spaceflight industry is important to 
understand when discussing new policy issues and potential policy mechanisms to fix those gaps.  
2.2.1 The Outer Space Treaty 
In the middle of the 20th Century, the United Nations developed a variety of treaties and 
conventions on regions considered to be previously unclaimed by no individual or country; the 
Antarctic, the deep seabed, and outer space.111   All were written with the same intent: protecting 
the global commons and environment, ensuring that there is free use and access, and holding the 
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international community accountable to the successful future use of these unclaimed lands for 
economic, scientific, and industrial benefit, under a legal concept called the Common Heritage of 
Mankind.112 Unlike the other two policy regimes regarding these territories, the Outer Space Treaty 
was a direct product of the Cold War between the United States of America and now defunct Soviet 
Union, and specifically designed to inhibit militarization while also preventing nations from 
claiming the resources of space and promoting free access to space.113 
This 1967 treaty, written right before the first Moon landing in 1969, contains several 
articles which have fundamentally altered the way that nations pursue spaceflight. The underlying 
intent of this document was to prevent a steady militarization that potentially would limit the 
access others could have to space, which many saw similar to the seas, as well as promote the 
scientific use and sharing of that knowledge among nations in light of the great disparity between 
the few spacefaring nations114 and all of the others at the time:115 
 Outer space shall be free for the use and exploitation of all states, and there shall be 
freedom of exploration and cooperation (Article I) 
 Outer space is not subject to national appropriation through sovereignty, use, occupation, or 
any other means (Article II) 
 States of the treaty shall carry out exploration and use of outer space in accordance to 
international law and the charter of the United Nations (Article III) 
 Nuclear weapons and other devices of mass destruction are prohibited from being placed in 
space (Article IV) 
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 Astronauts under distress shall be allowed emergency landing and docking and returned to 
their respective nations (Article V) 
 States bear the responsibility of all activities in space for nations flying the flag of their 
nation (Article VI) 
 National liability is placed on the nation who launched or procured a system that damages 
another nation’s vehicle (Article VII) 
 If a vehicle flying the flag of one nation lands in the territory of another state, the vehicle 
shall be returned to the original state (Article VIII) 
 States shall provide assistance and cooperation opportunities for any activities in space 
(Article IX) 
 States have full rights to observe the flights of other nations launched under national 
control for scientific purposes (Article X) 
 All data collected by nations doing exploration must be freely shared to all nations as soon 
as possible and practically (Article XI) 
 Stations, bases, and outposts shall be free for access on a basis of reciprocity (Article XII) 
Under the Common Heritage of Mankind as outlined in Articles I through III, the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) protected space resources from national appropriation under the premise that they 
had existed without ownership for the entirety of humanity’s history and that all of mankind had a 
shared interest in these resources.116  The remainder of the document continued to reduce the 
rights of national programs and their direct, named agents such as  Articles X and XI that mandated 
that all data collected by national programs must be shared, effectively preventing any data 
collected by nations from being held privately.117 At the time, spaceflight was primarily handled by 
public agents, often working through public research groups or procuring technology 
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developments through private industry. The OST was able to recognize the potential implications of 
this trend, and established that private agents are governed by the laws of their origin location 
(Article IX) and that these policies could supersede elements of the OST (Articles XIII) as long as it 
was for the scientific or industrial use of space resources.118   
 
Figure 3: Signatories of the Outer Space Treaty (Green-Party to, Yellow-Signatory of, Red-No Party)119  
 The OST fundamentally altered the national exploration of space.120 Before, space 
developments were driven by both military and scientific interests and Articles I, II, and III 
prohibited exploitation, land claims, and militarization in favor of scientific exploration done 
cooperatively by nations, under the Common Heritage of Mankind.121 It succeeded in just about 
every way, with the military programs moving from offensive weapons to passive detectors and 
intelligence services. The threat of a “red moon” was never fully actualized as well,122 and the 
potential of having military outposts shoot down other satellites was nullified.123 It was an 
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outstanding example of how law and political arrangements could keep pace with science and 
technology. The OST, through the use of the Common Heritage of Mankind prevented the militarized 
use of space resources and it was widely accepted with little conflict (Figure 3) and created the 
international space community seen today.124 
 With the language used, the OST did succeed in preventing limitations on the free use of 
space being put in place by nations through military or other means, but it did create several 
serious policy questions that have plagued the industrial development of space mineral resource 
mining as a business. First and foremost, Articles X and XI require that data collected throughout 
the exploration of space must be disseminated if the data is collected as part of a national interest. 
In the process, the characterization data that determined the mass, composition and potentially the 
wealth of an asteroid ore body had to be shared. Previously, individual knowledge of an economic 
resource site was a substantial enough grounds for a mining claim, but now, much of the basic 
geology data is freely shared and there are unclear implications about the private use of space 
generating information about space resources for private benefit when public benefit could be had 
at the same time.  
 Secondly, the language of the OST identifies that national operation and procurement of 
space missions (Article VI and VII) would have the same preventions on ownership and possession 
of space resources (Article I). However, public agents are no longer the only agents operating in 
space, and technology development is becoming steadily hybridized (encompassing public and 
private interests and risk sharing). Applying Common Heritage of Mankind to private agents now 
would fundamentally change whether or not miners could own the resources they mine and then 
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sell them. The national appropriation of space resource is expressly forbidden in Article I, and even 
the United States of America’s lunar rocks collected through the Apollo missions are not owned.125  
This policy gap has been well discussed over the past fifty years. In the late 1970’s, a group of 
nations drafted the Moon Treaty, which would extend the Common Heritage of Mankind to all 
human agents, including private actors.126 However, industrialized nations rejected the plan (Figure 
4), 127 as this policy regime provided no economic advantage to the use of these space resources and 
would interfere with the industrial development of remote sensing and telecommunications by 
private industry.128 Without any policy regime in place, the use of space remained res communis and 
was to be freely accessed and used by private agencies on a first come first serve basis or as 
dictated by coordination policies at that time.129  
 
Figure 4: Signatories of the Moon Treaty (Green-Party to, Yellow-Signatory of, Red-No Party)130 
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In 2000, before asteroid mining was seriously considered, it was argued that “a minority of 
authors consider that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits only the national appropriation of outer 
space and celestial bodies,”131 and in 2010, the International Institute of Space Law argued that 
private activities are permitted according to Articles II and IV, but legally claiming space mineral 
resources through private activities were still very dubious, creating a major policy gap dealing 
with the ownership of asteroids and working with space mineral resources.132 To a private agent, 
space mineral resources were completely unowned with no ownership policy regime placed on 
them and there was no clear indication of ownership. It wasn’t until 2014 when the private 
ownership policy issue would begin to be addressed, leading to the ASTEROIDS Act and eventually 
SPACE Act, discussed later.  
2.2.2 National Space Policy of the United States of America 
Evolving and being rewritten by every President and their respective cabinets, advocacy 
groups, industry, research groups and many more, the National Space Policy of the United States of 
America sets the goals of the public civilian space program and any other public organizations 
involved or interested in operating in space.133 Among western states, the policies bear strong 
resemblances, with differing focuses on specific technologies or destinations for missions. These 
National Space Policies are then used to design Authorization Acts which allocate funds directly to 
specific research projects and programs and to local research groups based on feedback gathered 
and evaluation of national programs.134  
The 2010 United States of America National Space Policy, which is still in effect through at 
least 2016, was partially written to support the development of an asteroid redirect mission to 
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demonstrate the technology of asteroid dock and capture, to test planetary defense through a 
gravity tractor program to divert asteroids away from Earth, to perform planetary science, and to 
potentially serve as an In Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) test platform for resource and mineral 
exploitation.135 ISRU is of great interest to basic researchers, as the technology would potentially 
allow crewed Mars mission design architectures to be possible by producing propellant in deep 
space, so an opportunity to actually perform it with actual space mineral resources would be 
perfect. 
Along with the push for an asteroid program, the National Space Policy also sets the 
standards for what is deemed valuable to develop in terms of technology or infrastructure, or what 
to explore scientifically or industrially.136 The intent of the policy is to share responsibility for the 
use of space resources, develop a competitive commercial space sector, follow the intent of the 
Outer Space Treaty, develop and protect infrastructure for using space or deploying operations in 
space, and look at using space to aid in defensive programs.137 The goals for the national space 
policy are to develop competitive domestic industries,138 expand international cooperation, 
strengthen stability in space,139 increase the assurance of mission-essential functions,140 pursue 
human and robotic initiatives,141 and to improve space-based observation capabilities. Specific 
guidelines include:  
 Strengthen United States’ leadership in space-related science, technology, and industrial 
bases 
                                                             
135 (National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010) 
136 (Mari, 2011) p151-164 
137 (National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010) 
138 Satellite manufacturing, satellite-based service, space launch, terrestrial applications, and increasing 
entrepreneurship  
139 Improved information collection and sharing for collision avoidance, protection of supporting 
infrastructures, and mitigating orbital debris 
140 Developing infrastructure to support launch for civil, scientific, and industrial craft 
141 To develop innovative technologies, increase humanity’s understanding of the Earth and space 
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 Enhance capabilities for assured access of space 
 Maintain and enhance space-based position, navigation, and timing systems 
 Develop and retain space professionals 
 Improve development and procurement of space-related technology 
 Strengthen interagency partnerships and develop transparency measurements 
 Preserve the space environment (namely with regards to debris in the low earth orbit) 
 Foster the development of space collision warning measures 
These policy goals have been developed to prevent the pursuit of expensive space systems 
technology to falling into the trap of unfettered research and focus the entirety of the nation on a 
few, broad goals.142 There is also a section focused primarily on the commercial space sector that 
argues for more infrastructure development and infrastructure building, as well as a specific claim 
under the civil space guidelines to “pursue capabilities, in cooperation with other departments, 
agencies, and commercial partners, to detect, track, catalog, and characterize near-Earth objects to 
reduce the risk of harm to humans from an unexpected impact on our planet and to identify 
potentially resource-rich planetary objects.”143   
 The language of this constantly changing policy raises a few interesting questions that 
asteroid miners want to answer through policies and proposals of their own. The language of the 
technology development section casts light about national support for systems development and 
who should perform development. Some sections are strongly in support of the development of 
space systems to potentially exploit mineral resources.144  Some sections might actually inhibit this 
                                                             
142 (Sarewitz, 1996) 
143 (National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010) 
144 For technology development 
 “Pursue potential opportunities for transferring routine, operational space functions to the 
commercial space sector where beneficial and cost-effective, except where the government has legal, 
security, or safety needs that would preclude commercialization; “ 
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development,145 but usually only if the final technology tool is being actively used by national 
government, and in violation of the Outer Space Treaty. 
 Additionally, another major concern of proponents for space mineral resource exploitation 
is that infrastructure is greatly needed in the transport of resources as well as the launch of refinery 
and mining equipment to space. National Space Policy charges government to develop general 
infrastructure to support space access,146 but only if there is some benefit to be gained, which has 
not yet been demonstrated with the one technology demonstration mission flown. In line with this, 
there is also the specific language in the National Space Policy about finding asteroids of high 
mineral resource with no indication how that would fit into pre-existing policies to find asteroids 
and how that could potentially interact with the act of asteroid discovery for private agents. 
 The National Space Policy is broadly written, designed to empower a nation and help ensure 
basic policy and political protection for the development of technology, to grow the knowledge 
about space, and to expand infrastructure and support. However, its broad language has left many 
potential policy gaps open, increasing the risk of space mineral resource exploiters who are unsure 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 “Departments and agencies shall:  conduct basic and applied research that increases capabilities and 
decreases costs, where this research is best supported by the government; encourage an innovative 
and entrepreneurial commercial space sector; and help ensure the availability of space-related 
industrial capabilities in support of critical government functions. “ 
 ““Implement a new space technology development and test program, working with industry, 
academia, and international partners to build, fly, and test several key technologies that can increase 
the capabilities, decrease the costs, and expand the opportunities for future space activities;” 
145 Against 
 “Purchase and use commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical extent when 
such capabilities and services are available in the marketplace and meet United States Government 
requirements;” Which could prevent violation by government of  the OST through the operation of 
space mining hardware 
146 Infrastructure Arguments 
 “Enhance operational efficiency, increase capacity, and reduce launch costs by investing in the 
modernization of space launch infrastructure;” 
 “Assure space-enabled mission-essential functions by developing the techniques, measures, 
relationships, and capabilities necessary to maintain continuity of services;” 
 “Ensure that United States Government space technology and infrastructure are made available for 
commercial use on a reimbursable, noninterference, and equitable basis to the maximum practical 
extent; “ 
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about the support that they can gain for their activities at the national level. No other nation’s space 
policy, publically available, discusses the operations in space to harvest mineral resources from 
asteroids.   
2.2.3 The SPACE Act 
The SPACE (Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship) Act 
fundamentally changed the policy regime of space resource ownership harvested by private 
mineral resource agents, placing it in a res communis, (first come, first serve) ownership policy 
regime when passed in November 2015. Partially written by space mineral resource agents 
working with legislators, the SPACE Act fundamentally reduced the risk of private ownership by 
ensuring that once possessed, citizens own the space resources they’ve claimed. However, the 
passing of this bill into law has increased other risks of potential dangerous policy regimes moving 
ahead of over exploitation and a lack of protections from interference.147 The SPACE Act is the first 
bill ever passed directly supporting the act of space mineral resource exploitation, and a good first 
step in starting the policy discussion. The act only focuses on the ownership risk with its current 
policy state, and disregards any other potential risks or technological, infrastructure, and surveying 
needs for space mineral resource mining. 
The first revision of the SPACE Act focused on reducing all of the risks discussed previously 
of the space mineral mining act. Representatives Posey and Kilmer first proposed the ASTEROIDS 
(American Space Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities in Deep Space) Act in 
September 2014 in front of the House Committee on Space, Science and Technology as HR 5063.148 
The Act was designed to support the growth of the space mineral resource industry by removing 
governmental barriers and charging the president to design a regime of ownership, infrastructure, 
                                                             
147 (Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A move forward or a step back?, 2015) 
148 (Tronchetti, Private property rights on asteroid resources: Assessing the legality of the ASTEROIDS Act, 
2014) p 193-194 
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market creation, technology development, surveying, and conflict mediation between ownership 
claims.149 Most importantly, the bill created a res communis policy domain for the acquisition of 
asteroids and then the ability to completely control the asteroid and protect it from any harmful 
interference through litigation in the courts of the United States of America.150 This bill was heavily 
sponsored by Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, who argued that it was necessary for 
their development of a private industry.151 
In response, the International Institute of Space Law’s Joanne Gabrynowicz, along with 
others in the space law field such as Fabio Tronchetti, argued that there were major legal issues 
with the ASTEROIDS Act as proposed.152 The bill was lacking in a variety of ways, such as with the 
misuse of the court systems and legal terms within the document about “harmful interference” and 
“first in time” concepts, or the general disregard to resource extraction being a “volatile and 
contentious issue at the international level,” and even a lack of discussion about the cross cutting 
infrastructure and technology development issues not yet addressed with mining and policy 
mechanisms.153  Additionally, the bill was primarily designed to help promote the interests of 
particular companies, and not the industry as a whole, leading to an undesirable and potentially 
exclusive state.154 The ASTEROIDS Act was never passed due to other issues superseding it in 
Committee,155 but the core element of the text regarding the ownership of space resources was 
brought up in the next Congress as part of the SPACE Act.  
                                                             
149 (Tronchetti, Private property rights on asteroid resources: Assessing the legality of the ASTEROIDS Act, 
2014) p 193-195  
150 (Tronchetti, Private property rights on asteroid resources: Assessing the legality of the ASTEROIDS Act, 
2014) p 194 
151 (Stotler, 2014) 
152 (Smith M. , 2014) 
153 (International Institute of Space Law) 
154 (Smith M. , 2014) 
155 (House Committee on Science, 2014) 
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The res communis policy regime proposed by the ASTEROIDS Act was the only major 
element that survived its transition to the SPACE Act, where it was added without review March 
15th, 2015 to the larger Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act in the House of 
Representatives, a bill intended to promote the development of space industry, infrastructure, and 
private support services.156 This new revision was heavily supported by Deep Space Industries157 
and Planetary Resources,158  and was put into place without much discussion or review. 
Contained within the last few sections of this bill originally designed to “…facilitate a pro-
growth environment for the developing commercial space industry by encouraging private sector 
investment and creating more stable and predictable regulatory conditions, and for other 
purposes,”159 is Title IV, the Space Resource Utilization Act. The language of this law is clear, as any 
United States Citizens“…engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space 
resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, 
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained 
in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States.”160 
Also contained within Title IV, section 51302 charges the President of the United States of America 
through the appropriate Federal Agencies to: 
 Facilitate commercial exploration of space resources 
 Discourage government barriers for viable, safe and stable industries, and  
                                                             
156 (GovTrack, 2015) 
157 (Deep Space Industries, 2015) 
158 (Planetary Resources, 2015) 
159 (GovTrack, 2015) 
160  (GovTrack, 2015)  
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 Promote the right of the United States citizens to engage in commercial exploration subject 
to the authorization and continuing supervision by the Federal Government, just as it was 
seen in the ASTEROIDS Act161 
Fabio Tronchetti, in his analysis, determined that the SPACE Act only provides a provisional 
ownership right until a later report is submitted, and it only vaguely recommends that citizens are 
consistent with international obligations.162 Arguably, the policy allows the United States of 
America to confer an ownership right without any regulations on location (the use of "in situ" 
indicates in place, but the other language contradicts this such as "in possession of"), duration, 
intent, or international implementation of the Act. Tronchetti argues that the SPACE Act “is 
instrumental towards achieving such a goal [exploitation of asteroidal resources],” but functionally, 
it can be opposed by other states, potentially allow for competing interests and policies to take root 
in the international community, cause instability in current space policy, seen as a violation of space 
treaties so far, and ultimately be ineffective in both promoting the industry and technology 
development and do more harm than good.163 
2.3 THE EXPOSED POLICY GAPS 
Space policy is a new field and has succeeded in developing basic technologies, but has very 
little history to draw from and has an even smaller number of stakeholders. The number of analysts 
in the field is very low, and the current state of space policy is severely lacking in historical scope, 
leaving the community vulnerable to a wide variety of suggestions about how to progress.  
                                                             
161 (GovTrack, 2015)  
162 (Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A move forward or a step back?, 2015)p 7  
163 (Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A move forward or a step back?, 2015)p 
8-9 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 43 of 178 
 
During the hearing on the ASTEROIDS Act, Joanne Gabrynowicz, the Director of the 
International Institute of Space Law, recognized that the policy itself seems to be potentially written 
for the benefit of Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries rather than the field as a whole 
and that there are some serious concerns that should be met to make asteroid mineral resource 
programs more accessible for all.164 Because there are no direct historical precedents of when space 
mineral resources were mined before for private benefit, and there was a high cost to entry which 
prevent nearly everyone besides large national space programs from operating in space, these 
policies were not needed before. Referring back to those salient characteristics that Sonter first 
proposed back in the 2000’s,165 there are policy needs to develop markets and infrastructure, 
technology and ultimately what is necessary to protect the ownership right of asteroid miners as 
well.166 
Vidvuds Beldavs, a banker in Latvia, proposes that asteroid mining be handled through a 
central bank established in his home country.167 This bank, similar to the function of the World 
Bank’s development funds for mines, would require space miners to return a sample of asteroid 
material for assay, which would then award the company a loan appropriate to that amount of 
material as well as a temporary licensing claim for that asteroid.  
The Space Settlement Prize Act, proposed by Rand Simberg of the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, pulls heavily from the Homestead Act, establishing a licensing ownership regime based on 
private development of infrastructure and technology.168 There is a role of government in the 
process to prevent land fraud by being an impartial surveyor, but otherwise the policy argues that 
                                                             
164 (Smith M. , 2014) 
165 (Sonter M. J., 1997) p 638 
166 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) 
167 (Beldavs, 2013) 
168 This includes 600,000 square miles or 4% of lunar surface or 1/6th of the area of the United States of 
America or 3,600,000 square miles of Mars being awarded to those agents who can develop infrastructure for 
the safe and reliable transport of human crews 
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there is little role for federal government, just like the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s motto 
(Simberg's employer) of “Free Markets and Limited Government.”  169 
 The Abundant Planet think-tank argued that NASA should be redeveloped into a Space 
Resource Development Agency, to promote the exploration of NEA to determine their mineral 
composition and economic value.170 This policy would argue that surveying, infrastructure, and 
technology development be primarily handled by this agency, while the actual business operations 
and applied research be handled by private agents, and that in the process, the two develop an 
advanced licensing system for ownership as an interpretation of the original 1958 charter of 
NASA.171 
 One of the most well reviewed policies comes from Dr. Ricky J. Lee, a preeminent scholar of 
space law and policy and Principal Administrator of the International Air and Space Law Academy, 
to develop an International Space Resource Development Authority. This organization would 
borrow heavily from the design of the International Seabed Authority and develop an impartial 
international government with a Registry that would coordinate a license and claim system, a 
General Assembly to deal with litigation, and a Secretariat to promote technology development, 
prevent environmental damage, and perform surveying duties.172  
Ultimately, in light of this new policy window opening on a previously unregulated policy 
space, now is the time to develop and implement policy. There are increasing public and political 
                                                             
169 (Simberg, 2012) 
170 The functions of the Space Resource Development Agency would be:  
1. Fund the development of sky survey telescopes and observation programs 
2. Deploy 100 spacecraft to 200-300 NEA’s to discover, tag, and track mineral content of asteroids 
3. Run competitions to develop asteroid mineral extraction and processing technologies 
4. Deploy robotic miners to the most attractive asteroids 
5. Purchase transportation from commercial suppliers to and from the Near Earth Objects 
6. Develop an international asteroid property right 
 
171 (Abundant Planet, 2009) 
172 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 297 
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interests and there are actual realistic and feasible engineering proposals to mine these asteroids. 
At this early stage of development, technologically and business-wise, policy will have long standing 
effects, and as it will be evidenced later, a radically changing policy scheme is disruptive and 
dangerous. There is an opening and there are questions to answer: 
 What are policies that could be implemented to allow and support the exploration and 
potential development of these new industries if they do prove to have some value? 
 What elements of proposed policies or those in place could be used to support future 
goals? 
 What can be learned from previous resource management policies that support future 
asteroid resource exploitation? 
2.3.1 Technology Development  
A long history of public science and basic research policies have developed the field of space 
systems and have made them increasingly cheaper and more available to a larger number of people. 
In light of the current high prices to develop the technology for a single asteroid redirect mission, 
there are concerns about how to develop new basic and applied technologies necessary for these 
expeditions. Sonter discussed the development of low cost space mineral mining technologies and 
transportation systems as two major salient characteristics for a successful space mining 
environment.173 Technology development has been mentioned in numerous policy proposals on the 
subject, such as the funding for private technology development being supported by an assay 
mission,174 or being the only focus of a redirected NASA designed to exploit the resources of 
space.175 
                                                             
173 (Sonter M. J., 1997) p 638 
174 (Beldavs, 2013) 
175 (Abundant Planet, 2009) 
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At this point, questions need to be asked about who is responsible for technology 
development, as well as what policy mechanisms should be applied if it is deemed appropriate that 
policy get involved in the process. Participation of various public and private agents would be 
determined on the potential value for these activities and the development of associated 
technologies. Ultimately, the goal is to produce the most public good for applied research programs 
and only assist in the development of applied research if there is a public benefit to do so at the 
current time.  
2.3.2 Surveying Duties  
The surveying claim was a fundamental element of the early mining process, and also 
critical to the development of a successful mining community (Sonter’s Characteristics for adequate 
characterization data and location data).176 Previously, it acted as a single action that demonstrated 
the knowledge of a resource, access to the region, and access to the resource. However, the modern 
sky-watch programs have separated knowledge of a resource from access by finding potential 
orebodies as a way to protect Earth. The use of remote sensing and its low fidelity characterization 
data has separated the knowledge of the resource from the access demonstrations. The free sharing 
mandated by the Outer Space Treaty of location and composition data further has reduced the 
strength of private mining claims, reducing the economic advantage for private agents to 
participate in remote sensing and physical assay of asteroids, despite the potential public and 
private benefits that could be derived.  
Right now, the data collected through sky watch programs to protect the Earth from 
impactors (or just recognize that they might be there) does not include thorough enough data to 
substantiate mining claims. Policy proposals within the space mineral mining field propose that 
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government undertake this activity and release that data only to national programs,177 mandate the 
assay process to receiving funding and a license,178 or that these processes are organized by 
international bodies179 or left to be completely private mining activities.180 There are many 
disagreements about the importance of these activities and the responsible parties.  
In light of the public good in identifying potential Near Earth Asteroids, should those 
programs be continued, or shut down, or supported by the activities and applied research of private 
miners? At same time, in light of the changing nature of the survey process, should remote surveys 
be sufficient, or is more necessary, especially in light of the difficultly of space mineral resource 
mining? 
2.3.3 Ownership 
The ownership regime currently in place is one of the most fiercely debated issues related 
to space mineral resource activities. The recent passing of the SPACE Act represents a tremendous 
change in the legal paradigm of space material ownership, and many argue that the current state is 
insufficient in its protections against interference and complications with international law at the 
same time.181 There is an agreed upper bound preventing national procurement of space systems 
technology under the Common Heritage of Mankind and a lower res communis bound put in place, 
with great disagreement, by the SPACE Act, but as demonstrated throughout history, res communis 
policies among private agents leads to over utilization or a potential for a totally exclusive space 
environment.182 Ownership regimes have been proposed to be a total ownership regime,183 to a 
                                                             
177 (Abundant Planet, 2009) 
178 (Beldavs, 2013) 
179 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) 
180 (Simberg, 2012) 
181 (Smith M. , 2014) 
182 (International Institute of Space Law) 
183 (Simberg, 2012) 
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heavily licensed one based on demonstrated assay,184 to simply keeping the systems res communis 
and first come, first use in nature.185 Ultimately, is there a policy regime that prevents exclusivity as 
well as preventing interference between agents at a level that reduces the risk of asteroid mining 
operations at the decadal timeframe? 
2.3.4 Infrastructure Development 
Finally, transportation infrastructure (salient Characteristic V) and market creation (to 
support I and VI of Sonter’s Characteristics) is a large risk for space mineral resource developers. 
They wish to develop these systems at a low cost by having government involvement based on the 
promise of potential future public and private benefit through the reduction of system costs. The 
concept appears in a variety of texts, sometimes being the critical representation of an ownership 
claim,186 or simply something handled by the infrastructure-building public policy system.187 Are 
these claims substantiated, and if so, under what premises and assumptions of future benefit?  
                                                             
184 (Beldavs, 2013) 
185 (Lee, Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer 
Space, 2009) 
186 (Simberg, 2012) 
187 (Abundant Planet, 2009) 
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3 METHODOLOGY OF THIS ANALYSIS 
There are few precedents that can be drawn on to develop policies to support the further 
development of space mineral resource activities. The closest analogies for space mineral resource 
mining on Earth are resource rushes, where suddenly a new resource opens up for utilization, often 
without any policy precedent. To best understand the effect of policy in the context of asteroid 
mineral resource exploitation, historical policies were analyzed and compared to the current state 
of asteroid mineral exploitation against the desired end states.  
3.1 HISTORICAL ANALOGS 
There are a variety of historical analogs to be drawn on for this analysis. Typically when 
discussing asteroid mining, advocates focus on the American Gold Rush, Antarctic Treaty System, 
and the Convention on the Law of the Sea without reviewing other resource rushes and the policies 
that came with them. For this analysis, a resource rush is defined as a situation where: 
 There is an undetermined policy state or sudden change that opens up a resource stock for 
exploitation 
 New resources are found through surveying or exploration 
 New technologies make resource stocks available for exploitation 
 The cost for access decreases through the development of new infrastructure 
Resource rushes have happened for a variety of resource types with varying context and 
timeframes that policy lessons could be learned from. Stemming from the classic example of a 
mineral rush,188 the American Gold Rush, the body of related resource management policies can be 
expanded to the Australian Gold Rush and diamond mining. Expanding the scope to include fructus, 
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or reproducing stocks, as well as telecommunications technologies and digital resources can 
provide increasing insight into the developments of resource regulation policy in a variety of 
regimes. 
 
 Resource rushes have been an element of the terrestrial mining process for hundreds of 
years, and now there is the opportunity for the same to happen in space and with the riches of 
celestial bodies. By looking at the previous history of resource rushes, many things can be learned 
about how to regulate the exploitation of these new resources. This is especially important with 
space mineral resource mining as there are no previous precedents, and previous discussions have 
been based on superficial reviews of the gold rush in America and the use of Common Heritage of 
Mankind in the Antarctic and deep seabed.  By expanding the definition of a resource rush and 
analyzing more resource management policy regimes, the effects of various policy treatments can 
be seen. Ultimately, this facilitates a better understanding of how to manage the potential resource 
rush of space mineral resources. There are no direct precedents to space mineral resource mining 
in terms of the actual mechanics, technologies, and scope, but by using a large body of previous 
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resource management experiences, each situation can contribute to a set of general policy 
recommendations for the future of space mineral resource exploitation.  
3.2 MINERAL MINING 
Mineral mining are the most common resource rushes of the past millennia, as the resources 
in question are particularly high value or there is a sudden change in some way that allows 
competitive industry to take root and develop. These are the easiest minerals to mine and industry 
has been centered on the exploitation of these materials for thousands of years. In the process, 
mining and the technological developments associated with it has been fundamental in shaping 
policy and the role of government.189 For asteroid miners, many believe that mineral mining on 
Earth is the most direct analog to mineral mining in space. This thesis argues that besides the 
typically referenced American Gold Rush, the Australian Gold Rush, silver exploitation in the New 
World by the Spanish, diamond mining in South Africa, and the attempted resource exploitations 
eventually blocked by the Common Heritage of Mankind are some of the most direct analogs to 
space mineral resource exploitation, and much can be learned from the policy attempts to control 
ownership, develop technology and infrastructure, and perform surveys. 
3.2.1 Spanish Silver Exploitation 
The exploitation of silver by the Spanish in the 1500’s through the 1700’s laid a 
fundamental framework that would drive economic mineral mining today. The Crown of Spain did 
manage to help promote surveying, spur technological development,190 help support an economic 
mining of minerals through infrastructure development, and create rudimentary ownership policy 
on licensing, leading to a successful exploitation of the continent’s resources for a short period of 
time. However, a narrow focus, and too tight of a coupling between the federal infrastructure and 
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private miners caused long-term instabilities that eventual led to the collapse of the Spanish mining 
empire.  
In the late 1400’s, there was a massive European mining technology boom, and throughout 
the remainder of that century into the next, Europeans were looking for new sources of mineral 
resources, particularly precious metals outside their own continent, which was limited in size with 
strong borders preventing movement and the free exploitation of mineral resources.191 Expeditions 
were launched across the Atlantic Ocean for a variety of reasons, but one explorer found North 
America and indigenous peoples who seemed to have access to various valuable mineral 
resources.192 Further surveying discovered more deposits of silver that could be easily exploited 
with European technology, and Spain, under the Crown of Castile Ferdinand II of Aragon, directed 
merchants to exploit these resources and colonize the New World.193  
The surveying undertaken by Spanish explorers and the investment by the Crown into these 
expeditions formed the fundamental basis of their claim to the continent, as it demonstrated that 
they could access the resources and it was a way for them to protect their investment into 
exploration and discovery of resource goods.194  The Crown claimed the land as their own, and then 
began licensing specific regions for use and mining. Private mining operators were the ones who 
operated the mine sites, and their license was sustained by a steady and constant use of the land 
and their ability to generate revenue for the Crown and themselves. The foundations laid by the 
Spanish, which required constant use and exploitation to sustain a license to operate on a given 
patch of land, would eventually form the basis of the American mining codes.195 These policies were 
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intended to promote the use of the land, prevent interference, and protect initial investments into 
mining and long-term investments in infrastructure development.196 
Spanish government also recognized the importance of the technology development of the 
mining process. The basic technologies of extracting valuable minerals from ore had been 
developed centuries before, and Spanish miners supported the writing of De re metallica by 
Georgius Agricola in 1556 which brought new mercury amalgamation techniques from Europe to 
the Spanish silver mines, increasing their process efficiency.197 Merchants and miners brought new 
technologies and capabilities from their travels, such as Pachua Bartolome de Medina, who 
discovered lead smelting processes and brought them to industrial mines. 198 In the lands of the 
New World, Spanish miners had to develop new techniques for going deeper into the Earth.199 To 
promote increasing efficiency, and to some extent increasing tax revenues for the Crown, taxes 
were reduced when mines were to perform upgrades.200 This reduced the risk for technology 
improvement, while ultimately better serving the public and private good over time.201 
In order to further maximize the efficiency and profit for the Crown of the operation of New 
World silver mining, Spain created a monopoly on the mercury required for the amalgamation 
process and controlled the mint and dissemination of silver through a mercantilist approach. 202 By 
controlling a necessary resource that allowed technology to be used, the Spanish Crown could make 
profit off of the otherwise private industries. Standard rates were set on mercury, which was 
necessary for the infrastructure of silver mining.203 Additionally, once the silver arrived on Spanish 
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shores, the tax levied on the mines was equal to 20% of total production (decreased to 10% by 
1736), and 0.5% was deducted for assay and surveying costs for originally finding the continent.204  
Silver went through its first economic boom during the 1530’s because of new mines 
opening and new logistics structures to pass silver through the Spanish mints.205 The purchasing 
power of the Spanish empire fluctuated due to inflation and recession, dropping precipitously in the 
1536-1540, 1556-1560, and 1600’s due to over inflation and over exploitation.206 With all of the 
success of the mining industry, profit was high at the beginning and steadily was reduced over time 
as over production reduced the value of the previously rare silver stock.207 Eventually, technical 
difficulties reduced some elements of that mercury supply that Spain controlled and several mines 
suddenly were exhausted, leading to greater instability in the mining market, heralding the collapse 
of the Spanish silver mining empire.208 Reactionary, large-scale taxing regime changes continued to 
decrease profitability more than investments could make them back.209 The tight coupling and price 
fluctuations of the mercury and silver market led to the eventual downfall of the large empire in the 
1650’s.210 The government simply took on too much risk by controlling the crucial supplies to 
enable silver amalgamation, maintaining a mint, enforcing a high tax, and managing the use of land 
resources. In a modern mineral mining program, no one entity, especially a government, would take 
on all of this risk regardless of the amount of potential riches and economic prosperity that might 
exist.  
From the profit and pitfalls of the Spanish, it is evident that there are some positive ways to 
encourage technology development, and ensure that ownership allows for protection, while 
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encouraging use for public and private benefit. However, overexploitation and instabilities from a 
lack of infrastructure as well as tight coupling between the governmental supply chains eventually 
led to a downfall of the program, the mining network, and even to some extent the Spanish empire 
in its entirety.  
The exploitation of space mineral resources could potentially bear a great similarity to the 
mineral resource exploitation. Leading up to this point, nations were responsible for a majority of 
the development of space and space resources, such as orbit. There could be a strong urge for 
government to participate a great deal in the risk sharing programs, by surveying, developing 
technologies, managing resource infrastructures, and operating full banks, but as seen with Spain 
and their silver, the tight coupling of all of these factors could be deleterious. However, the success 
of controlling mining claims and preventing interference while promoting new technology options 
could lend some insight into how to manage the risk of developing expensive space systems and 
infrastructure to support it.  
3.2.2 American Gold Rush 
The New World not only had wealth in silver, but also gold, which wasn’t discovered until 
the 1850’s along the West Coast, nearly three hundred years after the first major resource rush of 
silver in the same regions. The American Gold Rush represents a policy environment that promoted 
exploitation and eventually laid the foundation for modern mining policies on ownership. It stands 
as one of the first examples of grassroots policies being developed by private agents and eventually 
being codified as local, national, and eventually international law.  
In 1750, at the time of the original colonization by the British of what would become the East 
Coast of the United States of America, King George III of England issued a Royal Proclamation 
forbidding movement westward beyond the sources of the water that flowed into the Atlantic and 
ownership of any of these lands, but people continued to disregard the King’s orders and occupy 
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and improve these lands.211 During the first half of the 19th Century, America was gripped by 
Manifest Destiny to spread westward across the North American continent.  
The United States of America Government procured a great deal of land through trades, deals, 
and military strength and created a variety of policies to help support the steady movement 
westward.212  In 1841, the United States Congress recognized that many squatters had been living 
in the areas normally forbidden, and passed the Preemption Act, which gave squatters the ability to 
purchase up to 160 acres of land that they had been using based on prior appropriation.213 With this 
early code, there were some concerns, as coordination between claimants could potentially allow 
for large tracks of land to be acquired through shell companies, 214 as well as the concern that the 
160 acres being granted typically were less fertile than the Eastern lands, forcing settlers to develop 
new technologies for resource exploitation including timber and other resources.215 Ultimately, 
these methods of licensing turning into eventual ownership worked well, enabling economic 
exploitation of the land, coordinating use and preventing interference, laying down the foundation 
of basic ownership of unclaimed lands, and were expanded upon in the West once gold was 
discovered, and the value of land could also include its minerals as well.216 Eventually, the policies 
developed for squatters became codified as part of the 1862 Homestead Act, 217 where they could 
purchase the land at $1.25 per acre after six months of residency and improvement of the land,218 
and unused regions could be used for infrastructure as part of the Railroad Act. 
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When gold was discovered by a watermill worker in California nine days before annexation, 
the word spread quickly across the nation.219 At the time, this land was mostly uninhabited, and 
once annexed by the United States, it was completely unowned, except for a few settlements and 
military outposts.220 The technology of previous mineral exploitation allowed for the cheap and 
easy exploitation of alluvial gold sources, 221 and the sudden discovery of gold with no pre-existing 
prior appropriation claims created a new resource rush for the mineral. Here, the American miners 
took on technology development by themselves, and developed hybrids of old world methods, like 
the alluvial gold panning process, where gold was sifted through pans to reveal gold,222 
 Transportation infrastructure connecting the east and the west was nonexistent, so many 
chose to sail through Panama to San Francisco and many lives were lost on disease ridden boats 
during their long trips.223 Some did decide to use overland routes to move to the west after hearing 
about the boats, and within the year, 60 or more wagons per day set out on the singular overland 
trail.224 Later, in recognition of the riches of the West, the Transcontinental Railroad and over land 
trails were developed as a byproduct of the Homestead and Railroad Act. Eventually, these miners 
reached the unclaimed lands and started mining but, at the time, there was no way to limit the 
interference from other mining agents or retain any legal right to a claim.  
Just like with the silver mining before, the land belonged to the US government, and there 
was a public debate to make the mines operate for the public benefit (meaning that all of the 
resource recovered and land would be owned by the federal government).225 However, the 
President and Congress decided against this course of action, and eventually each small mining area 
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made their own rules and procedures for mining claims, knowing that whatever they mined would 
be their own and used the Preemption Act to secure ownership rights and possession. The Gold 
Rush of 1849, often seen as a “chaotic scramble for high-profit opportunities in an open-access 
setting,” was actually quite different than that, with policy being made at the local level and 
eventually being codified.226 Despite the lack of common law, the culture of the community made 
their own set of laws to describe how resources, land and mining rights were to be established. The 
legal system that eventually developed was based on two fundamental principles each seen up and 
down the West Coast:227 
 A man could only claim such ground they could work by themselves 
 A man must continue to work that land to hold the claim 
There had been slight variation in the rules of order, but because they stemmed nearly directly 
from the social norms set by earlier Spanish silver exploiters on the west coast of North America 
and the Homestead Act, there was a high level of agreement between individual camps.228 By the 
time government caught up with the technological development of the miners, the modern claim 
system was implemented based on the original work of these miners.229 The later 1872 Mining 
Codes kept the same intent and focus of the original mining claim, and made it into law.230 These 
mining codes took a culture developed in the west that was derivative of Spanish, squatting culture, 
and Homestead Act beginnings, and adapted all of these into a hybridized structure that became 
well accepted and the basis for further laws.  
 The American Gold Rush can show space mineral resource miners the potential for 
sustainable resource use policy development by taking initial cultural and legal starting points and 
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then developing new policy regimes on ownership on their own. As an extension of this, the modern 
mining claim system based on licensing appears during the American Gold Rush, and is still the 
standard on land ownership for resource exploitation today.  
3.2.3 Australian Gold Rush 
The American Gold Rush was not the only gold rush that happened in the middle of the 19th 
Century, as gold was discovered in Australia in 1851. One American miner, Edward Hargraves, 
having failed in the California Gold Rush, went to Australia after hearing about various gold 
discoveries, bringing techniques and tools for gold mining with him.231 The discovery of large 
alluvial gold veins and gold ore triggered another Gold Rush, as the necessary technology was 
already there from the previous American Gold Rush, costs were low to work in Australia, and 
Australia had no large scale policies on mineral mining and land exploitation.232 
Australia was fundamentally different in its social and legal structure than the West Coast of 
America with regards to land exploitation, and land had been historically licensed for the use of 
animal husbandry or otherwise occupied through prior appropriation by indigenous peoples or 
squatters.233  After the discovery of gold in the southern regions, 19,000 British, American, Chinese 
and South Asians immigrated in 1851, and the year afterwards, more than 75,000 had 
immigrated.234 Many miners came from America, bringing the licensing and mining culture from 
that country, which in combination with the wealth of the gold mined, triggered a ‘complete social 
revolution.’235 The concept of using land temporarily for mining based on current use was foreign to 
the federal land coordinators in Australia, who had typically given permanent deeds for land 
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ownership for agriculture and livestock. There were great conflicts in the perception of the public 
and private good of mineral mining. 
In order to limit economic losses of Australia due to a shifting focus from agriculture to 
mining, controls were put in place in the form of restrictive licensing for mining which would highly 
tax miners and limit participation in the act.236 This tax, equivalent to a few hundred grams of gold 
(when a miner might only gather a few kilograms over a year) was designed to further strengthen 
industrial development in Australia and offset the public risk of reallocating land use.237 However, 
miners simply avoided paying the tax, causing a great deal of stress for the peoples in Australia and 
adding to growing tension between the colonial government and the miners.238 The next few years 
were fraught with policy reversals, protests and eventually in 1854, the Eureka Stockade rebellions, 
in which the armed miners and authorities fought.239 Twenty four miners were killed in the 
rebellions, and afterwards, reform swept across the country. The license fee was revoked, replaced 
with an export tax and a Miner’s Right, and local governments asked for a more general mining fee 
for one year.240 Australia eventually did enjoy the economic, social, and infrastructure success that 
America had, but at a greater economic and social cost over time. 
Space mineral resource miners could also potentially go down a similar path to the Australian 
Gold Rush scenario if there are too high upfront costs arbitrarily imposed to limit participation. 
Already, there are concerns about the potential to leave lesser developed nations behind by 
expanding the resource base to include space,241 but by imposing harsh fines and fees, which could 
help develop other nation’s space mineral mining capacity, the economic interest in mining greatly 
decreases. Ultimately, the Australian Gold Rush details the limits of risks that private agents are 
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willing to undertake, and any extra financial risk with the management and use of resources before 
any profit is earned is highly undesirable as a way to control utilization.  
3.2.4 Modern Mining 
Since these early gold and silver rushes, the nature of mining has fundamentally changed, 
focusing on a large variety of ores rather than just precious minerals creating new risks and policy 
opportunities, but much of the ownership policies have stayed the same. The mental image of a man 
with a cart pushing ore out of an open mineshaft is less prevalent with the growing use of large and 
complicated machinery to dig deeply into the Earth. 242 Modern mining is highly connected to a 
global commodity market and banking system, highly connected to local and international 
environmental monitoring agencies, and organized by investors to maximize efficiency, reduce 
environmental impact, and ultimately maximize profit. 243 Modern mining is large in scope, 
expensive in execution, and representative of some of the same investments and technologies that 
need to be developed for space mineral resource mining.  
The ownership of mining sites is primarily done through temporary licenses as part of the 
1872 Mining Law, developed from the common laws of the American Gold Rush..244 Since then 
however, the act of surveying is shared between public and private agents, and more of a focus on 
ensuring that not only does the mine add value to the region and is profitable,245 but that it is also 
environmentally friendly.246 To ensure that these lands can also be used in the future, the land is 
managed by federal governments, such as the Bureau of Land Management for the United States of 
America.247 The United States of America allows citizens to use federal lands for mineral extraction. 
Licenses can be requested, and licensees are asked to continue infrastructure development (at least 
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$100 worth) and supply information about their operations and materials with smaller filing fees 
from $10-$100. 248 Additionally, land is licensed for a period of time in a given region, but in specific 
cases where land is isolated or uneconomic to manage, or fallen in disarray and disposal would be 
preferable, individuals can buy this region. 249 
 The development of processes like the Hall-Heroult process by Bayer made aluminum metal 
mining profitable and took something that was once valuable, like pure aluminum, into a common 
commodity that is thrown away.250 This kind of advanced metallurgy heralded a new age of 
materials science being integrated with modern mining and the centralization of large refineries 
technology with distributed mining networks. 251 To establish these mines, there is also growing 
reliance on large financing structures to ensure profitability. 252 Financing and economically 
supporting a startup mine is nearly impossible for an individual to do. The use of international 
financing and the banking system can help companies start up and by the extensive architectures 
for mining, safety, and mineral exploitation (drills, refinery equipment, etc.) can also help in 
preventing competition by supporting one company over another, or forming alliances and 
partnerships for a common goal.253 Competition is one of the greatest threats to the modern 
mineral miner, as most economic deposits have been found, and profitability is determined by 
process innovation in perfecting the methods and modes of mineral mining.254  Policies are usually 
developed to help mitigate these competitive risks through altering the ownership process or 
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providing subsidizes and incentives to promote the development and deployment of mines within 
nations.255  
Mining financing is a growing aspect of the mineral market today. Part of the financing 
structure is participating in the exploration ($12 billion industry in 2010 for exploitable minerals 
and $440 billion for the development of hydrocarbons), definition and assay, feasibility studies, 
extraction, processing, and mining. 256 Capital is required now more than ever for exploration of 
mineral resource deposits as returns can only be made with substantial scale earning more profit 
than the large equipment and machinery required to mine.257 State development banks and even 
the World Bank get involved for these large scale developments, and they are used often as a 
borrowing base to help these large scale operations function profitably and develop specific 
implementations of technology to mine. In some cases, mining financing is also done by the state to 
promote the development and growth of new industries or for the expansion of a domestic 
resource base. Chinese mining management focuses on large scale industries being operated by the 
national government rather than private investors, and they have had success exploiting the 
mineral deposits of the Gobi Desert. 258 However, they have had some issues with the high risk of 
mining interacting with the interests of the federal government, which typically has a very low risk 
threshold, causing their mines to be highly conditional. 259 Lesser developed nations with high 
mineral resources tend to have strained relationships with the mineral wealth of their nations, 
where investment into the short term benefit of natural resources and infrastructure development 
often prevents sustainable economic development, called a resource curse. 260 
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Ultimately, modern mineral mining can be done in a variety of ways, with financing coming 
from private backing, multinational world development banks or the support of nations. For the 
space mineral resource miner looking to ultimately reduce the risks they might encounter when 
mining asteroids, these policies might provide some help in promoting the development of new 
systems and technologies. However, heavy involvement into the development of a few resources by 
risk-averse investors such as governments or a few private agents might limit overall economic 
impact and activity.  
3.2.5 The Use of Antarctica 
Antarctica was another major resource rush triggered by steady technology development, a 
policy gap that had never been addressed about the ownership of Antarctica, and a large scale 
surveying done as part of international research.  Antarctica was never claimed by any human 
civilization during the age of imperialism during the 1850’s, and the use of Antarctica was primarily 
limited to short term docks and a few scientific expeditions. 261  The continent is nearly twice the 
size of Australia, and covered by ice, which limited the ability of nearly any country from working 
deep into the continent.262  
However, this all changed during the International Geophysical Year between 1958 and 
1959. In Antarctica specifically, thirty thousand scientists from 70 different countries explored this 
continent to understand more about its geology and past history.263   Despite its harsh weather, the 
continent was found to be incredibly rich in resources that were now accessible with modern 
mining tools. Minerals were found in abundance near the surface, and 50 billion barrels of oil, 
comparable to the entire reserves of Alaska, were found in the continent.264  
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Because of these numerous mineral riches, many nations used their surveying knowledge to 
lay claims to Antarctica before any international policy could be put into place. Generally, the intent 
behind all of these claims was to not only be able to access resources, but to also expand scientific 
research regions and prevent later interference between nations trying to own the mineral and 
energy resources of the continent.265 However, fearing larger scale interference and seeking a way 
to legally support their claims, the international community that had grown on the continent, 
guided by some of the same principles of equitable and fair use for scientific research over time, 
developed the first instance of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Originally, the mineral resources 
were of great interest to nations who laid claims, but realizing that the scientific and environmental 
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resources and maintaining their claims were more important than immediate exploitation, 
industrialized nations were willing to put off economic development for some time.266 
The Antarctic Treaty (now called the Antarctic Treaty System, or ATS, reflecting its growth 
since 1959) was put into place by the United Nations to establish principles for the peaceful use of 
the Antarctic, prevent powerful industrialized nations potentially overusing the environment and 
mineral resources of the Antarctic before any other nation could, ensure the freedom of scientific 
investigation within the region, and protect the unclaimed environment.267 This was the first use of 
the Common Heritage of Mankind to ensure that there was a future use of the continent for all 
peoples and reduce the potential impacts of industrialized nations.268 Participation in the Treaty 
System was determined by who had been participating or actively exploring the Antarctic and other 
provisions were designed to ensure the free sharing of all scientific knowledge derived from the 
exploration of the continent.269 Unfortunately, there were few tools actually in place to enforce this 
policy mechanism besides legal action to revoke the land claims that were left in place after CHM 
was applied to the continent.270 
In the regions claimed by their host nations, some economic activity still continued, done by 
private agents focusing on mining, dock working, and oil exploration for future use under a 
different policy regime. 271 The text of the Treaty using the Common Heritage of Mankind was not 
strong enough to prevent exploitation that could damage the environment and there was no 
discussion about allowing or preventing private ownership of Antarctica-derived mineral 
                                                             
266 (Pop, Appropriation in outer space: the relationship between land ownership and soverignty on the 
celestial bodies, 2000) 
267 (Soucek, The Polar Regions, 2011) p 273 
268 (Shackelford, 2009) p 128-129 
269 (Soucek, The Polar Regions, 2011) p 277 
270 (Soucek & Brunner, Outer Space in Society, Politics, and Law, 2011) 
271 (Joyner, 1992) 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 67 of 178 
 
resources. That original language of the ATS only prevented nations from exploiting the minerals,272 
but allowed for private agents to exploit mineral resources with no liability as the region was res 
communis to private agents.273 In response to the economic exploitation (typically by industrialized 
nations) and the environmental damage that was involved, the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1991, declared the Antarctic to be a natural reserve in 
light of the growing knowledge of the scientific and environmental resources of the continent.274 
Claims for scientific and peaceful use were maintained, but no further economic exploitation by any 
national or private agents was allowed, strengthening the intent of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind by actually undoing it and replacing it with a natural preserve.275 
This major reversal of the Common Heritage of Mankind came about when social and 
technological pressures forced the policy systems and mechanisms to break down.276 Through the 
1950’s, the technological capability of exploitation steadily grew, and eventually began to 
supersede the environmental argument for preserving the Antarctic.277 However, it was determined 
by the Antarctic community that the preservation of the scientific and natural resources were more 
important than the private exploitation argument and the Common Heritage of Mankind  and the res 
communis policies on private ownership allowed exploitation to happen.278 The potential for 
runaway environmental degradation and exploitation was too dangerous, and in light of the 
national activities on the continent, the new protocols prevented any economic exploitation.  
Antarctic serves as an example of potentially detrimental application and change of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind principle already in place for space mineral resource mining and the 
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potential future of that regime when economic and social pressures were applied. Additionally, 
with regards for the coordination of efforts among space mineral resource miners, it does 
demonstrate coordination coming out of shared communal interest in exploiting the scientific 
resources of this untouched continent. Ultimately, the change of the use of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind to meet a variety of different needs shows the capabilities and deficits of the CHM, and 
how it might evolve. 
3.2.6 Deep Sea Bed Exploitation 
For the same reasons of free and equitable use while trying to preserve the scientific and 
environmental resources, the deep seabed and high seas (regions far away from the Exclusive 
Economic Zones operated by coastal nations to be discussed later) were declared to be part of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind shortly after the Antarctic in the early 1960’s. The use of this policy 
regime during UNCLOS I, its reversal to a more open regime in UNCLOS III, and eventual 
redeployment as part of UNCLOS IV caused several issues for the economic development of deep 
seabed mineral resources while inhibiting technological growth and steady economic exploitation. 
Ultimately, by extending the Common Heritage of Mankind by forcing the sharing of technology, 
dissemination of expensive survey knowledge, and reducing the ability for private investors to 
actually own deep seabed-derived mineral resources across industrialized and non-industrialized 
nations has inhibited any further development of this resource base. Asteroid and space mineral 
resource miners should rightfully fear what happened to the deep seabed.  
The ocean covers over 70% of the Earth’s surface, and just as there are economic mineral 
deposits on the surface, there are also mineral deposits underneath the water. While undersea 
mining is more expensive than surface mining, economic resource deposits are seen with rare-earth 
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metals, some platinum group metals,279 and other ferrophilic metals such as iron, cobalt and nickel 
locked in nodules and hydrothermal vents that contain heavy metals in large supply, pumped 
directly up from the core of the Earth.280 Going into the second half of the 21st century, most of these 
mining activities were held close to shore, and there was no capability to mine the deep seabed 
which is several times deeper underwater than the continental shelf. Over time, technology 
capabilities grew in robotics, remote sensing, and autonomous mining, expanding the usable 
domain of the sea well outside of the local Exclusive Economic Zones and the lands beyond the 
continental shelf (100 nautical miles out from the shore).281 
In response to the growth into the deep seabed for mineral miners as well as the incursion 
of diesel powered fishing vessels venturing into commonly held waters, the first meeting of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea happened in the late 1950’s, creating the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
which created a legal framework akin to the Common Heritage of Mankind. Under this regime, any 
natural resources mined or extracted in this region would be available for the common good of all 
international people with minimal coordination put in place for things beyond the continental shelf 
extending a few hundred nautical miles from shore. 
This policy regime worked for the first few decades of its deployment, but as technology 
progressed, more nations were looking to access the ocean and fishing regions, UNCLOS I could not 
be sustained due to the extending ranges of industrialized nations and their powered fishing 
vessels. This stance was later reversed, as the UNCLOS was nearly completely rewritten as a 
byproduct of creating Exclusive Economic Zones and other coastal jurisdictions as part of UNCLOS 
III. The high seas were once again open for all to use under a res communis policy regime, with little 
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coordination behind it. UNCLOS III, in 1973, gave nations the rights to mineral resource activities in 
their immediate Exclusive Economic Zones, required nations that used the commonly held zones to 
preserve the environment, and opened up the deep seabed outside of Exclusive Economic Zones for 
private operations by removing the original language in UNCLOS I.282 At this point, UNCLOS 
attempted to balance the needs of industrialized nations and non-industrialized nations as both had 
rapid technology developments allowing them to access more ocean and potential fishing 
regions.283 
During the next two decades, until UNCLOS IV in 1994, the field of deep seabed mineral 
resource exploitation grew rapidly with new opportunities to exploit the mineral resources of the 
deep seabed. The US Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resource Act in 1980, which allowed private 
American agents to apply to the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association 
for a 10 year license to explore and 20 year permits to mine for mineral resources, marked the 
beginning of private ownership regimes of lands in the commons.284 During the time of open use 
under UNCLOS III, licenses were administered to four separate companies to work in an area that 
would be known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone between Hawaii and Mexico.285 Other 
industrialized nations throughout Europe, and some Asiatic countries followed suit, developing 
their own policies for claiming the international seabed, but also recognizing the claims and 
licenses of other nations.286 Most of these licenses were only given out to organizations that were 
financially capable of exploring and recovering resources, and they also abided by international 
regulations on pollution and environmental protection.287 Just like with gold mining in America, 
individual private agents and their national representatives developed a mining and ownership 
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paradigm by themselves through a shared interest in maintaining the commons for future 
exploitation while protecting their own economic interests.288 However, the actions among 
industrialized nations drew concerns from non-industrialized nations as these large technological 
and economic super powers were starting to go and exploit the resources of the deep seabed before 
any other nation had the opportunity to do so.   
UNCLOS IV, in 1994, and the Part XI convention were developed primarily as a way to 
prevent industrialized nations from continuing to mine the deep seabed as an extension of the 
intent of the Common Heritage of Mankind. To normalize the field and ensure that the resource, 
surveying knowledge, technology development, and infrastructure costs were evenly shared among 
all nations and their private agents, the Common Heritage of Mankind was enhanced to include 
private agents organized through the International Seabed Authority.289 The International Seabed 
Authority (ISA) ensured that the use of these resources and Commons is done to its fullest extent 
and the exploitation of commonly held resources benefits all. Technology development transfer is 
mandatory among all participating nations (though the only functional technology is owned by the 
United States who is not a signatory to Part XI and not a part of the ISA). 290 Large funds are 
required to participate in the mining process, 291  and all data and scientific knowledge about 
resource deposits must be freely shared. The ISA also has292 “The right to take at any time any 
measures…to ensure compliance with its provisions and the exercise of the functions of control and 
regulation assigned to it thereunder or under any contract.” The ISA inherently is designed to 
prevent private or national level exploitation of these resources in order to ensure future and free 
use of them, but in the process, greatly disenfranchises industrialized nations who could actually be 
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mining this region. For example, the United States of America has yet to actually agree to be part of 
this 1994 Addendum, due to issues with the ISA’s environmental regulations, total control over 
operations and resource areas, the dissemination of knowledge and profit among lesser developed 
nations.293  
 Ultimately, the strengthening of the Common Heritage of Mankind principles reduced any 
and all economic advantage for private mineral exploitation within the region, now evidenced by no 
nation in the ISA actually mining the deep seabed. There is no way to ensure economic success, 
little protection against risk, and the new policy regime removes any incentive to mine and sell the 
derived resources. Additionally, the threat of removing the intellectual property protections 
through technology transfer further reduces the opportunities for private members to actually 
make back their investment. In two of the three instances where the Common Heritage of Mankind 
has been enacted, which was designed to inhibit governmental exploitation of commonly held 
resources, these policy regimes have failed when economic and social pressures have been 
introduced. In Antarctica, the Common Heritage of Mankind was weakened and replaced to secure 
scientific resources, while on the Deep Seabed, these policy controls grew in such strength that 
even social beneficial exploitation was too risky to take on.  
 For the space mineral resource miner, the outcome of the Common Heritage of Mankind to 
coordinate control of the deep seabed allowed for exploitation, but a sudden reversal of these 
policies caused several issues despite its intent to better the world. UNCLOS IV forced industrialized 
nations to share technologies that where costly to develop where these nations were expecting to 
reclaim some of that investment during the process of mining minerals. Additionally, with no ability 
to effectively sell minerals exploited or even own them or have an ownership right to a plot or 
claim, there was no way to secure a region to invest in to develop the mineral resources there. 
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Finally, by even forcing surveying data to be freely shared, any chance to reclaim that investment 
was greatly diminished. Ultimately, by extending and increasing the strength of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind, UNCLOS removed any economic reason or advantage to developing the 
minerals.  
3.2.7 Diamond Mining 
The exploitation of a modern precious mineral, diamonds is another interesting pathway for 
resource exploitation policy development, where the strong privatization was almost completely 
opposite of the communal nature seen with most mineral resources. Modern diamond mining is 
another major ownership and policy regime where much can be learned from the interaction of 
governments and private interests. Diamond mining today represents the end state for an 
unbridled ownership, technology development and mining process with rare minerals, similar to 
what could be experienced with asteroidal platinum exploitation if no changes are made from the 
current state. There are strong similarities between the res communis nature of asteroid material 
and the historical exploitation of diamonds, a high value rush to acquire more of it, a group of very 
wealthy investors ready to help support the initial profit-makers, and a strong chance to actually 
close off the mining market to other competitors.  
In the second half of the 19th Century, large scale diamond production started within South 
Africa, attracting numerous veterans of the Australian and American Gold Rushes, as well as 
European imperialists and industrialists.294 Diamonds could be mined economically, there were 
technologies already in place to facilitate the mining of these pretty pebbles, and these unowned 
lands could be claimed and used by nearly anyone.295 Diamonds would eventually become an 
undeniable source and image of wealth and power to these early miners.  
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Individuals flocked to the continent to try to take advantage of the untapped mineral 
resources within the region. Individual miners squatted to claim various plots of land, started 
mining those resources, and traded knowledge of new mine sites and volcanic tubes that contained 
diamonds. This res communis, first come and first serve policy regime for land ownership did not 
inhibit individuals from participating and promoted exploitation in the most extreme sense, as 
anyone who wasn’t actively mining could lose their investment instantly.296 Exploitation was open 
to all participants with no protections limiting the number of agents or the ability to buy or invade 
other claims, while no formal mechanisms were there for technology development, infrastructure 
building or surveying.297 
Individual miners scattered across the country side and would move from place to place as 
they heard about new mineral deposits.298 For example, John Cecil Rhoades was told about the 
valuable minerals found at what would eventually become the Kimberly Mine, and started mining 
and claiming land there.299 Other miners followed him, separating mining claims with pieces of 
string and only a few inches of dirt. Rhoades was able to get diamonds first, sell them, and then use 
that to eventually buy out all of the miners and their claims to quickly consolidate the land into the 
Kimberly Mine. Eventually, several mines consolidated, forming the Diamond Syndicate to help 
coordinate and establish a diamond market as well as the supply of diamonds, controlling the 
market value and volatility. 300  
This focus on rapid economic growth, which disregarded sustainable ownership and 
infrastructure development policies, turned the diamond mining conglomerates of South Africa into 
economic powerhouses with little regard for corporate responsibility, sustainable development, or 
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designing economic systems to promote open access. 301 Throughout World War II, the Diamond 
Syndicate was threatened with Sherman Anti-trust legislation when it was found that the total 
control over diamonds allowed this group to inhibit the wartime development for both Allied and 
Axis powers.302 Additionally, the focus on diamonds and high value natural resources inhibited the 
development of alternative infrastructure and economic programs, and is thought to be the source 
of several socio-economic failures and conflict (which would lead to the term “Blood Diamonds”) 
throughout the regions where diamonds were mined.303 Other countries, such as Botswana, have a 
great deal of mineral richness from diamonds alone and could have developed hospitals, schools, 
and other infrastructure. However, the short term focus on profitable mining of diamonds has 
increased the death rates, increased the disparity between the poor and rich, and leaves no future 
pathway for Botswana’s development that doesn’t involve diamonds.304 
Sierra Leone is another case example of the growth and eventual resource curse of a strong 
natural mineral resource economy. Since the 1930’s, diamonds have been a major export of the 
country at nearly 60% its GDP,305 and a major diamond rush happened in the 1950’s, with the 
deployment of new mechanical mining technologies. By the middle of the 1970’s, diamonds grew to 
most of the GDP (approximately 80%) and eventually overtook the use of the rural lands for 
agriculture, converting them to mining regions. The focus on diamonds took away from the farming 
of food, and the population steadily decreased as there was a growing reliance on imported goods 
and foods. Infrastructure for roads, schools, and hospitals was not built, and today as diamond 
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mines are starting to be exhausted, there are few economic prospects for the people of Sierra 
Leone.306 
With very few controls on the exploitation of highly valuable minerals with respect to 
ownership and infrastructure development, the diamond mining of Africa can serve as an example 
of a potential path that space mineral resource mining could take, with a short term focus on 
immediate profit overriding or designing protections against long term changes in the economic 
environment.307 Policies designed to help ensure sustainable economic development of highly 
valuable minerals need to be able to recover from sudden shocks and ultimately recover by 
adapting or rebuilding the previous natural resource base through the development of supporting 
industries and infrastructure.308 For the exploitation of diamonds and other rare minerals, these 
controls were never put into place and there was a free and unencumbered exploitation of these 
mineral resources. In the process, interests became entrenched, leading to resource curses 
preventing further economic development such as seen with the settlement and colonization of the 
New World, while also creating a system where no new agents are able to participate. This final 
outcome flies in the face of the past fifty years of precedent for the utilization of space, and in light 
of the nearly innumerable resources of space, is a completely unacceptable outcome for space 
mineral resource mining policy paradigms. 
3.3 FRUCTUS STOCKS 
Mineral resource exploitation on Earth is the most similar example to mineral resource 
exploitation in space from a mechanical and geological standpoint, but there might be similarities 
that can be drawn from the policies managing renewable and replenishing resources. Drawing from 
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the common similarities between the high seas and outer space, and the replenishing nature of 
asteroids as they orbit the sun in large cycles, much can be learned from biologically reproducing 
and replenishing stocks of renewable resources or even the fishing of the deep sea. Asteroids, 
agriculture, and fish might bear many similarities as the market and technology develops to the 
point where asteroids replenish themselves due to the cyclic nature of the solar system and these 
ore bodies’ orbits.  
3.3.1 French and British Renewable Resource Exploitation 
The first really long term successful colonies founded by the British and French focused on 
the development of renewable resources and infrastructure systems that supported future growth 
of the primary industries. For asteroid miners, this enabling feature of infrastructure forms the 
basis of an argument to support the development of infrastructure by national governments 
through policy. Historically, the growth of the primary industries (agriculture and trading) was 
supported by the growth of secondary industries which eventually allowed the continents to seek 
eventual economic and political independence.  
The Colonies founded by the British and French (which would ultimately become the United 
States of America and Canada respectively) ultimately would become more successful in the long 
term than the Spanish colonies (Mexico and South America) that focused on minerals. These 
colonies, focusing on renewable resources and trading, would have a higher GDP per capita with 
lower crime rates and higher rate of development, which some argue stem from the development of 
their original industries and economies.309 The plantations and trading posts that soon became 
standard in the French and British colonies were many times more scalable than even the most 
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profitable mines created by the Spanish in the New World, and large scale agriculture to support 
the more intense mining markets was very successful.310  
Reliance on scalable markets that favored the mercantilism approach succeeded with the 
North American colonies, as they could quickly expand agricultural plantations and develop better 
trading networks. The mines could only be expanded if local ore veins were found adjacent to the 
original mine sites, but agriculture could be expanded as long as there was adjacent fertile land. 
Large plantations to small family owned farms could be expanded on demand and in reaction to 
market forces, allowing all to participate rather than just an elite class that operated the mines and 
all of the associated equipment.311 Anyone could invest and potentially make a return on their 
investments with agriculture. In North America, many small land plots were opened up for a variety 
of immigrants with little difficulty in acquiring a plot, in comparison to the Middle and South 
American viewpoints, where there was a large tax or licensing free levied.312 Elite farmers and their 
families dominated the agriculture of the Spanish Americas, leading to greater strength and political 
will, and now, in retrospect, lower capability to generate actual revenue among individuals.313  
Ultimately, allowing more participants in the industrial process, promoting the growth of 
infrastructure, and supporting ownership policies that allowed numerous peoples to participate 
and provide a variety of services eventually led to the independence of these nations and the 
economic well-being of these colonies. Asteroid miners might be looking to these policies to form 
the foundation of their future independence from Earth.314 By keeping the possibility for ownership 
open to a variety of newer agents, the colonies of North America fared much better than the 
colonies of South and Middle America which focused on rapid profit by any means necessary. Both 
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groups had steady economic growth, with the mineral mining focus being much quicker, but in the 
long run, the steady, natural development that supports further economic and infrastructure 
development into newer industries helped create economic and social independence faster and 
enabled greater economic growth into new supporting industries, which only increased the rate of 
further growth. 
3.3.2 Fishing and Exclusive Economic Zones 
Ensuring the sea was open for use, and ensuring that there was enough fish to catch have 
been major elements of international law and policy since the beginning of the concept of 
government. With the similarities between the seas and space in terms of their use, knowledge of 
resources, and costs to operate in them, as well as their great value for commerce and trade, there 
are many parallels that could be drawn, some of which are even codified into the Common Heritage 
of Mankind.315 The development of sustainable fishing programs, the development of licensing 
systems in response to growing technological capabilities to sail the seas, and ultimately the ability 
to prevent interference while also preventing exclusivity is something very desirable for future 
space mineral mining programs.  
Under the first concepts of mare liberum, the seas were open for free use, and fishing was 
usually kept close to the shore, due to the fact that the technology behind fishing, sailing, and the 
storage of fishes after catching was heavily limited to sails and salt. Hugo Grotius’ Common Property 
of All  in the 1600’s (which would later form the basis of the Common Heritage of Mankind) states 
that “The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is not susceptible of occupation; 
and second its common use is destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, 
because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for 
the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Now, the same 
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right which applies to the sea applies also to the things which the sea has carried away from other 
uses and made its own, such for example as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the 
land is called the coast or shore.” 316 
Grotius’ original works would be sustained through the industrial era, but begin to falter by 
the mid twentieth century. When diesel turbines became prevalent after World War II, these ships 
could now extend their reach into the open ocean, and the governments supervising the ships 
extended their claims further and further, coming into conflict as their private agents continued to 
spread.317 This expansion was based on the principle that renewable resources and biologically 
replenishing resources were covered under res communis policies on ownership and they were free 
for open use as a fructus stock. In response to the potential for industrialized nations to claim a 
great deal of coastal waters for their own private industries, the potential Tragedy of Commons 
with regards to over-fishing, and the problematic status of land-locked nations, the international 
community came together to update the policies on ownership, territorial claims, and the freedom 
of the seas.318 
The first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) set the standard for 
the steady movement of nations into the immediate continental crust around their oceans, 
forbidding private use of the deep seabed and distant waters.319 Private agents quickly developed 
technology to fish all the way out to the edge of the continental shelf, and in light of the steady 
changes in the view of the sea as an ecological resource,320   as well as a source of a fructus stock, the 
original use of the Common Heritage of Mankind in these regions was further modified.321  
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UNCLOS III allowed nations to extend their claims 200 nautical miles out into the ocean 
adjacent to their shores and ensured the freedom of the seas and access to land-locked states. 
Today, these Exclusive Economic Zones are highly successful, covering 30% of the world’s oceans 
and representing 90% of the marine fish catches, the others coming from uniquely licensed fishing 
expeditions into deep water or fishing in rivers and lakes (Figure 6).322 The remainder of the land 
outside of the coastal state jurisdiction was  reclassified as res communis for use and exploration, 
which played a major role in the exploitation of the deep seabed discussed earlier.323 
 
 Today, national governments can control some aspects of the fishing business in terms of 
maximum hauls, and can exert environmental protection protocols on to the ships flying their flags. 
Prevalent in the United States of America are very formal procedures and accountability, where 
Canadian regimes are focused on flexibility and centralization of authority.324 The Canadian 
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Authorities uses a Fisheries Act to manage and license the use of their waters while leaving open 
the specific operations of their fisheries and exact management.325 They manage and operate total 
allowable limits through informal means, and publications dictating management structures are 
sparse.326 Allowable catches are determined for the entire country based on regions, and the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act allows heavier control over the regions. The United States of 
America fishing authorities operate in a different way, with a strong management oversight and 
focus on maintaining the few stocks that still remain in the overfished areas in the United States 
territories.327 Optimum yields are defined, organized, and distributed to domestic centers, while 
regional centers play a role in managing and organizing the stock usage over time.  This strategy 
sometimes falls short and is focused on ensuring profitability rather than conservation.328  
 Other authorities, such as the Chinese Fishing programs actually use policies and bilateral 
agreements to share communal Exclusive Economic Zones. 329 This can be extended to colony and 
friendly states near the Sea of Japan or around the coast of Africa and the premise has founded the 
basis of Distant Waters Fishing (DWF). 330 This has allowed organizations and nations to combine 
efforts and expand their economic zones, increasing  their yields of fish.331 Over fishing is still a 
major issue to be dealt with, as the res communis policies put in place are able to provide some 
controls to states within Exclusive Economic Zones, but the free use of fish outside these regions 
are hard to control and limit. These policies are still adapting over time, finding new methods to 
help control and reduce environmental impact. 
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 Ultimately, this international treaty system was able to develop a strategy that reduced 
overfishing to some extent, ensured some degree of protection for investments made into fishing 
boats, and promoted economic exploitation while still allowing new actors to participate. For the 
space mineral resource miner, there might be a role for governments to play in the coordination 
and control of resource markets of asteroid-derived mineral resources as they continually replenish 
themselves. In these cases, policies  put in place to prevent interference also attempted to prevent 
over exploitation for both economic reasons (market saturation) and environmental reasons 
(overfishing and ecological degradation). The same kind of policies and controls might be 
appropriate in light of the nature of space mineral resources.  
3.4 DIGITAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES 
Finally, the use of certain telecommunications resources and the process by which they are 
allocated can provide a lot of insight into potential future options for the utilization of space 
resources. The policy regimes of the International Telecommunication Union over seemingly 
infinite resource stocks are designed to prevent interference, maximize public gain, and ensure 
equitable access.  The regime provides a few great examples of how to potentially handle the near-
infinite resources of space, as well as providing the only precedent for the allocation and utilization 
of a portion of space (specifically geostationary orbit) despite national ownership being expressly 
forbidden by the Outer Space Treaty. 
The ITU was first known as the International Telegraph Union when it was founded in 1865 
to create standards for telegraph wiring. Today, the ITU is a mixture of government representatives, 
private individuals, and multi-national companies and corporations working together to coordinate 
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the use of seemingly infinite electromagnetic, orbital, and digital resources for communication 
while preventing interference.332 
3.4.1 Radio Spectrum 
The International Telecommunications Union’s first duty was to handle the coordination of 
telegraph lines, but soon adopted the mantel of coordinating the use of radio frequencies to support 
telecommunications as the radio was starting to be adopted. At the time, there was interest in using 
the new invention of the radio for a variety of different reasons, but there was a potential for two or 
more parties to use the same frequencies, interfere with their communications, and reduce the 
quality of the market. In light of electromagnetic radiation being a fundamental aspect of the 
universe, it is not possible to technically own it, but the ITU set the precedent of spectrum 
coordination to prevent harmful interference.  
No one is capable of owning radio spectrum, but it can be allocated to prevent harmful 
interference and maximize social utility.333The radio frequency spectrum is considered to be a 
natural resource, but unlike mineral resources, it is completely reusable.334 Spectrum management 
prevents the Tragedy of the Commons that often befalls readily available resources, and ensures 
that every user is capable of making the most of this resource. Many countries allocate some 
spectrum important to their vital services, but use spectrum auction (and sometimes lotteries) to 
open up the remainder of the spectrum to private industry. These licenses are temporary in nature, 
allowing other industries to replace existing ones if they can provide greater utility. In the process, 
it prevents most agents from "sitting on" spectrum resources, when they could be applied to more 
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beneficial uses for new industries to utilize for new business prospects, to hand them over to first 
responders for clear and efficient communication, or fit more users into the spectrum. 
In America, the Federal Communications Commission handles the specifics of radio 
spectrum allocation, as charged by the ITU, and allocates usage based on a spectrum auction and 
licenses for the use of this natural resource. The United States of America Supreme Court has 
recognized that radio spectrum is a scarce resource, and that it is similar to fisheries, forestry, and 
mineral extraction in terms of licensing and maintenance.335 European governments see the “radio 
spectrum [as] a vital and scarce natural resource,” and that they have full right to control and 
regulate access to the radio spectrum, allocating sections to companies and private agents when 
appropriate.336 
This licensing and management regime functions well, but with some criticisms. By limiting 
total use, it produces an artificial scarcity which undermines the benefit of managing that 
resource.337 Additionally, as technology has reduced bandwidth and the amount of radio spectrum 
necessary to be used, many companies end up holding on to spectrum they don’t need, causing 
inequality. This inequality exerts a great deal of pressure on innovators in the crowded spectrum 
areas, and gives capital simply through ownership to the larger spectrum holders. The licensing 
structure and natural monopoly that comes out of it to some extent is no longer fully supporting the 
original intent of the policy, so restructuring of the licensing system is argued for.338 However, this 
is one of the strengths of this ownership paradigm, where there are known limits on holdings, and 
the system can adapt. 
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Licensing has played a special role in physical resource allocation, and its use in managing 
and coordinating the use of radio spectrum resources shows that the same concepts can be applied 
to something that never runs out and is impossible to actually own. Space mineral resources fall 
under a similar category of being in the international commons, and their ownership by national 
agents is expressly forbidden.  
3.4.2 Geostationary Orbit Allocation 
In 1959, the ITU was the first organization to actually coordinate the use of space resources 
by identifying that there was a policy need for the coordination of activities in geostationary orbit. 
At the time, the benefits of placing a radio platform in such a distant orbit was that a spacecraft put 
in place there could maintain a position above a specific place on the Earth, and there was soon to 
be a major resource rush to use this untapped resource. Initially, the ITU designed a "first come, 
first served" policy that allowed private agents to place satellites in geostationary orbit above 
wherever they desired, and forced them to hand over that slot when a nation requested space 
above their own country.339 
Over the course of the next few decades, interest in using geostationary orbit grew,  and 
space systems technology steadily grew to be able to use this orbital space, which quickly grew very 
crowded. In light of this, several nations banded together to form the Bogota Declaration,340  which 
awarded equatorial states (most of which could not achieve spaceflight at that time in 1977) 
ownership of the space above their nation as an extension of UN Resolution 2692. 341  The treaty 
ultimately failed, due to the insistence of owning orbital tracks rather than envelopes342, as well as 
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the national appropriation of a space resource, expressly forbidden by the OST.343 At the same time, 
no industrialized nations actually supported this endeavor, as it would limit their private industrial 
use of the space.344 Most of the drive to put satellites in geostationary orbit was for 
telecommunications, so the ITU petitioned to be the primary coordinator of these orbits, and could 
provide licenses for specific orbital envelopes to place satellites there. If a greater or more cost 
effective service were to take its place, the orbit could be reallocated.345 
This process still stands today and is the only instance of controlling and operating orbital 
envelopes in space. However, installing this policy regime was not easy, and fraught with “paper 
satellites,” or fillings intended to hold a spot in a legal paralysis that the claimant could then sell for 
a profit even if there were no satellites installed.346 Policy changes were implemented to move from 
a first come first serve method to a larger sale planning process with financial commitments to 
effectively license the use of orbital locations and frequency spectrums.347  
Now, the orbits are managed to optimize public and private benefit, and are enjoying a great 
deal of success, with multiple agents being able to claim envelopes, and when their missions are 
done, moving to a graveyard orbit. There have been no collisions, a protection from interference, 
appropriate reactions to technology development and potentially the most reliable method of 
controlling and operating orbital space.  
3.4.3 Internet Allocation 
Finally, the ITU is also trying to get involved in the coordination of internet activities and 
the operating of Domain Name Servers and master lists to ensure websites do not interfere with 
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one another and that the internet remains free for commerce. The internet as it exists today 
represents an incredible amount of economic, technological, and social development. When the 
system was first created as ARPANET, Internet Protocol addresses, essentially machine readable 
codes to tell computers where to connect to receive data, were handed out if someone called up 
Vint Cerf or Jon Postel at the University of California at Los Angeles.348 In 1988, the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority was formally created to continue and formalize the work of handing 
out IP addresses. The development and current changes with this operating regime demonstrates 
how ownership and technology development policies can come out of private agents rather than 
being organized by a central authority, and eventually lead to an effective way of protecting the 
Commons.  
Mechanically, IP addresses could be handed out in billions of billions of permutations based 
on the four 255 digit numbers with IPV4, and the newest version of IPv6 could supply humanity 
with enough IP addresses for thousands of years. To prevent two computers holding the same 
address, which would cause just as many problems as two people having the same physical address 
for mail, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority(IANA) worked to prevent the over utilization of the 
IP address resource.349 Later, the same process would happen with the creation of domain names, 
short form names that match via a Domain Name Server (DNS) to an IP of choice. In both of these 
cases, seemingly infinite resources were controlled and harnessed by quasi-governmental agencies, 
like the IANA, which is supported by the US Department of Commerce to organize and prevent 
harmful interference. To do this, they collect small fees for operation, and organize servers to be set 
up for the public good to sustain this system.  
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However, the response to IANA being part of the United States of America governmental 
structure has caused some to be concerned within the international community. First and foremost, 
the internet is proving to be a critical element of commerce and trade, and to have any nation in 
control of  the ability to assign IP address blocks or redirect entire swaths of the internet is 
concerning.350 Alternately, the control over the entire internet by one company, and the monopoly 
through first-actor privilege and, to some extent, prior appropriation, seemed unlawful. At the same 
point, the management of infinite but limited-access resources of the international field has had a 
pretty diverse economic and social effect on a variety of fields; in some cases allowing everyone to 
freely access resources or putting in cost and regulation infrastructure so severe that no one wants 
to partake in the system.351  IANA would eventually become part of ICANN, The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and their scope would eventually expand to ensure 
that the infrastructure of the internet stays stable and open for growth through democratic input 
and an advisory committee.352 
The International Telecommunications Union is vying to include control of the Internet into 
their organization and structure. As an international organization looking to manage 
telecommunications resources, international internet policy is still very much in its infancy, based 
on earlier codes for telephone communication.353 Proposals under consideration would bring 
Domain Name and IP allocation into the ITU structure to control it too, but the current frameworks 
to organize this change have frightened some. In the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications 2012, the ITU would tax international communications using the internet, 
similar to the international taxes they levy on international phone calls based on the sender nation. 
ICANN and IANA have operated under the principle that the operation of the internet should be free 
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from government intervention, and that the model proposed of international governmental control 
would be against it and over time place an undue economic burden to limit access.354 This new 
model would actually achieve a diffusion of economic power, taking away from services in the 
western world and then providing those funds to other nations through infrastructure development 
and support, just as was done with radio technologies.355 
The development of ICANN and IANA are often used as representatives of industrial self-
governance when dealing with infinite, but limited access resources. In these cases, there is an 
understanding of the value and importance of non-interfered internet address numbers and the 
industry moved to self-regulate. The value is that the transfer of knowledge, economic advantages, 
and free and open communication is easy and unencumbered by governmental interference. 
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4 POLICY ISSUE: TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Hybrid policies for research, which share the risks and responsibilities of technology 
development among private and public entities, are necessary for the basic and applied research 
required to support space mineral resource industries.356 Contests for research grants or prizes as 
well as protection for intellectual property (IP) rights might be the best suited policy mechanisms 
for these research topics, as the goals of public space programs and private space mining programs 
overlap and have the potential for great public and private benefit. Public procurement research 
policies might conflict with the Outer Space Treaty, and private industry tax incentives and 
subsidies assume an overwhelming benefit for the applied research in business development and 
implementation which has yet to be substantiated. 
4.1 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TYPES 
Developing new technology innovations are risky; the payoffs are unknown, the upfront 
costs are unknown, and the time to develop is often unknown, but promised are substantial 
economic and social value that could be realized in the future.357 Right now, the development of the 
asteroid redirect mission for scientific exploration (planned to be launched within the decade by 
NASA along with a small fleet of sample return missions) is expected to cost over $100 billion USD 
including research, development, launch, and mission operations358 and the prospective costs of an 
asteroid mining program would be many times larger.359 Policy can help deal with these risks,360 
and a hybrid of basic and applied research (Figure 7: Simplified Linear Model of Technology 
Development) is required for space mineral resource programs. As identified by Mark Sonter in his 
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salient Characteristics of a space mineral mining paradigm, there needs to be feasible concepts for 
the refinement of asteroid resources, as well as feasible concepts for their storage and potential use 
on the surface of the Earth (salient characteristics III and IV).361  
 
Figure 7: Simplified Linear Model of Technology Development362 
4.1.1 Basic Research Needs 
Basic research is focused on creating a new product or mechanism, or exploring the basic 
elements of technology or scientific field to further develop it into something that could be 
industrialized or formed into a business opportunity.363 This kind of research is primarily done by 
governmental groups or individuals curious about a topic.364 Basic research was seen in mineral 
mining during the early stages of its development. Individual miners in the 1500’s through 1800’s 
did large amounts of basic research to develop their field, such as Georgius Agricola writing on and 
collecting the techniques of mining in De re metallica which inspired silver and gold miners in 
North and South America.365  In the American and Australian Gold Rushes, sluicing and hydraulic 
techniques were developed by individuals curious about new ways to exploit the gold in alluvial 
deposits,366 but as the need and costs for new technologies grew, there was a steady movement 
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towards more applied research. 367 In the past 50 years, aerospace basic research was done 
primarily by national civilian space programs and defense programs curious about using space for 
defense and exploration.368 Over time, this technology development paradigm has moved steadily 
towards applied research focusing more on the industrial applications of spaceflight, now making 
space mining a technical possibility. 
For space mineral resource exploitation programs, there are a wide variety of basic 
technologies that need to be developed to support the implementation of these asteroid mineral 
mining programs based on assessments from those in the field (Table 3).  
Field Description Implications 
Robotics Mining operations under remote 
control 
Ability to mine without humans at 
site 
Electronics Lowering cost, improving 
capabilities and increasing storage 
Improved automation and longer, 
more robust mission architectures 
Ballute And Drag Devices Methods to Slow Reentry Or 
Reenter Earth’s Atmosphere 
Delivering larger and larger 
payloads with less thermal 
protection system shielding 
Advanced Materials Composites, meta materials and 
smart materials for spaceflight 
Reducing cost, reducing mass, and 
improving quality 
Power Systems Nuclear, solar and other power 
systems for spaceflight 
Improving power budgets, 
increasing total capacity, more 
power to operate 
Control And Automation Improved software and control 
mechanisms 
Ability to self-repair code or adapt 
naturally 
Simulation Improvements in computer aided 
design and optimization 
Test and simulate more extreme 
environments 
Propulsion Development of innovative launch 
and space propulsion  
Lower launch costs and reduce 
transportation costs 
Table 3: Potential Technologies to Develop to Support Asteroid resource Exploitation369 
4.1.2 Applied Research Needs 
Applied research is the other end of the research spectrum, focused on implementing 
technology developments as a business, focusing on increasing the efficiency of a discovered 
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process, or deploying it as part of a technology product or solution.370 Applied research is 
supported by policy because it provides almost immediate public and private good (compared to 
the longer time scale implications of basic research).371 Currently, exploitation technologies of both 
fructus and mineral stocks has become increasingly more focused on these applied research 
solutions as the basic research has been done about how to mine and fish.372 In the aerospace field, 
the applied research of companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, United Launch Alliance, and 
OrbitalATK over the past two decades have driven down launch costs and have expanded the field 
of potential launch suppliers.373  
4.2 DIMENSIONS OF RESEARCH AGENTS 
Basic and applied research can be done by private or public agents, depending on the 
intended purpose of these developments and the current state of technology.374 The promise of 
public and private benefit forms a substantial basis of an argument for technology to support 
hybridized research programs for space mineral mining activities.375 
4.2.1 Public Research Policy Support  
Technology development to create new products, ideas, or basic technologies is usually 
handled by public organizations.376 With public research programs, there is some kind of benefit in 
the future from the development of new technologies, and these programs tend to be able to absorb 
higher risks upfront because they are sustained by governments and their substantial economic 
base if the exploration of a new idea is not profitable in the long-term.377 Public benefit for 
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technology development for space mineral resource exploitation could stem from a lower cost of 
resources and materials or an increased ability to exploit and access space, but that would not 
happen until well into the mining process.  
Public research policy support can be public procurement buying vehicles and spacecraft, 
prizes and contests to determine who to award research grants to, and protection of IP rights so 
that those who are taking the risk of development could sell their technology to others to reclaim 
the investment.378 Public research programs have been the primary drivers for aerospace systems 
because the development of these systems are generally for the public good in terms of scientific 
development or defense applications.379 Driving this has been the high promises of public and 
private wealth, anywhere from 10% to 40%, for space systems technology in remote sensing and 
telecommunications (which may be higher for systems that can generate mineral wealth).380 
To coordinate efforts, the United State of America (through NASA) and other industrialized 
nations develop a technology roadmap of technologies they are developing that year based off of 
their National Space Policies.381 Under the current revision for the United States of America, civilian 
science programs in the United States of America are charged to increase space access, promote 
industry, and strengthen national leadership in space systems through public research (Table 4). 
Private industry is encouraged to participate, and in some cases, the similarities between 
technology goals encourage partnerships. NASA is currently focused on crewed Mars exploration, 
the development of the Space Launch  System, and an Asteroid Redirect Mission to bring back 
asteroid material to lunar orbit to develop impact mitigation and even in situ resource utilization 
basic technology.382  Some of the relevant technologies areas for this asteroid mission (and eventual 
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space mineral resource exploitation) are listed below while irrelevant topics are grayed out (Table 
4: NASA Technology Areas).  
Field Description Applications 
TA 1: Launch Propulsion Achieving spaceflight Liquid Propulsion Systems, 
Unconventional Propulsion Systems 
TA 2: In Space Propulsion Maintaining spaceflight and moving 
to location 
Chemical, Non-Chemical, Advanced 
Propulsion 
TA 3: Space Power And Energy 
Storage 
Gathering and storing electrical 
energy 
Power Generation, Energy Storage, 
Distribution 
TA 4:  Robotics And Autonomous 
Systems 
Using autonomous systems to 
explore and use the space 
environment 
Sensing, Mobility, System Level 
Autonomy, Autonomous Rendezvous, 
Systems Engineering 
TA 5: Communications, Navigation Designing robust communication 
systems 
Communications, Inertial Guidance 
Systems 
TA 6: Human Life Ensuring crew safety Environmental Controls 
TA 7: Human Exploration 
Destination Systems 
Supporting human habitation and 
exploration by gathering water, 
propellant, and life support materials 
In Situ Resource Utilization 
TA 8: Science Instruments Using sensors to gather data about 
the world 
Remote Sensing, Observatories 
TA 9: Entry, Descent, And Landing 
Systems 
Landing and returning material from 
space to a surface 
Descent And Targeting 
TA 10: Nanotechnology Improving materials science Enhanced structures 
TA 11: Modeling and Simulation Improving model fidelity for better 
analysis 
Computational Fluid Dynamics 
TA 12: Materials, Structures, 
Mechanical Systems And 
Manufacturing 
Designing a structure and 
mechanisms to support space 
exploration 
Materials, Structures, Mechanical 
Systems, Manufacturing 
TA 13: Ground and Launch Developing ground support Launch Complex 39A 
TA 14: Thermal Management Heat rejection for crew safety Radiator systems and thermal sinks 
TA 15: Aeronautics Better aeronautic systems Quiet Supersonic Cruise 
Table 4: NASA Technology Areas383 
4.2.2 Private Research Programs 
Private research typically is used to deal with applied research, such as designing business 
plans to sell a technology, or increasing the efficiency of implementing a technology (if that is 
selling it, using it, or improving it) but it requires basic technology to be developed first.384 This 
support usually takes the form of IP right protection, subsidies for development of better business 
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operations or tax subsidies for the risk of the activity or implementing a new technology.385 The 
private benefits for space mineral resource exploitation stem from Planetary Resources’ objective 
“to be the first to harness potentially trillions of dollars of minerals including platinum group 
metals.”386 If they are successful, they might not need the help of an industrialized and wealthy 
nation to absorb the costs and risks of their technology development. 
In the past, private technology development was readily seen, especially with mineral 
mining innovations. Typically, when mines were shut down to enhance their technology, tax 
exemptions and subsidies were provided by the national governments monitoring their claims, 
happening as early as the Spanish silver mines in the 1500’s. 387 Subsidies are provided to develop 
and implement technologies to reduce environmental impact during PGM and REM mining, as these 
actions have an overwhelming good associated.388 Private research programs have been less 
prevalent with spaceflight because it is such a new field. 
4.3 POLICY MECHANISMS 
Consistently, these research policy mechanisms fall along a line, with more socially beneficial and 
basic research happening by public agents, and as industrial agents become interested in deploying 
these technologies for a profit, their research becomes more privatized and applied. 389  The policies 
to support technology development tend to be the following along a spectrum of options (Figure 
8):390 
 Tax Incentives: Indirectly reducing cost for innovation by reducing the taxes that 
private agents would have to pay while they also invest in development 
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 Subsidies: Providing a grant for the development of a specific technology or process 
improvement 
 Intellectual Property Rights: Developing a technology and supporting initial 
development for a funding reclamation 
 Prizes and Contests: Allowing private or public research groups to compete to develop 
in a challenge for a prize, which could vary from a competitive contract to a cash payout  
 Public Procurement: Contracting the development of a new technology to serve some 
kind of public good 
  
Figure 8: Technology Policy Support Spectrum 
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4.4 HYBRID RESEARCH POLICY FOR SPACE MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES 
When dealing with a problem as large as space mineral resource exploitation, hybrid 
research programs are ideal to promote further development of the field (Figure 9: Technology 
Breakdown for Space Mineral Resource Activities). Technology policy would most likely be prizes 
and contests and IP protection, which has been very successful in other mineral mining activities 
and in spaceflight (Table 5: Technology Development Regimes) because neither totally public 
(procurement) nor private research regimes (tax incentives and subsidies) alone are suitable for 
this current high risk state of development and in some cases are not acceptable at all.  
 
 
Figure 9: Technology Breakdown for Space Mineral Resource Activities 
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Policy 
Regime 
Resource Actor Mechanisms Outcomes 
Mineral Gold/American Basic Research Private Research Development new process 
technologies (sluicing) 
Silver/New World Basic Research Private Research (Tax 
Incentives) 
De Me Metallica book bound 
and disseminated, Mining 
processes improved 
Metals/Modern Applied Research Private Research 
(Subsidies, Tax 
Incentives) 
Decreasing environmental 
costs, Development of new 
process technologies 
Metals/Deep Sea 
(UNCLOS III) 
Applied Research  Hybrid Research 
(Subsidies, IP Rights, 
Prizes And Contests) 
Growth of competing agents, 
four agents begin process 
Metals/Deep Sea 
(UNCLOS IV) 
Applied Research Public Research 
(Procurement, 
Mandatory Tech 
Transfer) 
Failure of industry, 
(withdrawal of participating 
private agents, and other 
nations) 
Space Policy/ 
Space 
Technology 
Commercial Crew 
Development 
Applied Research Hybrid Research 
(Public Procurement, 
Contests, IP Rights, 
Subsidies) 
New launch suppliers and 
decreasing launch costs 
Centennial 
Challenges 
Applied Research Public Research 
(Contests, IP Rights, 
Public Procurement) 
General Success with some 
technologies (Power 
beaming, Glove, vertical 
landing), failure of other 
competitions (mineral 
extraction, unmanned flight) 
Small Satellites Applied Research Hybrid Research 
(Subsidies, Tax 
Incentives) 
Growth of CubeSat field 
through and industry 
Science Vehicle 
Design 
Basic Research Public Research 
(Procurement) 
Space Shuttle, Apollo, Remote 
Sensing (etc.) 
Free Market 
Space 
Competition 
Ansari X PRIZE Applied Research Private Research 
(Contests) 
No growth of the suborbital 
spaceflight market 
Google Lunar X 
PRIZE 
Applied Research Private Research 
(Contests) 
Steady monopolization and 
potential cancellation of the 
contest 
Table 5: Technology Development Regimes  
4.4.1 Public Procurement Might Be Forbidden 
Public procurement to support research primarily focuses on buying or contracting 
companies to develop new technologies to use for the public good391 and normally require a 
customer like the government to pay for expensive satellites and vehicles to form the basis of a 
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civilian space exploration program when no major profits are foreseeable in the near future.392 One 
could argue that the risks of technology development for asteroid mining could be absorbed by 
national governments to start these space mineral mining programs, but in light of the OST 
obligations, this may not be acceptable.393 Ownership of space resources is in direct conflict with 
the prohibition of nations owning space resources without freely sharing the benefit for all 
mankind.394 Public programs might end up buying technology components to assist shared space 
goals to explore more distant places (such as using automation and propulsion technology designed 
for asteroid missions to fly to other locations to collect scientific data), but the procurement-based 
development and operation of a full asteroid mining system architecture (and all of its basic and 
applied research developments) is not acceptable.  
4.4.2 Public Prizes and Contests to Develop Shared Technology Interests 
Prizes and contests are uniquely suited to support the development of the technologies for 
space mineral resource operations. Public prizes and contests usually revolve around promoting 
individuals, research agencies, and private companies to compete in a public research competition 
either for a prize or a potential to fill a procurement contract later.395 Public research contests and 
prizes can provide an economic incentive to develop new technologies that meet certain 
performance requirements, as well as create relationships between technology developers and 
suppliers to support future business plans396 and both public and private groups benefit.397 The 
National Academies Press in 1999 identified these “Open Innovation” competition programs as a 
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beneficial supplement to basic research programs in the public sphere398 as well as sharing the risk 
and benefit between both public and private agents.399  
Technology development competitions are partially responsible for the current steady 
privatization of the aerospace field and its successes.400 Early in the history of space systems, 
competitions formed the basis of a lot of the developments, from spacesuits to lunar landers, as 
they excite people, propose next steps for applied research, and provide simple challenges to be 
met.401 In the field of space systems, these challenges have become increasingly more formalized, 
through the Centennial Challenges to address a wide variety of basic public research goals (Table 6: 
NASA Centennial Challenges).402 Other competitions, such as the Commercial Crew Development 
Program, create new launch providers such as SpaceX, OrbitalATK, and Blue Origin.403  
The private sector has been able to develop their own challenges like the XPRIZE for a 
variety of basic technology developments such as reusable suborbital spaceflight for tourism which 
was won in 2004 and currently the Google Lunar XPRIZE for landing on the Moon.404 These 
competitions are generally unable to provide support for basic research, as they do not have the 
capacity to deal with the high risks usually incurred by public basic research programs.405 
Additionally, they have insufficient support for the next steps of development that public research 
can provide, as seen with the experience of the Ansari X-Prize for suborbital spaceflight and its 
inability to come to market.406  
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Challenge Focus Outcome 
Sample Return Robot Challenge Develop A Robot To Collect A Sample 
And Load It Into A Rocket 
Ongoing 
Mars Ascent Vehicle Prize Insert A Sample Into A Rocket, Launch 
From The Surface And Deploy The 
Container 
Ongoing 
Cube Quest Challenge Design A CubeSat To Fly Onboard The 
Space Launch System Exploration 
Mission For A Lunar Flyby 
Ongoing 
Green Flight Challenge Fly 200 Miles In 2 Hours With A Gallon 
Per Gasoline Per Passenger 
Pipistrel USA Won In 2011 
Strong Tether Challenge Develop High Strength Tether Systems Ongoing/Postponed 2011 
Power Beam Challenge Direct Energy To A Robot Climbing 
Within A Limited Time Frame 
Completed 2009 
Moon Regolith Oxygen 
Challenge 
Extract Oxygen From Lunar Regolith No Winner 2009 
Astronaut Glove Challenge Develop A Better Astronaut Glove 2009 
Vertical Lunar Lander Challenge Vertical Take Off And Vertical Landing 
With A Given Flight Time 
Armadillo Aerospace (Now A 
Part Of A Lunar Landing 
Company) Won In 2009 
Regolith Excavation Challenge Excavate Lunar Regolith Won In 2009 
Night Rover Challenge Long Duration Night Rover Closed In 2013 
Table 6: NASA Centennial Challenges407 
When there are overlapping goals between public and private research, competitions are 
uniquely suited to promote private individuals to find the “best” solutions, whether that be 
performance or cost-based.408 With publicly run competitions, there are clear next steps in terms of 
implementation and often these competitions are successful in involving a wide variety of 
participants and finding a wide variety of possible solutions. 409 Prizes and contests for technology 
development that supports private space mineral exploitation activities as well as public civilian 
science programs could be done for asteroid characterization and sample return missions, 
automation and robotics, re-entry for high mass payloads or even in situ resource utilization that 
would also be in line with the developments required for national space programs (Figure 10: 
Overlap of Technology Goals). These would fall in line with previously publically run programs 
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dealing with space flight technologies, seen below, but could potentially have greater success in 
light of increased demand for these technologies and the potential immediate application of the 
products developed in space mineral business applications. Creating more Centennial Challenges 
could be the key for future technology development for space mineral mining and supporting public 
space programs at the same time.  
 
.  
 
4.4.3 Intellectual Property (IP) as a Resource 
Aerospace technology is a highly valuable resource in and of itself due to the time and 
energy required to develop it as well as the performance standards that must be met for spaceflight. 
Risking time, energy, and money on developing these technologies is dangerous, but allowing 
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Figure 10: Overlap of Technology Goals 
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private agents to maintain their control of this intangible resource could help promote the 
development of the necessary basic and applied technologies for space mineral exploitation 
programs and produce a market for the future trading of these technologies. 
 Intellectual property is the byproduct of the research process, and representative of the 
investment into making that new technology.410 In the modern era, intellectual property has 
become an economic resource of its own, with numerous companies brokering and trading IP rights 
to different pieces of technology that has come out of basic and applied research.411 The 
technologies developed in the pursuit of a spaceflight or mining goal can be reapplied in a variety of 
situations, as they often have high performance characteristics.  
In some cases, after developing a new basic technology, that technology can then be 
licensed or sold to another company for that original research to recuperate the cost.412 When the 
ability to maintain and control IP rights has been threatened in the past, such as with mandatory 
technology transfer with the International Seabed Authority, private agents are less willing to 
participate in the technology development process.413 
4.4.4 Tax Subsidies and Incentives are Not Appropriate Now 
Subsidies and tax incentives are some of the strongest policies to support technology 
development, but usually are provided only if there is an overwhelming social or economic good for 
the technologies developed or implemented.414 It is usually reserved for applied research outcomes 
rather than basic research.415 In light of the basic research needs now and the unknown benefit of 
                                                             
410 (Neal & Smith, 2008) p 14-145 
411 (Neal & Smith, 2008) p 230 
412 (Eckert, 1979) 
413 (Neal & Smith, 2008) p144-145 
414 (Takalo, 2012) 
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unknown business applications and potential market implementations, using tax subsidy or 
incentive policy is not warranted.  
4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAYS 
The basic research innovations for new technology developments to support space mineral 
resource exploitation are well supported by policy mechanisms and by typical policy development 
regimes. These basic research goals share commonalities with national research goals, could be 
well maintained through mechanisms such as prizes, contests, and IP protection and would be 
undertaken by both public and private agents as has been done in the past. Some of the applied 
research innovations, which would benefit the private the most are still incredibly high risk, and 
due a lack of definition in the field, subsidies and further incentives are not appropriate right now, 
but rather policy should be focused on the development of common public science goals.  
As the field matures, there is a strong argument to steadily support less of the basic 
research goals and increase support of the applied research. The hybrid approach is currently 
supported due to the fact that many technologies have already started being developed under 
public and basic research paradigms and the needs of future development lies more in the applied 
and private research domain. 
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5 POLICY ISSUE: SURVEYING 
The detection and characterization of mineral resources before exploitation is a crucial step 
in the business process for any kind of mining operation and policy should be written such that 
identification and tracking of asteroids by private industries is encouraged, but the characterization 
data collected should be protected as intellectual property. Space mineral mining groups should 
supplement the work already being done and improve the quality of sky watch programs for all. At 
the same time, improving the economic advantage to undertaking these programs would be 
beneficial and restore some of the intent of the surveying process, while still retaining and 
recording the potential scientific value of asteroid mineral resources.   
The International Astronomical Union organizes surveys to find Near Earth Asteroids (NEA) 
and in the process, it has developed a considerable international community of observers gathering 
data on the night sky trying to identify potential Earth impactors and add to the body of knowledge 
about our solar system.416 Freely sharing the knowledge of asteroid location and basic 
compositional data of over 750,000 asteroids helped create the asteroid mineral resource mining 
industry seen today, and now these mining agents are looking to increase their data on the 
composition of asteroids as economic resources and could assist in the public good of further NEA 
identification.417 By allowing the characterization data these mineral mining agents collect along 
the way to be kept private like intellectual property (IP, see 4.4.3 Intellectual Property (IP) as a 
Resource), the economic risk and investment into detection is protected by the promise of future 
exclusive knowledge of where economic resource stocks are and what asteroids to license (see 
Chapter 6 Policy Issue: Ownership).  
                                                             
416 (Martin P. , NASA's Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards, 2014) p 5-6 
417 (Sonter M. , 2006) 
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5.1 SURVEYING AS PART OF THE CLAIM PROCESS, AND CHANGES FROM TRADITION 
For nearly any major mining program, there needs to be explicit knowledge of where 
resources are to direct future investments to ensure that private investors and miners make the 
most profit.418 Functionally, the act of surveying and the intent of these historical policies were to 
demonstrate that individuals wishing to mine a region:419 
 Knew of the economic value of the region  
 Could access the region of economic interest 
 Could access the sources of economic interest 
From this information collected and the investment made into this process, the act of surveying 
could substantiate a further claim and start the process of mining, as seen in numerous mineral 
resource surveying scenarios on Earth.420  
As a policy, surveying was designed to ensure that there is some degree of upfront interest 
and potential investment into the land as well as a capability to use it, which would include 
transportation infrastructure, market knowledge, technology capability and the ability to own the 
resource stock while preventing exclusive ownership and still allowing free use until it was 
claimed.421Silver was one of the first formalized instances of this surveying leading to ownership 
and fulfilling the needs listed above,422 as the knowledge collected by early imperial explorers  
would eventually constitute the Crown’s ownership of all lands they discovered (which they would 
later license to individual mines).423  With gold, individual miners used the time they invested in 
                                                             
418 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 28-30 
419 (US Department of the Interior-Bureau of Land Management, 2015) 
420 (McAllister & Alexander, 1997) p 5-8 
421 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 31 
422 (Brading & Cross, 1972) p 548 
423 (Brading & Cross, 1972) p 562-563 
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finding alluvial gold deposits to form the basis of their claims.424 The knowledge of diamond tubes 
was bought and sold among business partners,425  who sometimes found it more economic to 
broker surveying knowledge than mine themselves, such as with John Cecil Rhoades who used his 
knowledge to exploit the Kimberly Mines first and use those first actor funds to take over the mines 
of the people who followed him.426  The 1872 Mining Code included policies to promote the 
surveying of land and then used the claim itself almost like a modern patent disclosure to publically 
release that data at the same time a license was given for someone to temporarily own the land and 
exploit its resources.427  In the modern era in regions outside of their control, such as with the deep 
seabed, nations still did recognize the importance of surveying regions that they could not survey 
themselves. For every license given to deep seabed mineral exploiters, there was a ten year grace 
period for survey before the actual mining claim came into effect. 428  Surveying done by private 
agents leading to ownership or claiming the land was prevalent in the past, but as the nature of 
surveying changed in terms of the requisite technology requirements and upfront investments, the 
policies surrounding surveying changed as well.  
The International Geophysical Year in 1958-1959 fundamentally altered who did surveying 
and made the surveying process more scientifically-oriented.429 Claims in Antarctica were made 
based on the location of resource sites discovered during this year by national explorers, and 
throughout the world other nations developed their internal geological survey programs to 
reassess the natural resources within their countries for scientific, preservation, and potential 
economic use.430  
                                                             
424  (Martin L. , 2004)p 30-32 
425 (Zoellner, 2006) p 106-108 
426 (Zoellner, 2006) p 116-118 
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428 (Groves, 2012) 
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When national space programs started to develop at the same time, there was a great deal 
of interest in better understanding the space environment and local neighborhood.431 Through the 
1960’s to the 1990’s, rudimentary telescope and detector combinations with resolutions as low as 
200 by 200 pixels observed the night sky to gather data about the solar system, asteroids, potential 
threats to the Earth, and some basic compositional data.432 Early policies, such as HR 4489 in 
1994,433  created the first asteroid detection programs to formally search for asteroids and in 1998,  
rates of asteroid detection and basic characterization increased with more funding and technology 
upgrades (Figure 11: NEA Discovery by Survey).434 These programs have identified more than 
750,000 asteroids from the original thousand known about in the 1980’s, and have identified more 
than 15,000 potential NEA’s,435 with ten potentially being very valuable (over $1 billion in platinum 
alone), more than 100 meters in size, and requiring less energy than the Moon landing to visit, 
refine, and return.436  
                                                             
431 (European Space Agency) 
432 (Martin P. , NASA's Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards, 2014) 
433 (Evans, Shell, & Stokes, 2003) 
434 (Martin P. , NASA's Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards, 2014) p 2 
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Figure 11: NEA Discovery by Survey437 
This characterization and location data collected by these national and international 
programs had to be freely shared as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty, as outlined in Article I 
(“There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such 
investigation”), in Article X (“ the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality 
any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the 
flight of space objects launched by those States”) and in Article XI (“States Parties to the Treaty 
conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific 
community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and 
results of such activities.”).438 This language set a strong precedent in the policy for the free sharing 
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of all knowledge acquired by national resources in the pursuit of space exploration, including the 
spectral and location data of potential space resource stocks.439  
Fundamentally, the act of surveying was to demonstrate knowledge, capability to mine, and 
the capability to access and mine, and typically all three had been done simultaneously. Mark 
Sonter in 2000 identified that launch costs and the lack of knowledge were the primary drivers of 
increasing cost with space mineral resource mining440 and substantial prospecting is necessary in 
advance.441 However, the nature of public asteroid discovery (which satisfies Sonter’s Characteristic 
III of a successful asteroid mining paradigm, knowing where the resource is) is lacking for economic 
projects and has changed some of the intent and outcomes of the asteroid surveying process with 
regards to understanding what resources are there (salient characteristic II).442 The public interest 
in finding asteroids that could threaten Earth, and then expanding that capacity to do basic 
characterization of these bodies fragmented the typical surveying process and also fragmented its 
intent. Additionally, the data collected now is inherently decoupled, as in the location (the 
knowledge of its orbit around the sun), characterization (the knowledge of the chemical 
composition of the asteroid derived from either spectroscopy or physical characterization and 
assay), and identification (determining the location, size and movement for the first time of an 
asteroid) can be separated and recombined as necessary. Surveying asteroids is no longer a single 
process, but rather multiple dissimilar processes including remote sensing and eventual physical 
assay (i.e. a probe or spacecraft sent to sample in situ). 
The body of knowledge about asteroid mineral composition at this time is insufficient, adding 
greatly to the already large amount of risk of mining minerals in space.443 To confirm mining sites, 
                                                             
439 (National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010) 
440 (Sonter M. J., 1997) p 29-30 
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Sonter444 and Lewis445 both originally recommended spectral data, but it appears that actual sample 
assay might also help the operations of space mineral miners,446 and is increasingly becoming 
cheaper.447 Current plans typically focus on telescope observations followed by physical assay 
probes to return samples to Earth for further characterization, as the location of resources (Sonter’s 
Characteristic II) is already known. Planetary Resources plans on using an Earth-orbiting telescope, 
and then follow up with more extensive surveying from an interceptor spacecraft and a prospector 
spacecraft that would gather shape, rotation, density and composition data.448 Deep Space 
Industries will start with picosatellite scale platforms (bricked sized satellites) first to flyby several 
asteroids to collect data rapidly and inexpensively, and then send out a secondary mothership with 
more picosatellites on board to go and gather more data of asteroids of interest and essentially 
place a buoy on them for more accurate tracking.449 Ultimately, is the data collected by these 
individuals for their use only, or can it be shared, and can it be supported by policy in any way? 
At the current time, there is a debate about whether or not private characterization data 
collected by private agents would have to be freely shared among the public because of the OST. 450  
If there is, it would reduce the economic reasons for private agents to survey, but would contribute 
to the public good.451 However, the norm currently favors the private ownership of information 
gathered from space by private agents, and space mineral resource miners should be allowed to use 
this surveying data to help secure an asteroid claim and prevent interference.452  Ultimately for 
space mineral mining characterization, it is proposed that private agents participate in the public 
identification programs and receive the benefits derived from contributing to planetary defense, 
                                                             
444 (Sonter M. J., 1997)  
445 (Lewis, Mining the Sky, 1997) p 101-102 
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447 (Planetary Resources, 2016) 
448 (Planetary Resources, 2016) 
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such as telescope time and funding. This encourages participation and potentially increases the 
quality of our knowledge of Near Earth Asteroids while providing private agents the foundation to 
explore asteroids in more depth to find economic deposits.453  
5.2 IDENTIFYING ASTEROIDS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 
In light of the potential to cover the same parts of the sky and potentially detect new 
asteroids that could threaten the public safety or provide to the public scientific benefit, asteroid 
mineral resource exploiters should be included in the sky survey regime (identification of new 
asteroids as well as collecting their location data) alongside other sky watch programs and be 
partially funded as they hunt for asteroids that could provide them with economic benefit. These 
mining agents can increase the detection rate because they will be reviewing the same parts of the 
sky; help develop the field of asteroid detection, and not lose the economic advantage associated 
with identifying resource deposits that could be exploited, encouraging them to participate in the 
identification duty while they characterize ore bodies.  
There is a simple correlation about finding asteroids; the more telescopes watching the sky, 
the greater the detection rate of these bodies, and consequently, more public benefit can be gained 
as finding asteroids is beneficial as evidenced by the purpose and language of HR4489 and the 
intent to identify possible Earth impacting NEA’s.454 Mechanically, the sky survey programs that 
these asteroid miners will perform leading up to physical survey and assay455 will be reviewing 
large sections of the sky trying to detect new asteroids or increase the fidelity of previous location 
assessments.456 In the process, they will most likely be capturing or indexing hundreds of asteroids 
at a single time in a single patch of the sky while other sky survey programs are happening at the 
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same time (Figure 12: Current Sky Coverage of Various Programs Surveying the Sky).457 Associated 
with this is also the potential for funding and support for these activities, which asteroid miners 
could use to help reduce the financial risk of some of their activities,458 and the potential for the 
technology developments associated with private research to decrease costs while increasing the 
performance of the basic research already done by sky watch programs.459 
  
Figure 12: Current Sky Coverage of Various Programs Surveying the Sky460  
The identification, location, and characterization data is inherently separate and not directly 
coupled together, and further characterization only comes out of actually visiting or heavily 
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analyzing via telescope these potential orebodies. The knowledge and identification of a potential 
NEA as well as tracking the location of this body only provides half of the salient characteristics 
necessary for a space mineral mining program and is not economic alone. Consequently, the free 
sharing of this knowledge for public good will, and potential private benefit through public funding 
to perform this activity to identify and release location data of newly found NEA’s is proposed. 
5.3 CHARACTERIZING ASTEROIDS FOR PRIVATE BENEFIT 
As sharing the knowledge of potential ore body asteroids, as nearly all asteroids could be 
considered economic resource deposits, is recommended for the public benefit, the data collected 
from assay missions using a physical probe or enhanced surveying telescopes could be handled as 
private intellectual property (IP). The value of the space mineral mining activity directly derives 
itself from the knowledge of the resources that could be found at a location and the location of 
those resources, referring back to the original salient Characteristics identified by Sonter in his 
analysis (Characteristic II and Characteristic III).461 Above it is argued that there is an 
overwhelming public benefit for the identification of asteroid bodies, including their location 
(characteristic III), and it is the knowledge of the ore body composition that provides the economic 
value.  
Gathering this character and compositional data is a fundamental final step in the process of 
ownership, which has otherwise been disrupted with the rise and analysis of the modern sky 
survey program. The intent of surveying is to not only know of the economic value, but to 
demonstrate access of the region, the resources, and ultimately form a basis of an ownership claim 
through the investment of time into owning that region. 
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In order to return value to the concept of mining in an increasingly remote sensing based 
paradigm, two actions should be mandated as part of the surveying process that eventually leads to 
the claiming and licensing process (explained later): compositional data should be collected via 
remote sensing to identify a small set of bodies of interest, and a physical assay probe (or sample 
return) should be sent to the surface to collect a minimum amount of sample that would reflect the 
mineral composition of the asteroid. The data collected during this operation, as described above, 
could be handled privately, or traded between agents as part of a secondary market.  
With respect to the original intent of the survey to find, access the region and access the 
resource of interest, this proposal does mandate that access of the resource is a critical step in the 
process to later license resources. Characterization via telescopes is still well encouraged to expand 
the knowledge of potential economic ore bodies, but to confirm, that physical assay mission is 
necessary to these business endeavors. The physical assay and the knowledge of the mineral and 
economic resources of an asteroid would fulfill some of Sonter’s original recommendations for a 
successful space mineral mining program.462 
By providing some intellectual property protection, companies are encouraged to collect 
this knowledge by remote sensing and physical assay; even if they themselves might not be asteroid 
miners because the data could be sold and handled to give others large competitive advantages by 
knowing which resource deposits are valuable earlier than others. That intellectual property right 
produces value, which increases economic advantage to doing this kind of privately valuable 
research, which could then be used to help manage the risks of launching a physical assay mission, 
building a better telescope, or launching that mining expedition. 
Completely public surveying operations to characterize asteroids through telescope survey 
or sample return is a socially, but not economically, beneficial outcome. The National Space Policy 
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does call for the United States of America to “…pursue capabilities, in cooperation with other 
departments, agencies, and commercial partners, to detect, track, catalog, and characterize near-
Earth objects to reduce the risk of harm to humans from an unexpected impact on our planet and to 
identify potentially resource-rich planetary objects,”463 but in the context of this document, it is 
primarily to support national and international space exploration programs and not industry. 
Additionally, as discussed in Articles I, II, and III of the OST, national appropriation for private gain, 
unlike national appropriation for public gain like Moon rocks which contribute to the scientific 
good, are expressly forbidden, so to do this observation with the intent of private gain is not 
allowable.464 Finally, by being forced to freely share the information, the reaction is the same as 
yelling the location of the next big gold deposit to a large group of miners. It encourages a massive 
resource rush when policy issues have not yet been addressed, it creates first actor problems if the 
resource in question is res communis in nature, and it does not help prevent exclusivity of 
exploiting a resource.  
Completely surveying data privately also completely disregards the fact that there might be 
potential scientific value in the space environment. Arguably, it could be said that if a resource of 
great scientific interest were found, or a potential NEA that could impact the Earth, no matter how 
large or small, there would be no incentive to keep this data or convey it to national survey 
programs. At the same time, completely private survey programs receive no assistance with 
technology development or funding, and provide no technology development or new data to other 
programs that are functionally doing the same things. It represents a serious duplication of efforts 
in both the observation and physical assay.  
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The fundamental argument that government should do the remote sensing and physical 
assays of asteroids is well grounded in some historical fact, but it seems more along the line of a 
major applied research and private undertaking. There are some technologies that would need to 
be further developed from the basic research already done and the actual deployment and 
operation of this technology would not be for the public good, but rather private benefit.  If this 
activity is done for the private interest, using applied research, and collecting data on 
characteristics of asteroids that have only some scientific benefit, then they are certainly not 
entirely for the public good, and responsibilities have to be shared or handed off to private interests 
(as national activities would have to reveal the knowledge of economic deposit location under the 
OST).   
5.4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAYS 
Ultimately, more knowledge about the character and composition of asteroid resources is 
needed, which could be achieved with telescopes and remote sensing as well as with physical 
assays of these places. The proposed policy argues that public sky watch programs should continue 
and be supplemented in their location and identification duties (with physical scientific assays 
being performed for the scientific and public good) while further analysis and physical assay of 
space mineral resources be treated as intellectual property developed by the private space mineral 
resource agents.  
Nations will continue to identify location and base character of asteroids as a public service 
and are uninterested in more in depth compositional analysis due to the already present strain on 
telescope time and sky coverage needs. Gathering this really in depth and economic in nature data 
is simply not a goal right now, and also potentially conflicts with the Outer Space Treaty to some 
extent. Companies need to develop their own detection and surveying infrastructure to fill this need 
that policy cannot cover. In the process, when developing telescope technology, they can contribute 
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back to the field, and potentially recuperate their costs in the process, by enhancing detector 
process efficiency or sharing identification and location data, which has some economic interest to 
them.  
Eventually, once they have base composition data, these private space miners will be 
sending physical survey probes to collect more data. This is a technology development issue, 
primarily focused on furthering applied research in the field (which makes it more of a private 
issue), and this policy mandated physical assay will strengthen a later license for that region. This is 
a reversion to the typical surveying process and intent, where the survey acts not only 
demonstrated the location of an ore body, but the ability to access the location and resource in 
question. In the process, it encourages more technology development, more risk assumption 
upfront by actually surveying the site before a mining license is provided, economic encouragement 
and investing into the survey process and potentially creates a new market for both scientific and 
industrial researchers to sell their characterization data. 
Mechanically, the protection for space mineral resource miners would not be an incursion or 
request to share this data unless it serves an overwhelming public good to do so. In line with the 
SPACE Act, if biological or scientifically valuable samples were found, they should be shared under 
that policy regime. This would mimic the model currently seen with mineral resource exploitation 
and allow these actors to help the public good in identification, but also protect their investments 
into finding the perfect asteroid to mine. 
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6 POLICY ISSUE: OWNERSHIP 
Ownership of space mineral resources by national agents was forbidden under the Common 
Heritage of Mankind policy regime (also known as CHM, which asks for resources and benefit 
gained from the exploitation of unclaimed lands to be shared equally among all, prohibiting 
national ownership) set in the Outer Space Treaty (OST),465 but never recognized the actions of 
private agents.466 Now, with the growth of private agents, this policy gap is being examined because 
of the SPACE Act in the United States of America, which confers the right for private agents 
(specifically US Citizens) to possess space resources under a res communis policy regime.467  
However, the previous history on mineral ownership and management, as well as the 
utilization of space resources (namely geostationary orbit), indicates that this ownership regime is 
insufficient to promote the development of resources while also protecting exploiting agents from 
harmful interference. With a res communis and the opportunity to potentially exhaust resources 
because the high value of the mineral resources in question, along with no upper limits on 
ownership, this ownership policy regime has failed consistently in protecting others from harmful 
interference in light of the great cost of operating in space. 468 Total ownership of space resources as 
proposed by many would create potential issues with exclusive ownership and the ability to own all 
of the resource of the Common Heritage of Mankind. One cannot assume that the Common Heritage 
of Mankind  in its current form will succeed as a ownership policy regime, as it has been overturned 
                                                             
465 (United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2016) 
466 (Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space, 2012) p 15-16 
467 (Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A move forward or a step back?, 2015) p 
6-7 
468 (Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A move forward or a step back?, 2015) p 
6-7 
A. Hennig  Policy Recommendations for Space Mineral Mining   
2016  Page 122 of 178 
 
in two of the three resource domains it was originally used in once pressure was applied 
(Antarctica and seabed, with space resources being the third unchanged domain).469   
The use of a licensing regime from mineral mining to geostationary orbit means that of all 
the potential policy proposals, this one has been used the most, with the greatest amount of success 
in encouraging use, preventing interference, and preventing exclusivity, all while maximizing public 
and private gain (Table 7).  There has been a long history of this method being used to optimize the 
use of public and private mineral, fructus, and even telecommunications resources. 
Legal Paradigm Definition Benefits Costs 
Common Heritage 
of Mankind 
Resources derived must be 
shared the benefit of all 
mankind 
Prevents militarization and 
national claims 
Provides no economic incentive 
for use 
Res Communis First come, first serve  Free use of all resources without 
reservation 
Tragedy of the Commons 
overuse scenario 
Licensing  Provisional use based on 
squatting, use, public benefit, 
etc. 
Protections from interference 
while temporary exclusivity 
Temporary in nature 
Total Ownership Owning the land, and mineral 
resources contained within for 
the rest of time 
Full use and control of all 
resources, present or future 
High opportunities for 
exclusivity and first actor 
monopolies 
Table 7: Legal and Policy Paradigms for Resource Rushes 
6.1 THE FAILURES OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
Unfortunately, the uses of the CHM as an ownership regime, where resources gained from the 
exploitation of a resource body must be freely shared among all mankind at no cost,470 have 
consistently failed in promoting economic exploitation of resources by disenfranchising 
industrialized nations who are the only ones who can fund and develop these resource stocks.471 
CHM has consistently succeeded in preventing any nation from claiming resources, whether 
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mineral, scientific, or industrial for a period of time,472 but in the process this policy regime has 
changed when any economic or social pressures were applied for the use of these resources.473 
Developed nations look to use materials freely, where developing nations are interested in 
managing the resources of the Commons, and these differing viewpoints inhibit economic 
exploitation and cause instability as seen in the Antarctic and deep seabed.474 Within the OST and a 
slightly modified CHM policy regime that focused on militaristic expansion by nations, very little 
language actually affects private agents, leaving a substantial policy gap regarding the private 
ownership of space resources as well as threatening that the adoption of CHM would remove any 
economic reason to exploit the resources of space.475  
The Common Heritage of Mankind policy regime on ownership is a policy developed in 
response to the imperialism and militarization that was part of the Cold War476 as a byproduct of 
growing social awareness of the disparity between industrialized and non-industrialized 
states477and an interest to preserve the environment from rampant industrialization.478 Previously, 
many regions of the world lay “beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,” and the very existence of 
these regions “created a ‘basic political problem’ that could no longer be avoided” as new 
technologies allowed for expansion and use.479 These technologies are typically developed by 
richer, developed nations,480 creating a regime where the rich became richer, and the poor became 
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poorer.481 This issue was faced early on with the operations in Antarctica and the Deep Seabed, and 
are now being seen today again with Outer Space.  
Functionally, there are five components to the Common Heritage of Mankind which have 
been formalized through the three major applications of this policy:482 
I. Can be no public or private appropriation of the Commons 
II. Representatives from all nations must manage the Commons area 
III. Must actively share in the benefits acquired from exploitation of resources within a 
region 
IV. Can be no weaponry or military installations established 
V. The Commons must be preserved for future generations 
However, as technological competencies grew to allow for the mining of the mineral resources 
locked away in the ice continent of Antarctica, diesel power expanded the reach of fishing trawlers, 
and now space systems may allow for economic mining of space mineral resources, the CHM might 
not be able to resist the economic and social pressures (element III above).  
CHM was first applied in Antarctica as a reaction to the territorial claiming of the land and 
discovery of a wide variety of resources on the previously uninhabited continent during the 
International Geophysical Year (1958-1959).483 Through the 1960’s to the 1990’s, there was 
overwhelming interest in using the continent for scientific research, but also growing interest in 
using the mineral resources and expanding territorial claims for a variety of nations.484Eventually, 
the overwhelming scientific and environmental importance of the Antarctic outweighed the 
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exploitation argument485 and in 1991, the region was reclassified as a nature preserve.486 Leading 
up to this change, private agents were interested in mining the resources of Antarctica and 
exploiting energy and mineral resources,487 but the CHM policy regime was not enforceable in the 
private sphere and did not fully protect the environmental resources of the continent.488 The 
territorial claims nations had made at the beginning could stay, but heavier environmental controls 
further reduced the capacity for exploitation of mineral resources.489 Today, economic activity in 
Antarctica is focused on technology development and ecological tourism, while many scientists still 
live in the region exploring the mineral deposits and scientific resources, such as ice-cores, bacteria, 
and meteorite falls (which were also used to characterize the asteroids that many want to mine).490 
More alarming was the impact of the reversion from CHM to a res communis policy regime 
and then back to the CHM for deep seabed mineral resources.491 These changes severely impacted 
economic development of these resource stocks on the deep seabed and has placed the exploitation 
of these resources into a policy limbo where no one is sure about the future state of ownership.492 
Originally, UNCLOS I in the 1950’s used CHM because there was no economic interest in mining the 
region. In the 1970’s after exploration of the seabed and after new technologies were developed to 
operate there, UNCLOS III changed the use of the deep seabed to res communis,493  which allowed 
states to implement a license structure to use the deep seabed for mineral mining through a policy 
gap on ownership similar to what is seen now with the OST and Space Act.494 This license protected 
surveying for 10 years and then exploitation for 20 years after that. The United States of America 
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issued four licenses to potential miners for a ten year exploration and twenty year exploitation 
within the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), and other nations recognized these claims and made 
their own through a series of independent treaties. 495  By 1994, at the drafting of UNCLOS IV and 
Part XI, the deep seabed was reclassified to the CHM and control was placed in a central 
coordinating authority, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), in charge of all mineral activities 
to coordinate resource use, freely share the resources, and protect the environment.496 Ultimately, 
“These limits are designed to protect developing land-based producer countries against 
overabundant world mineral suppliers which would reduce price and result in lower export 
earnings”497 Under the Part XI policy regime, ISA took control from independent states and licensed 
miners, and was to control all claims, most notably redistributing wealth gained through deep 
seabed mineral mining activities to all nations participating in the ISA (including mineral resources 
and the $500,000 fee for a mining license). 498  In protest, two of the four original American miners 
withdrew their claims before the United States of America considered recognizing Part XI (which it 
never has) because of the threat to redistribute the wealth that they had exploited and technology 
they had developed.499 Functionally, the application of CHM here did prevent exclusivity from 
mining the seabed among agents participating in the International Seabed Authority (save for the 
United States of America which still recognizes two deep seabed miners and has not accepted 
UNCLOS IV Part XI in order to protect their activities)500 but caused much interference to mining 
operations, increasing the already high risk of their activities.501 The potential economic elements of 
mining the deep seabed, from investing in technology development to developing infrastructure, 
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has prevented the complete acceptance of the UNCLOS IV treaties for sharing the deep seabed.502 
The industrial viewpoint is to protect the maximum freedom to exploit while also maintain the 
environment and preventing interference among private agents.503 Functionally, the changes 
demonstrated that the CHM has no capacity to encourage economic development or prevent 
interference, leaving the deep seabed in a very undesirable state.  
Interestingly, the current use of the CHM in controlling the space resource and regions only 
applies to national agents, and not private agents.504 The actions of nations are heavily controlled 
due to the potential of militarization in space, but at the time of the drafting the OST, there was no 
recognition of the private agent participating in space flight.505 With no policy regime in place, space 
was generally considered to be res communis and as the number of vehicles and nations 
participating grew, coordination programs and regimes took over, such as the ITU’s licensing and 
coordination scheme or Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) and National Space Science Data 
Center.506 The passing of the SPACE Act formally recognized this policy gap and provided a way to 
prevent interference without modifying the res communis nature of private space resource 
activities.507 
CHM does succeed in preventing exclusivity, but fails terribly in protecting mineral 
exploiters from interference, who are already dealing with the risks of mining, and simply adding 
more risk in the name of mankind’s development. Ultimately, one could only expect that the Outer 
Space Treaty’s (OST) application of the CHM will be replaced as CHM provides no economic 
incentive to utilize new resource stocks if these resources will be redistributed equally at price (or 
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through the paying of a general fee to participate in the ISA) to all of mankind and the profit will be 
undercut.508 Economic and social pressures have already been applied, and the passing of the 
SPACE Act represents the first of probably many changes.509 The International Institute of Space 
Law and a variety of other space policy and space law groups argue that the SPACE Act and others 
can function in the same regime of OST510 and the CHM and that only national ownership is truly 
forbidden currently.511  
6.2 RES COMMUNIS POLICIES ARE ALSO INSUFFICIENT 
Res communis is a way to make a region of land “immune from appropriation by any state, but 
open to the use of all states on a ‘first come, first serve basis.’”512 Res communis was seen with early 
unmanaged lands, where anyone could use any resource derived from the use of that region. The 
general mentality of a res communis policy regime is to promote the exploitation and use of a 
resource that is commonly shared, difficult ways to divide the resource, or previously unowned.513 
Res communis is used to describe the use of open fields, the open sea before the rise of Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, and the Antarctic before the Antarctic Treaty System. Any person could own 
and come to possess resources as they saw fit, and no further guidance, coordination, or deeds 
could be created to control access to these Commons 
Functionally, res communis ownership policies lack protections to prevent high degrees of 
exclusive ownership, lack methods to prevent the interference between agents doing space 
resources activities, and establish a strong potential for the overuse and interference of the 
exploitation of mineral resources as there are no limits to use, in a typical Tragedy of the Commons 
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fashion.514 Fundamentally, the res communis policies proposed by a variety of space mineral 
resource miners make it highly valuable for them to mine now, but takes away from others in the 
future. 
Res communis policies are placed on any unowned land where all agents are roughly equal 
in stature or exploitation power and there is a common interest in the use of the resource.515 Res 
communis has been seen in a variety of frameworks from early gold mining516 or use of orbital 
space for satellites.517 Prior appropriation typically takes a primary role in determining who can use 
what resource and when,518 and over time, res communis policies adapt and modify to meet the 
needs of the policy, economic, and social environment. 519 Ultimately a resource is open to first 
come and first use basis.520 
Res communis policies are typically overwritten quickly, due to the potential of creating a 
Tragedy of the Commons situation, where first agents acting through prior appropriation can 
exploit and utilize an entire resource stock quicker than it can be replenished or recovered.521 
Today, no resources are truly res communis, as policy and coordination is put into effect to prevent 
over use or exclusivity. The Preemption Act recognized the prior appropriation522 of the unowned 
lands of the West and allowed these individuals to own their squatted land before it was opened up 
through the Homestead Act preventing further interference between land claims.523 Gold miners in 
America valued the concept of a mining claim and license to prevent another miner from taking all 
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of their gold resources524 before they could mine and with the radio spectrum where two radios 
operating on the same channel could interfere with each other,525 coordination policies were made 
to prevent this.526 Satellites colliding with or interfering with each other’s operations is actually 
prohibited by elements of the Outer Space Treaty (Liability Convention) and coordination is done 
by the International Telecommunications Union to ensure that people have orbital slots that are 
theirs that they can invest in.527 
Additionally, res communis policy regimes do not prevent the overuse of resources. For 
example, fructus stocks of reproducing resources have generally been res communis in nature, 528 
such as with the trawling of fish or the use of public lands.529 In these cases, overfishing and 
overutilization of these resources is very dangerous and possible530  so controls were placed on the 
use of these stocks as technology capability to exploit to exhaustion became possible.531  There 
might only be a limited number of asteroids right now that are economically beneficial to exploit, 
and the timescale to cycle through the set of asteroids to a “fresh stock” is measured on the scale of 
years.532 Consequently, overuse is very possible, as well as over exploitation of various resource 
stocks, and one can only expect that an ownership policy will be put into place.  
As an extension of this, res communis policies allow for the possibility of high exclusivity in 
owning the entirety of a resource stock,533  as a resource stock cannot be appropriated by any state 
to coordinate usage, and unilateral exploitation allows a first agent to gain a serious economic 
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advantage over others.534 Despite no actor actively owning an asteroid or its constituent 
components, res communis promotes the free and uninhibited use of asteroid material.535 This 
regime can be initially privately and publically beneficial, such as seen with the exploitation of gold 
in America,536 but unless a regime is put into place (such as the 1872 Mining Code, which limited 
and coordinated usage537) this regime often turns into a heavily entrenched total ownership regime, 
such as with diamond mining.538 
Finally, res communis policies do not provide frameworks to prevent interference between 
actors. Because everything is considered free for use, it is intended that agents interfere with each 
other’s resources by using or exploiting resources first.539 In the field of space systems engineering, 
where there are large timescales for these activities to get to location and return (on the scale of 
decades), there is a high cost of participation and an even higher cost for failure.540 For example, 
one could use a series of energy intensive maneuvers to access a high value asteroid before another 
refinery arrives, wasting the time, energy, and funds of another mining agent, potentially losing 
them upwards of billions of dollars in the launch, coordination, and operations.541 Res Communis 
interference has not happened often in actual history, as most of the time, policies are put in place 
beforehand to prevent these potential outcomes, or private ownership laws take precedent.542 As 
seen in the next section, with diamonds, the first few large mines were able to further conglomerate 
supply543 and demand elements of their market, and create a situation where they own nearly all 
resources as well as their dissemination of diamonds. Later, they would convert this first come, first 
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serve ownership into a Total Ownership policy regime where their entrenched interests protected 
and supported.544   
Currently, private ownership of space resources under the SPACE Act is fundamentally 
based in res communis ownership of resources,545 and this current state is highly undesirable due to 
the lack of interference protections and great opportunity for exclusivity.546 The mineral resources 
of a single asteroid have been promised to bring back enough resources to pay for the development 
and operation of a space mineral mining business.547 However, this requires no limits on ownership 
or exploitation, which are not favored right now as part of current legislation.548 Consistently, res 
communis policies are constantly replaced, and in the few situations where they were not replaced 
after a short period of time, they developed into very exclusive ownership regimes. Res communis 
does not protect exploiters from interference, does not prevent exclusivity and does not ensure the 
maximum public and private benefit. 
6.3 TOTAL OWNERSHIP POLICIES PROPOSE A FRIGHTENING FUTURE 
Total ownership policies, where someone is allowed to own the entirety of a resource stock 
for an indefinite period of time, usually is a byproduct of res communis policies becoming 
formalized and heavily entrenched to favor a few actors, or as an extension of a single ruler over a 
region to ensure an ultimate protection from interference.549 This would include the permanent 
owning of land and the resources contained within, and it ultimately generate a great deal of 
influence and economic pressure to keep it that way.550 The land claim is often more economically 
beneficial to trade rather than exploitation, and development is put off into the far future because 
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there is no impetus to exploit the resources contained now, leading to an unexploited resource.551 
As asteroid mineral resource exploiters would argue, total ownership is necessary because they are 
the tried and true method of mineral resource ownership, but in reality these policies are not seen 
in many situations in the modern mining landscape.552 The potential to own the entirety of asteroid 
mineral resources that might be in multiples of the mass of the planet Earth would most likely 
cause exclusive ownership and monopolization of the space resources for an indefinite period of 
time.553 This would be a highly undesirable state where nearly all of the resource stock available to 
humanity could be controlled by a small exclusive group.  
Total ownership of mineral resources does not happen often, with many preferring licensed 
based structures to control resource rights. There are some provisions, though highly limited in the 
1872 Mining Code554 or with diamond mining in South Africa where first actors and their 
entrenched interests have prevented any limits on their monopolization.555 Today, the Diamond 
Syndicate is the focus of several corporate responsibility studies due to social failures556 (wars, 
systemic oppression, lack of socially valuable infrastructure, paramilitary states) throughout South 
Africa (their primary mining location), the target of criticism for creating demand through artificial 
scarcity of their mineral resources,557 and generally thought to be the worst possible outcome for a 
res communis policy regime.558 
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6.4 COORDINATING ASTEROID USE THROUGH LICENSES 
To manage the use of future space mineral resources, a license structure managed by some 
form of coordinating entity at the international scale is ideal because it promotes industrial and 
economic growth, protects investments from interference, prevents exclusivity, and has a long 
history of success with mineral, fructus (biologically reproducing), and telecommunications 
resources including geostationary orbit, the only precedent for ownership of resources in space. 
The license structure is a method of managing common spaces that was developed over the past 
few hundred years as governments took on more of a land management role.559 The concept behind 
licensing took some of the features from the other three major ownership domains, allowing open 
use, preventing interference, providing a maximum time limit for use, and ultimately encourages 
economic exploitation of the resource in question, while still managing and protecting the 
environment.560 The general concept behind the license structure is that total ownership is granted 
for some period of time with general terms and conditions for use, environmental protection and 
exploitation, with a government acting as a coordinating and oversight body.561 Licenses can also 
ensure that interaction between private agents doesn’t prevent operations, while also providing 
legal protections from governmental interference, ultimately leading to controlled res communis 
that also protects just as a total ownership regime would.562 This license claim and auctioning 
process has been widely accepted, and analysis shows that licensing:563 
 Extends the usage lifetime of the stock being licensed and rent to use 
 Allows for new agents to enter or to disseminate valuable access to resource stocks during 
the lifetime of a resource 
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 Mitigates price and ownership issues by insulating the risk and high costs of long term 
ownership in favor for short term payments for the short term use of the stock 
 Allows for economic and social values to change and affect the public/private use of the 
stock 
Ultimately, licensing specifically for space mineral resource mining operations have a long history 
of being successful, they prevent interference between private agents of the already high risk 
activity and they also prevent exclusivity of the potential near-infinite wealth of asteroid mineral 
resources. 
6.4.1 History of Success 
There has been a long history of using licensing where the usage of a resource stock is 
metered over time among private agents by some national public program, and in recent history is 
becoming more popular and more successful in promoting the exploitation of a resource while also 
preventing interference and exclusivity at the same time.  (Table 8: Ownership Policy Effects and 
History). With mineral resources, mining licenses are a way to provide a legal backing to their 
claims, and with fructus stocks, a way to prevent overuse.   
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Policy 
Regime 
Resource Initial State  Ownership 
Regime 
Intent Outcomes 
Mineral 
Mining 
Silver/New 
World (1500’s-
1700’s) 
Res Communis, highly 
profitable lands 
controlled by a King 
Licensing Optimize use of 
public resources 
(economically) 
Acceptance and 
Growth 
Gold/America 
(1850’s) 
Res Communis, highly 
profitable lands 
Licensing Prevent interference Acceptance and 
Growth 
Gold/Australia 
(1850’s) 
Res Communis, highly 
profitable lands 
Licensing Prevent interference, 
Prevent exclusivity 
Disagreements, 
reversal to pure 
licensing 
1872 Mining 
Code (1880’s-
Today) 
Res Communis, highly 
profitable lands 
Licensing Optimize use of 
public resources 
(economically), 
Prevent exclusivity 
Acceptance and 
Growth 
Deep Seabed 
UNCLOS III 
(1980’s) 
Res Communis, hard 
to access resource 
stocks 
Licensing Prevent interference Acceptance and 
Growth see 
below) 
Deep Seabed 
UNCLOS IV 
(1990’s-Today) 
Licensing paradigm 
reversed to benefit 
mankind 
Common 
Heritage of 
Mankind 
Optimize use of 
public resources 
(economically, 
access)) 
Disagreements, 
unrecognized 
policy states 
Modern 
Diamond Mining 
(1850’s-Today) 
Res Communis, highly 
profitable lands 
Total 
Ownership 
Prevent interference Monopolization 
Antarctic Treaty 
System (1950’s) 
Res Communis, 
scientific resources 
Common 
Heritage of 
Mankind  
Optimize use of 
public resources 
Acceptance 
Fructus 
Stocks 
Fishing UNCLOS 
I (1960’s) 
Res Communis (mare 
liberum) 
Res 
Communis 
Optimize use of 
public resources 
(economically) 
Acceptance and 
Growth (see 
below) 
Fishing UNCLOS 
III (1980’s-
Today) 
Overfishing and 
environmental 
degradation 
Licensing Optimize use of 
public resources 
(environmentally), 
Prevent exclusivity 
Acceptance and 
Growth 
Digital/ 
Comm. 
Resources 
Geostationary 
Orbit (1980’s-
Today) 
Res Communis, hard 
to access resource 
stocks 
Licensing Optimize use of 
public resources, 
Prevent Interference, 
Prevent exclusivity 
Acceptance and 
Growth 
Radio Frequency Res Communis Licensing Prevent interference, 
Prevent exclusivity 
Acceptance and 
Growth 
Space 
Resources 
Outer Space 
Treaty (1967) 
Res Communis, hard 
to access resource 
stocks 
Common 
Heritage of 
Mankind 
Prevent interference 
(environmentally, 
militarily), Prevent 
exclusivity 
Acceptance and 
Growth, but 
changing status 
quo 
Table 8: Ownership Policy Effects and History 
 With early mineral miners, total ownership was heavily favored, but usually was operated 
through a rudimentary license structure where they were expected to meet specific terms and 
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provide certain tariffs on their work to maintain their claim on the land.564 This precedent was then 
carried over to the American Gold Rush,565 where gold miners and panners valued the ability to 
keep their land and prevent interference and quickly designed a license regime system to protect 
their operations.566 Their policy mechanisms, where ownership was based on meeting specific 
terms and not interfering with each other was later put into legal code567 and became standard 
among most western nations, as this method ensured certain protections from other private agents, 
provided a public legal claim, and ultimately maximized both the public and private utilization of 
the resource.568 
 Licensing was also developed heavily in the middle of the 20th Century as a way to solve the 
age old problem of managing the Commons and preventing the Tragedy of the Commons. 569 
Fructus stocks, those that replenish themselves such as fish, became less predominant over the 
course of the 20th Century, leaving only really the fish of the sea and certain land animals still 
hunted for game.570 With rapid technology improvements after World War II, the capability of 
trawlers to gather more fish grew causing conflicts between nations about overexploitation of fish 
resources and incursions into national territory.571 UNCLOS took the original concepts of the 
freedom of the seas (mare liberus, developed by Grotius in the 1400’s572) and codified it, with 
specific protections to use fishing resources.573 Under UNCLOS III, countries developed their own 
fishing policies to prevent mismanagement, with the American regime focusing on licensing with 
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public feedback and public controls on the amount of fish exploited,574 the Canadian regime 
focusing on total internal management of all fishing duties,575 or even a more radical Chinese 
regime that uses Distant Waters Fishing (DWF) to maintain their supply through coordinating 
fishing with allies.576 All of these license regimes have demonstrated that they can prevent 
overfishing, encourage economic exploitation, and protect the use of these resources for both 
current and future use.577  
 Finally, the latter half of the 20th century shows that licensing works incredibly well with 
not only digital resources, but also provides the only instance of a policy on ownership being 
instantiated in space by an international body. Licensing is used to help coordinate the use of the 
Internet Numbers and the machine addresses for every webpage and databases as part of the 
internet,578 as well as ensuring that radio spectrum is not interfered with for public, private, and 
individual use.579 The ITU manages elements of both of these, but also provides the singular 
precedent for ownership of space, with the coordination and licensing of geostationary orbits.580 
The ITU is actually able to own geostationary orbit envelopes and give licenses for use under the 
premise of providing a public benefit,581 and their operations have encouraged use of the space 
while also preventing interference among private agents.582 
 By putting this policy regime into place, it would not be too far from any precedent already 
set here on Earth. In fact, that adds to its strength from a historical perspective and supports the 
adoption of this regime over any other. Adoption would bring the exploitation of space mineral 
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resources in line with both mineral management and geostationary orbit management and 
coordination precedents.  
6.4.2 Preventing Exclusivity 
Through the use of license, the potential for a single or small group of exclusive actors is 
kept low, as public organizations and private agents can lobby and design license mechanisms to 
promote large scale involvement, something commonly accepted to be important with these 
resource utilization policy regimes.583 Unlike Total Ownership and res communis policy regimes, 
there are methods available to policy makers to prevent the total amount of claimed resources as 
well as ensure that there is free access to resources with respect to the original intentions of the 
Outer Space Treaty.584   
Previous ownership license structures were primarily focused on preventing interference, 
but in the process did prevent exclusivity of ownership by imposing ultimate limits in the space for 
resource exploitation, the time to do so, or placing terms and conditions that must be met. For 
example, Spanish silver miners were allowed to maintain their claims as long as they continued to 
mine and or improve their mines,585 while American gold miners maintained their claim as long as 
they were present on the claim nearly every day586 and Australians had to pay heavily for that 
permission (which was not accepted widely).587 The modern mining claim (1872 Mining Act) is 
based on continual ownership and infrastructure improvement (at least $100 per year)588 and even 
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with fructus stocks, coordination of activities prevents overfishing, which could damage the 
environment and revoke one’s ability to fish within that nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone.589  
Licenses for the use of geostationary orbit are on the scale of a few decades based on 
efficient and equitable use principles,590 where after that period, satellites must be moved to a 
graveyard orbit to open up new space (literally) to avoid collision with newer, better satellites that 
can more effectively use that orbital slot.591 Internet assigned numbers and IP addresses are being 
reissued and coordinated to ensure that new internet users and service providers can participate in 
the larger framework,592 and the temporary nature of domain names allow unused domains that 
can no longer sustain themselves to be reissued and recycled.593 Radio spectrum is also being 
reallocated to new users,594 especially when technology improvements allow less spectrum to be 
used for preexisting services(such as the switch from commercial analog to digital television seen 
in the Americas through 2000’s-2010’s)595 allowing for more agents to use the previously claimed 
resources.596  
Preventing exclusivity has always been a very valuable aspect of using space as a resource, 
and it is a commonly held belief that the free use of space is crucial.597 Using a license structure 
allows time limits to be built into policy to prevent ownership indefinitely. Ownership could pass 
from agent to agent ensuring constant use, and at the same time encouraging the exploitation and 
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development of infrastructure immediately, rather than putting it off, which is common in 
situations where the right of ownership is too protective. 598 
Licensing also provides a way to monitor and limit the total number of claims. This would 
prevent a single individual or agent from claiming the entirety of space resources before a single 
mission is sent and virtually preventing anyone from using space mineral resource deposits. Nearly 
all mining claims throughout history have eventually had some ultimate size imposed on them over 
time to prevent uncontrolled expansion, save for diamond mining which continued to grow with 
the economic strength of the Diamond Syndicate.599 Even with digital resources, the early allocation 
process of geostationary orbit was filled with actors filing for “paper satellites,” which never 
occupied the orbit envelope, but their slots could be shared and traded for profit, impeding other’s 
access to the resource.600 Ultimately, fees and safety deposits were imposed to prevent the use of 
paper satellites, and mining claims tend to allow a single organization to only mine one claim at a 
time. 601 If those fees are too restrictive and intended to prevent participation, these policies 
generally are not accepted by the resource exploitation community, as seen by the Eureka Stockade 
rebellions in protest to high mining fees during the Australian Gold Rush.602 Ultimately, in ensuring 
that space mineral resources are constantly in use, and multiple agents to participate, the licensing 
structure if executed properly provides all of the protections necessary. 
6.4.3 Protection from Interference 
Licenses can also provide protection against interference, which can be crippling in light of 
the already risky nature of mining activities on Earth, let alone in space.603 The ability for a miner to 
find a resource and then develop technology and infrastructure to exploit those resources without 
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the threat of interference is very important.604 The license provides incentive for private agents to 
invest into their mining claim early to exploit those resources, prevents others from taking away 
from their investment, and promotes the development of associated infrastructure almost 
immediately to support the exploitation of a resource while the claim is active.605 Applying for and 
possessing a license to mine and operate a region awards that kind of protection to a potential 
miner, and they can operate with confidence within that space.606 
Fundamentally, the concept of a license is temporary ownership given by some larger 
organization in charge of operating and coordinating the use of a region. In typical mining claims, 
these licenses are designed with terms and conditions to ensure continual use of the land, steady 
improvement, infrastructure building, and ultimately economic exploitation.607 It is seen with 
nearly every coordination and ownership policy used for digital/telecommunications resources,608 
Originally developed as part of early mining claims throughout Europe609 which eventually came to 
the Americas,610 the concept of preventing interference between two competing mineral miners is 
simple, and without it, we could see espionage, unallowable usage, and an environment that doesn’t 
support or promote economic encouragement because of the risk of others.611 Gold miners in 
Australia and America valued the mining claim to prevent interference612 and diamond miners kept 
claims separate by thin strips of dirt in between their individual claims, because they wanted to 
guarantee they received the economic benefit of their investment in mining.613UNCLOS uses 
licenses to design and designate Exclusive Economic Zones and ensure free use of the sea for 
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fishers.614 UNLOS III by allowing the deep seabed to be res communis actually ended up allowing 
individual nations to repeat what they did before, and develop their own independent licensing and 
claim system that was successfully managed among ten plus western states.615 
As an extension of this, the safety provided by not having to deal with the risks of 
interference promotes the development of supporting infrastructure and technology 
development.616 This could be for transportation infrastructure development,617 which is sorely 
needed for asteroid mineral resource mining.618 Because there wouldn’t be direct competition, it 
would be easier to develop and deploy large scale refinery platforms without the potential to 
reduce the return on their investments. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAYS 
The res communis policies that currently support private exploitation of space mineral 
resources will undoubtedly not hold, and the extension of the Common Heritage of Mankind to 
private industry has not succeeded before. Left with only a few options, the optimal remaining 
choice would be to use a license regime to maximize public and private value, protect from 
interference, prevent exclusive ownership and promote other fringe beneficial programs such as 
constant usage and infrastructure development.  
To provide and produce the licenses for public use, the methodology of the International 
Telecommunications Union619 and the precedents set by the United States Mining Codes620  which 
grew out of a long history of mining management (including the old European codes on usage of the 
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land guaranteeing a protection from interference) could be combined. To organize claims of 
mineral resources, there is a long process to ensure that claims are made with the intent to perform 
mineral exploitation, which includes:621  
1) Discovery of the deposit: Where someone surveying the land or being led by other 
geological survey data discovers some potential site 
2) Locating the mining claim: Also known as staking the claim, miners drive posts to indicate 
their desired ownership and then review previously made claims and other ownership of 
land in the area. 
3) Recordation of the mining claims: Analysis of the land and recording the mineral deposit 
locations to be released to the public as the mining process starts to add to the geological 
survey data for the region 
4) Recording the maintenance and performance: Mines need to record the infrastructure 
developments to the land and the revenue generated once they start mining to show that 
the land is being used properly and environmental impact is in accordance with local laws. 
The completion of these four activities along with ongoing fees (usually on the scale of $10 to $100 
USD per claim) provides a license to work the land for the resource stock approved for exploitation 
and can be done within a year.622  Individuals and companies are allowed up to 10 claims without 
incurring extra fees and oversight but generally, these claims are active as long as the land 
continues to be worked, infrastructure (more than $100 USD per claim) is done, and the mines 
operate profitably without damaging the local environment.  Mineral patenting, where someone 
might be able to own land and has been heavily restricted since 1994 in light of exclusivity 
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concerns, has become possible only if the land is already owned at this point.623 This system also 
heavily inspired the Deep Seabed Mineral Resource Act, which granted miners under UNCLOS III 
licensed use of the deep seabed for mineral utilization and these claims were also recognized and 
enforced by other participating agents. 624 
 The International Telecommunications Union uses a similar process to manage the use and 
coordination of geostationary orbit. Orbital slots are highly limited due to the needed orbital 
parameters to keep a satellite above the surface of the Earth. It takes a lot longer for these 
processes to go through, usually on the time scale of seven years, but requires coordination, 
notifications, and more to actually pull off.625 The ITU prioritizes the most efficient use of space, 
either for profit, or services provided, as well as equitable access for all states.626 Originally, the ITU 
functioned on a res communis basis, which “restricts and sometimes prevents access of certain 
frequency bands and orbit positions,” created “a relative disadvantage to developing countries,” and 
allowed for “the submitting of paper satellites that restrict access options.”627 Ultimately, the ITU 
created a “due diligence” application solution, where a several fees at the $10,000-$20,000 range as 
well as recordation of the country, private operator, spacecraft design, operation intent, delivery 
window, operational window, and more data detailing the business operations of the proposed 
satellite needed to happen to progress an application to use an orbital slot.628 When a satellite 
reaches its operational lifespan (which happens after it runs out of fuel or is no longer able to work) 
after about 20-25 years, the ITU forces these satellites to move to a graveyard orbit to open up a 
new slot for further use which is then auctioned.629  
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 From these two examples, a new license paradigm could be conceived. As stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, the goal of any ownership policy is to prevent interference for the 
deployment of time and cost intensive mining platforms, prevent exclusion, and promote economic 
exploitation and infrastructure development through their protections provided. Using the basis of 
terrestrial mining codes and the policies of the International Telecommunications Union to manage 
geostationary orbit, the following license terms are recommended: 
1) The recordation of a space mineral deposit, most likely done through a surveying process 
(outlined in Chapter 5 Policy Issue: Surveying) 
a. The data gathered would include spectral data included with physical assay data 
b. Demonstration of access and retrieval 
2) The recordation of the vehicle, company, and mineral or interest at that resource site 
3) A time-based claim to protect from interference during that time for transit, operation, and 
return to Earth on the scale of a few decades (30-40) with the opportunity to renew during 
the coordination process with some terms and conditions to be met 
a. They use the entirety of the claim period to exploit resources 
b. They release any scientific or compositional data of great note to the community 
discovered in the process 
c. They act to preserve the original space environment, either reconstituting the grains 
into a new asteroid or not exploiting biologically derived resources 
d. They develop infrastructure to support more exploitation activities or alternative 
exploitation pathways for themselves 
In the process, the site would be protected for a period of time, and the mineral and scientific 
resources of the asteroid would be catalogued for the public record (section 1). This policy would 
provide protection of the activity for a period of time necessary to get to an asteroid site (section 3), 
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would prevent rapid exclusive ownership by limiting or recognizing the amount of infrastructure 
being deployed to refine the asteroid and not allowing for more or less infrastructure to be 
deployed without licensing (Section 2). 
 Licenses are not totally perfect for this application though. Many would argue that very long 
term protections must be awarded to protect the sizeable investments of operating in space and 
that anything besides temporary ownership is acceptable.630 However, these terms and conditions 
can be extended to allow for the steady development of infrastructure and the deployment of large 
scale systems631 just as they have with the development of deep seabed mineral632 mining programs 
and the use of mineral resources here on Earth.633 Additionally, as argued by several policy 
advisers, the role of licensing inherently prevents companies from making profit rapidly, but in 
light of the high value of platinum, and the potential for these industries to also control the supply 
and demand characteristics of their resources, they will not be as beholden to these kinds of 
pressures as much.634 Finally, the use of licensing does require the development and operation of 
some kind of policy coordinating group.635 The operations of these groups can be highly contested, 
especially when limitations are placed on preventing the free access of previously res communis 
resources.636 In light of this, it makes it even more necessary to put these mechanisms in place now. 
It has been shown that if these policies can naturally grow from a basic starting point, such as with 
the mining of gold in America using Spanish mining policies as a starting point,637 or with the use of 
Internet Assigned Numbers,638 these systems can grow and adapt due to the partial impermanence 
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of the license.639 As long as these changes fundamentally do not affect the general regime type, 
incremental changes can be accepted.640 
In the near future as technology develops, and the ability to own and process new resources 
grows, coordination policy through the use of licensing asteroids for temporary ownership is 
necessary to prevent interference while still maintain enough ownership privileges to allow agents 
to invest in their asteroid claim. Total ownership might be a possibility in the far future, when 
mining larger asteroids that require larger upfront investments and larger timescales that must be 
protected from interference, but the technology, funding, and infrastructure is not yet there to 
support it.  
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7 POLICY ISSUE: INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Infrastructure development is needed at some point to connect space mineral resources to 
where they are needed or ensure that there are markets for these resources when the materials 
arrive, but should not be the focus of policy at this time, despite the arguments of space mineral 
resource agents and their advocates. Currently, this argument makes sense in light of the early state 
of technology development as it is a substantial risk for business operations and previously this 
kind of work has fallen under the realm of infrastructure development policy on Earth. However, 
asking national or international governments to develop this transportation infrastructure 
(compared to laying railroad tracks and telephone lines to support other mining efforts) or 
developing markets for the asteroid derived resources, is not a reasonable expectation at the 
current time and at the current level of risk. Despite the promises of public and private good, there 
are too many uncertainties to substantiate this claim, as well as potential conflicts with the Outer 
Space Treaty (OST), and it requires further development by private individuals to determine the 
best business operations for later support.  
7.1 THE PURPOSE OF SPACE MINING INFRASTRUCTURE 
Infrastructure can be described as major technical or organizational structures that facilitate 
the development of industries and other systems. There are two major needs argued for 
infrastructure development; developing the transportation infrastructure to connect Earth-space 
and space-space markets and creating a market for asteroid-derived resources.641 Both are labeled 
infrastructure, as they are mechanisms and processes that operate concurrently to a mineral 
mining operation not directly developing value, but serve a public good and increase the 
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capabilities of interconnected private systems that use that infrastructure for economic growth. 
Broadly put, Sonter outlined the two major needs of space mineral resource mining architecture; 
Characteristic I, a known market for the resources, and Characteristic V focusing on a resource 
return architecture.642  
As it stands right now, the materials gathered from asteroids, refined to constituent 
minerals and resources, and brought back to Earth will simply float in the sky, staying where they 
were left based on the current technological state. In order to make a profit, they actually need to be 
brought to the place where there is demand for them and that could be on the surface of the Earth 
or at some kind of orbital depot and factory.643 At the same time, there is no available data on the 
demand for asteroid derived space mineral resources on the surface or in orbit. If anything, there 
might be a demand for water, which is flown on every resupply mission (300 kg on the last 
Progress resupply to the International Space Station at $10,000 USD/kilogram leading to a cost of 
$3 million USD every few months644), but there are many unknowns that are plaguing the backend 
of business plans of space mineral resource exploiters regardless of the timescale.645 
Infrastructure systems are a focus of the current National Space Policy, where 
developments in securing space access and transportation are mandated.646 Infrastructure 
development for transportation has been a common piece of proposed policies for asteroid mining 
success, including, but not limited to having private companies only receive ownership after they 
develop a human transportation infrastructure,647 having an asteroid mining bank develop the 
infrastructure,648 or directing a heavily modified NASA to develop the infrastructure for Earth-
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Space interconnects.649 Transportation is needed that is cheap, designed to carry high mass and 
protects the mass of mineral resources all the way back down to the surface, or potentially allows 
for the docking and physical transfer in space. 
To illustrate the current transportation issues, very few vehicles can bring back the most 
precious resource, platinum, at a large scale economically. A SpaceX Dragon cargo variant, one of 
the more inexpensive vehicles to launch and then potentially reuse, can be launched for 
approximately $60 million USD (though reusability might be able to reduce future costs to $20 
million USD) and return 2.5 metric tons of cargo in its 10 cubic meter berth to the surface.650 This 
limitation is based on the mass of the vehicle to decelerate using the atmosphere and the Thermal 
Protection System’s (TPS) ability to deal with the total heating loads and the maximum heating rate 
from deceleration and re-entry. Adding more payload (mineral or resource) mass is not possible 
without altering the amount of the vehicle that is expendable TPS, forcing a redesign of the entire 
vehicle and potential reselection of the booster stage and rocket. If 2.5 metric tons of platinum were 
returned to LEO by a tug ship coming from an asteroid refinery, and docked with the Dragon cargo 
capsule in LEO, 120 liters of platinum (about 1/100th of the usable internal volume of the Dragon) 
could be returned,651 netting  approximately $80 million USD at current rates (approximately 
$32,000 USD/kilogram).652 This would yield only $20 million USD in net profits (assuming the $60 
million USD launch price), disregarding the launches and costs for the vehicle to return the material 
to LEO, the refinery to refine pure platinum out of the surface of the asteroid, the surveying and 
assay costs, and the mission operations to run and organize everything. Now, in all seriousness, the 
Dragon was intended for lightweight cargo and eventually people, but it shows that current vehicles 
are not designed for returning large amounts of highly profitable materials to Earth cheaply. Some 
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sample return missions have been designed and flown, with varying amounts of success, but these 
are all one-off scientific missions and not an economic industry.653 Developing this new 
infrastructure which would require designing new technology, coordinating activities in space, and 
operating landing locations while gathering the required licenses, clearances and more to do so is a 
business in and of itself, or usually headed up by some coordination body. Not knowing how to get 
resources back down to the surface or even connecting it to other space systems is as much as a 
problem as getting off the launch-pad.654 
Compounding the uncertainty in developing the space mineral mining business plan is the 
unknown demand on the surface or in Low Earth Orbit for the materials derived from asteroids. 
Cheap platinum, rare-Earths, and radioactive materials have never been an option on the surface of 
the planet, and there are unknown effects on global commodity markets if suddenly these valuable 
minerals were to become suddenly very cheap.655 Would prices remain high as demand for super-
high tech innovations come into being as the supply of platinum increased, or would prices respond 
in the same way as when the Hall-Heroult process increased the total supply of aluminum and 
caused plummeting prices? Some argue that it would herald the future of materials science, with 
platinum finding a use in jet engines and fuel cells to solve our energy problems,656 but these claims 
are speculative at best and based on projections of current usage regimes.657  
Additionally, there is very little knowledge about the demand for various resources in an in-
space market as well. Consistently, water has been on every cargo flight going to the space station, 
as it is very useful for spaceflight and crewed exploration, but there is no knowledge about whether 
or not it would be more economical to harvest water and bring it right to the International Space 
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Station after it has been filtered and purified.658 The use of and demand for space minerals in situ to 
build and fabricate new vehicles is also unknown, as that technology is slowly coming into being so 
business plans are hard to write,659 with most development now focusing on early technology 
innovations. 
7.2 CALLS FOR GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED 
Transportation architecture is severely lacking at the current point and does not satisfy the 
need of the community to have a reliable way to transport asteroid-derived resources from orbit to 
Earth’s surface or between space-faring entities. However, the issues of infrastructure development 
are more aligned with general applied research goals than with national infrastructure policies, and 
would be more privately and publically beneficial to be implemented by private industry. 
Additionally, infrastructure typically comes after private industries take the first risks, and not 
before. Ultimately, the arguments to develop infrastructure before this system is possible comes off 
more as a way to offset the technology and development costs for a critical part of the business 
plan.  
 National space policy does call for the creation of infrastructure development, but it focuses 
primarily on the development of launch systems, tracking, and communication.660 This is generally 
seen as development in launch pads and radio dishes, whereas the development of commercial 
crew and cargo systems has been handed off nearly entirely to commercial and private 
organizations doing private and applied research through a variety of hybrid research policies. The 
development of the basic systems of spaceflight was under the purview of national programs, when 
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there were high risks, but also high potential good to be had for science, industry, and defense.661 
The type of transportation architecture being asked for in many proposals to support space mineral 
resource exploitation is more along the lines of developing new vehicles to meet specific private 
needs, which should be handled by a hybrid public and private applied research policy in the near 
future. 
 As to the second goal to develop infrastructure to allow space systems to grow, there is 
simply nothing to grow at the moment. It is easy to draw the parallels between roads and railways 
to launch pads and rockets, but fundamentally, the costs, risks, policies, and engineering 
requirements of the two are fundamentally different. History has shown that infrastructure 
development typically comes after the business and industrial interests have demonstrated 
profitability in the public and private sphere. Silver miners used boats and shipping lanes that were 
developed with the profitability of the mines.662 Gold mining happened first followed by 
infrastructure development to support them.663 Telecommunications resources and their 
infrastructure was a response to the growth of the fields and after the demonstration of their 
usability and public and private benefit.664 To develop infrastructure to reduce the risk of a venture 
right now would be tantamount to automatically assuming that a program will be highly beneficial 
to both public and private sectors and it will succeed. However, in all of these cases there was a 
clear and demonstrated public and private benefit to establishing infrastructure, and that 
development came after the mining activity was underway. 
Infrastructure development primarily reacts to a growth of public or private good that 
could be enhanced by the development of infrastructure. Those supporting space mineral resource 
activities argue that their services would provide a great deal of public benefit through cheaper 
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materials and reduction of resource scarcity,665 while they also argue for private benefit under the 
“Trillions Await” motto referring to the mineral riches of asteroids.666 Driving this argument is also 
the assertation that infrastructure development and vehicle design would be cheaper for 
governments to undertake publically, which is in direct conflict with the experiences seen in 
chapter four. There are no grounds to support any of these assumptions yet, and no clear benefit to 
be gained publically (usually a driving factor in infrastructure development) from the exploitation 
of space mineral resources.  
This work on developing a transportation infrastructure is necessary applied research, and 
should be handled by increasingly private interests as asteroid mining comes into being, but at the 
current time, the lack of understanding or valuation of the public and private benefits to develop 
this infrastructure, and with the current high risks of developing another suite of spacecraft to fulfil 
a specific private need, is not appropriate for a government policy to handle. It is an understandable 
response to hand off the risks of technology development to someone else, but the risks involved 
are not appropriate for government to undertake. 
7.3 MARKET CREATION AND SUBSIDIES POSE DANGEROUS OST RISKS 
With platinum and other minerals, there are many unknowns about demand and valuation 
that interfere with business prospects and the creation of governmental based markets for these 
resources is not the way to solve this issue. Most importantly, there might actually be direct 
conflicts with the current policy of the Outer Space Treaty if nations were to get involved in the 
                                                             
665 (Lewis, Mining the Sky, 1997) 
666 (Planetary Resources, July ) 
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brokering and management of space mineral resources exploited by private agents.667 This would 
constitute ownership and appropriation of these resources, which is expressly forbidden.668  
Disregarding issues with the OST and their conflicts with national ownership of space 
resources, financing these projects is very dangerous and creating potential markets for 
development even more so.669 Gold wasn’t mined because it was there; it was mined because it was 
found in large supply, unowned, and profitable. Silver was mandated by Spain looking to strengthen 
its mints and there has always been a demand for fructus stocks like fish and agriculture because 
people need to eat. 670  
The volatility seen within the previous years with platinum prices fluctuating from $70,000 
USD/kilogram to now $30,000 USD/kilogram further erode the confidence in platinum as a good 
commodity for government to invest in (using the SpaceX Dragon platinum return example above, 
the profitability could be anywhere from $15 million USD to $115 million USD using these 
prices).671 Trying to control and manage these spaces mineral resources, if it is allowable under 
OST, might not help the price volatility either. Governmental controls are partially responsible for 
the prices of platinum to fluctuate between $70,000 USD/kg (2014) and $30,000 USD/kg between 
2008 and 2010 as Chinese672  and South African673  mining depots turned on and off in response to 
demand.  
Planetary Resources is specifically targeting asteroids containing $20-$50 billion USD in 
modern terms (with no analysis of the effects of returning these materials into a commodity market 
                                                             
667 (United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2016) 
668 (International Institute of Space Law) 
669 (Adams, 2012) 
670 (Walker, Breaking the Rare-Earth Monopoly, 2010) 
671 (United States Geological Service, 2014) 
672 (Park, Hu, Gao, Campbell, & Gong, 2012) 
673 (Coffee, 2002) 
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supply) at 30 meters in size.674 Bringing back large amounts of platinum in the near future might 
disrupt the supply and demand curves, but potentially internal market policies might be better 
suited for the management of demand and resource supply.675 Essentially, these private agents 
would need to manage and determine how to operate their markets at maximum efficiency for 
greatest profit and not rely on governmental control of markets to make their business stay afloat.  
This course of action is usually withheld for organizations that have demonstrated providing a 
substantial public and private good, such as natural monopolies or defense programs, and asteroid 
mining programs and businesses have not reached that level yet.  
7.4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAYS 
At this point, there are a large variety of risks that space mineral exploiters are advocating 
that national policies deal with by developing transportation and market infrastructure. The costs 
of implementation, coupled with price volatility of these resources make developing markets to 
support asteroid miners difficult as well as potentially create issues with the OST. Additionally, the 
development of Earth-space and space-space interconnects through policy charges disregard the 
fact these are large risks and technological risks that should be shared by private and public 
industries and that transportation comes after profitability demonstration. Ultimately, it is 
recommended that in the near future, after some of the initial expeditions demonstrate space 
mineral resource mining to be an economic success, that policy is drafted to potentially help with 
the cost reductions through infrastructure development to harness that economic and social good 
that comes with asteroid resource mining under an applied technology research regime. However, 
at this point, it is premature to recommend these policies. 
  
                                                             
674 (Endsor, 2014) 
675 (Global Economic Prospects, 2013) 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, as evidenced through this thesis, space mineral resource exploitation has the 
potential to alter how humanity acquires key minerals and other resources, but requires certain 
policy considerations to be made in advance to ensure that is as economically and socially valuable 
as possible. By looking through the annals of history, much can be learned about what policies 
promote exploitation, surveying, and technology development while also encouraging responsible 
and sustainable resource use. There is little past history to draw on that mimics the potential of a 
space mineral resource mining environment exactly, but a lot of parallels can be drawn.  
Looking into these historical examples, there are a few clear policy stances that should be 
made at the current time to potentially sustain the future development of space mineral resources. 
For the development of technology, the current state of technology development should support the 
current basic and use-inspired cases that are required to further develop the field. Fully 
procurement-based strategies, where the basic research is acquired by a sponsor nation could be 
problematic in light of the Outer Space Treaty’s requirements on national appropriation. Methods 
that support the later applied research, such as subsidies and incentives are also heavily 
discouraged, as they assume a benefit to the space mineral resource mining act not yet found. 
Methods that support the early stages of development, such as Intellectual Property (IP) right 
protections and the use of prizes and contests, where the development of common technologies 
between asteroid miners and space explorers could be shared and developed in conjunction are the 
most ideal technology support that can be provided.  
Surveying has been a fundamental element of the traditional mining process and with space 
mineral resource mining; it still needs to be considered, despite the influence of the public 
surveying process weakening this tradition of mining. In light of the public value of detecting 
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asteroids, space mineral mining companies could be included in this system and receive funding for 
their surveying activities and potentially technology development that could better the public 
service of Near Earth Asteroid detection. The work that they do in characterizing the content of 
asteroids, through spectroscopy and physical assay, which is mandated to be part of the ownership 
process, can be kept privately as a form of intellectual property, providing another economic reason 
to do the activity and making it fundamentally part of the international community of asteroid 
identification.  
Ownership policies currently are not satisfactory in preventing harmful interference 
between competing agents, and lead to a potential of total ownership which is not desirable as well 
because of the negative social and economic impacts of exclusivity. For this, a license structure is 
recommended with long term protections to support industrial growth and infrastructure 
development as well as preventing exclusivity through the use of terms, conditions, and temporary 
nature. There is also a long history of licenses being successfully employed in several different 
ownership regimes, including the development of mineral resource on the Earth’s surface, the 
management of fishing stocks, and the management of telecommunications resources such as 
internet protocol addresses and the radio spectrum. Licensing is also the only and most successful 
ownership regime for the coordination of space resources, namely geostationary orbit.  
Finally, the call for government mandated infrastructure development and market creation 
falls totally under the realm of applied research, and consequently, in light of the unknown public 
and private benefits of space mineral mining activities, to provide large scale tax incentives or have 
governments get involved in the use and appropriation of space mineral resources (which is 
partially forbidden by the Outer Space Treaty) is far too risky. These organizations should continue 
to develop technologies and systems. Once the benefits are beginning to be actualized, then they 
can request this kind of assistance.   
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Ultimately, this is an exciting time to be involved with the development of a brand new 
industry, and the potential to change the basic functions and methods of resource utilization here 
on Earth. Being able to “live off the land” in nearly any place is a necessary step in colonization and 
expansion, and space might be the next frontier of migration. There has been a steady movement 
towards this point and the first policies have been written. To continue an economically and 
socially valuable development of the space mineral mining field, policy written now must think of 
the future and learn from the past. 
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